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ABSTRACT 
Can teachers’ rewards improve educational outcomes? 
The role of financial and non-financial rewards  
Martha Mechthilde Kluttig Vega 
Inspired by the theoretical power of rewards in the labor market, to improve educational 
outcomes, this paper tests if giving a non-financial reward along with a financial one can result 
in higher student ex-post outcomes than just a financial incentive. The underlying mechanism by 
which non-financial reward might work is explored as well. The argument is based on Benabou 
and Tirole (2002)’s model, that non-financial reward may affect teachers’ self-esteem and, with 
that, their effort, and thereby the student outcomes after the reward is given. This is 
accomplished by exploiting a discontinuity in the running variable used to assign the Teaching 
Excellence Award (AEP for its initials in Spanish). A Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design is 
used to identify the effect of AEP using data for more than 5,000 math and language teachers. 
The dataset includes the teaching evaluation score that AEP gives every year to their applicants, 
the corresponding standardized test score of more than 100,000 students, (SIMCE for its initials 
in Spanish), school characteristics, and information about motivation and self-perception that 
teachers self-report in a survey administrated by SIMCE along with the standardized test every 
year. The results show that rewarding teachers by giving a non-financial reward along with a 
financial one does not work in the intended way. I find a not statistically significant effect of 
giving a reward to teachers with outstanding teaching skills and pedagogical knowledge on 
student test scores, teaching practices, teacher’s self-confidence in a window of three years after 
the certification process. Lastly, there is no evidence of teacher-student or teacher-school sorting 
as an ex-post effect of obtaining the certification. 
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Can teachers’ rewards improve educational outcomes? 
The role of financial and non-financial rewards 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that teachers are a key component of the 
educational production function. A one standard deviation increase in teacher quality raises math 
achievement by 0.11-0.24 standard deviations per year and Reading achievement by 0.11-0.20 
standard deviations per year (Rockoff, 2004, Rivkin et al., 2005, Aaronson et al., 2007, Kane and 
Staiger, 2008, Araujo et al., 2016). Moreover, teacher quality is a critically important 
determinant of later life outcomes as well (Chetty et al., 2011). Thus, there are many initiatives 
trying to foster teachers’ effectiveness in order to improve education outcomes subject to the 
available resources. 
Despite their importance, the question about how to enhance teachers’ effectiveness has no 
trivial answer. A possible answer is to provide direct incentives tied to an observable outcome—
student performance—in order to allow teachers to choose the best means to improve 
performance given their circumstances. In theory, a simple labor principal-agent model would 
predict higher effort in the presence of incentives. However, there are several reasons why 
incentives might not work. Neal (2011) argues that a bad design, such as setting a too low 
incentive or conditions too complicated to meet, might result on no effects of the incentive 
mechanism. Also, incentives may not work because teachers do not know how to improve 
(Springer, 2009). Others argue that teacher extrinsic incentives can decrease a teacher’s intrinsic 
motivation—the individual’s desire to perform the task for its own sake (Bénabou and Tirole, 
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2003)—which is referred as the crowding-out effect (Kreps, 1997, Deci and Ryan, 1975). 
Finally, incentives may lead to harmful competition between teachers in what some believe to be 
a collaborative environment (Moore Johnson, 1984, Firestone and Pennell, 1993, as cited in 
Fryer, 2013). 
Empirically, there has been an increasing number of papers that study the effects of 
performance related pay for teachers, showing mixed results. The evidence from developing 
countries tends to support the effectiveness of teachers’ incentives (Duflo et al., 2012, Glewwe et 
al., 2010, Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011), but these estimates are difficult to generalize 
to other countries due to large cross-country differences in educational systems (Imberman and 
Lovenheim, 2015). For developed countries, there is little evidence of performance-based pay’s 
effects for teachers on student learning outcomes (Springer et al., 2011, Fryer Jr et al., 2012, 
Fryer, 2013). Moreover, financial teacher incentives have been proven to result in many 
unintended consequences such as cheating (Jacob and Levitt, 2003, Figlio and Winicki, 2005, 
Behrman et al., 2015) and teaching to the test (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, Glewwe et al., 
2010, Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011, Imberman and Lovenheim, 2015). Also, there is 
evidence that teachers narrow their effort toward a subgroup of students (Neal and 
Schanzenbach, 2010) and finally, the effects on student results fade-out (Glewwe et al., 2010, 
Springer et al., 2011).  
A last and less explored answer to our question can be rewarding for teaching excellence. 
Theory derived from behavioral economics (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003) and psychology (Deci et 
al., 2001) supports the potential effectiveness of rewards to foster intrinsic motivation, and 
thereby productivity. In fact, rewards derive their intrinsic motivational power from a variety of 
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mechanisms including bolstering status, providing relative performance feedback, and enhancing 
self-esteem. Despite its potential, little is known about the empirical ex-post effect of rewards in 
the context of teacher-related policies.  
In this context, where most of the literature has focused on the ex-ante effect of financial 
incentives—putting little attention on the ex-post effects of teaching rewards—, I test if giving a 
knowledge- and skills-based reward to outstanding teachers can result in higher ex-post student 
outcomes. Complementarily, I test if giving a non-financial reward along with a financial one 
results in higher effects than a financial reward only. At the same time, I test the underlying 
mechanism by which the rewards might work. To perform this analysis, I use a Chilean public 
program to certify teachers’ quality, which is similar to National Board Certification (NBPTS) 
implemented in the US. I do so by exploiting a discontinuity in the running variable used to 
assign the Teaching Excellence Award (AEP for its initials in Spanish). I use a Sharp Regression 
Discontinuity Design (SRD) to identify the effect of AEP using data for more than 5,000 math 
and language teachers. 
The AEP rewarded teachers who showed outstanding teaching skills and knowledge after 
they voluntarily applied to a standards-based assessment. The program followed the professional 
teaching standards established in the Marco para la Buena Enseñanza (Ministry of Education, 
2004), which was developed by the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) in collaboration with 
teachers’ union and public schools’ administrators (municipalities). The AEP reward had two 
components: a yearly bonus on top of their salaries (8% of salary increase) for a period that 
could range from two to ten years, and a non-financial component (public merit 
acknowledgement, and a pin). Teachers were awarded in a public ceremony hosted by the 
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MINEDUC and received a diploma and a program pin that they could wear in their everyday 
activities. Teachers may have also received public acknowledgement at their schools. 
Since the certification was tied to bonuses (financial component of the reward) and public 
recognition (non-financial component of the reward), the program had the potential to improve 
school performance. The financial component could have also positively affected teacher’s 
decisions on the optimal level of effort. At the same time, the recognition of teacher’s quality 
may have worked as a reward, fostering teacher’s self-confidence and motivation and thereby 
permanently increasing their effort and productivity. 
All these likely effects of the AEP have not been causally addressed. Despite the absence of 
quantitative and causal research, a qualitative study carried out in 2012 raises questions about the 
effectiveness of the program and pointed out the value of the merit acknowledgement component 
of the program, and the importance of the monetary award (Araya, Taut, Santelices, and Manzi, 
2011). In addition, the program seems to have results that might have important and unexpected 
consequences. 
In more general terms, studying whether AEP and its financial and non-financial components 
had the power to increase teachers’ effort, and teachers’ productivity has the potential to make a 
significant contribution to the literature for at least four reasons. First, despite the theoretical 
potential benefits of rewards, there is little empirical evidence on their effects. So far, financial 
incentives as a mechanism to motive teachers have been widely studied showing mixed evidence 
on their effectiveness. Second, there is no previous research comparing financial with non-
financial rewards. Third, the fact that rewards may result in persistent effects makes it interesting 
to study the ex-post effect of a merit reward whose influence might never end. It is a novel topic 
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considering that the literature is focused on the behavioral changes either before the incentive is 
delivered or after the incentive has been removed. In fact, the effects of financial incentives do 
not seem to last after the incentive has been removed. Fourth, testing whether the effect of the 
program fades-out over time adds new evidence to the literature that has found that the effect of 
monetary incentives tends towards zero once the program is over. Notice that the non-financial 
component of the program never ended, despite the fact that was given only once. Ultimately, the 
objective of this research is to identify and test the underlying mechanisms of the program and 
then showing whether programs that acknowledge teacher merit are effective increasing 
educational quality. 
This document is divided into eleven chapters. The first one is this introduction. The second 
chapter explains the characteristics of the AEP. The third chapter is the literature review, while 
the fourth discusses the theoretical framework that links the program design to expected 
outcomes by an underlying theory. The fifth chapter aims to clearly state the research questions 
that are empirically addressed as explained in Chapters 7 and 8 with the data described in 
Chapter 6. Chapter 9 shows how the data is used and variables constructed. Finally, the 
estimation results and their discussion are presented in Chapters 10 and 11 respectively. 





Chapter 2 - Program description 
In Chile, large efforts have been done to improve educational outcomes by fostering teachers’ 
effectiveness through a different set of strategies of recruitment, assignment, compensation, 
evaluation, promotion, and retention. One of these strategies has been the recognition of teacher 
quality. One example of this was the Teaching Excellence Award1 program (AEP for its initials 
in Spanish); that was implemented by the Chilean Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) in 2002. 
This program had a political and strategic purpose in the context of the educational system 
reform and teacher-related policies. As explained by World Bank 2018), before implementing a 
mandatory program for all teachers in 2004, the Chilean administration introduced AEP as a 
voluntary individual assessment and incentive system that set a precedent for teacher evaluation. 
Because these steps allowed time for adjusting and gaining support for the new system, they 
were key to its success. In fact, in 2012 the program went through a great transformation to keep 
progressing with the introduction of incentive/evaluation models. It was modified in order to 
reward a larger number of teachers by providing different certification levels with smaller and 
differentiated bonuses. Later, the AEP has been transformed again to become the base of the new 
teacher career ladder that the MINEDUC designed in 2016. 
The AEP was a national, free, confidential, voluntary, standards-based, and multi-method 
teacher evaluation program that was implemented to reward the excellence of public-funded 
school’s teachers from pre-school to high school. Specifically, the program aimed: 
                                               
1 Asignación de Excelencia Pedagógica. 
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... to strengthen the quality of education and to recognize and highlight the merit of teachers, 
fostering their retention at teaching and helping identify those that show knowledge, skills and 
competencies of excellence. (Law N19715, 2001, Art. 14). 
In 2002 the program was created by law and their characteristics were established. First, the 
application requirements stated that only teachers with at least two years of experience who were 
teaching a minimum of 20 hours in public-funded schools could voluntary apply to the program. 
Second, the application process was confidential. Only the applicants would know the results of 
the process, and only the certified teachers would be publicly announced. 
As mentioned before, the AEP was standards based following the professional teaching 
standards established in the Framework for Good Teaching2 (FGT for its initials in Spanish), 
which defines good teaching performance (Ministry of Education, 2004). The FGT was based on 
Daniel-son’s Framework for Teaching (Danielson, 1996), which is also used for teacher 
evaluation in various school districts across the United States (Heneman III et al., 2006) as well 
as in the Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) Project (Kane and Cantrell, 2010, Kane and 
Staiger, 2012, Cantrell and Kane, 2013). 
The program combined two instruments to evaluate applicants: a structured portfolio, and a 
pedagogical knowledge written test. The instruments covered different aspects of teaching as 
defined by the FGT. The score for each of the two assessment instruments was continuous and 
took values between 1 and 4. The scores of each instrument were weighted (30% for the test and 
70% for the portfolio) to obtain a final score. If this final score was equal to or greater than the 
                                               
2 Marco para la Buena Enseñanza in Spanish. 
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cutoff score, the teacher was classified as certified by AEP. In this case, the teacher can easily 
access her certificate from the program web site (see Appendix A). Regardless of the final results 
of the evaluation process, the evaluated teachers received the same descriptive and extensive 
report detailing their results (see the Results Letter in Appendix B). 
The AEP worked as both evaluation and reward for those teachers who voluntarily applied 
for the program. On one hand the program assessed teaching quality and on the other hand 
rewarded teachers with a financial reward and public recognition—a non-financial reward. The 
economic benefit was a yearly bonus on top of their salary for a period that could range from two 
to ten years, if a) the teacher continued to teach in subsidized schools, and b) kept getting good 
teacher evaluations while the certification was valid. 
The AEP financial reward was likely to be perceived as attractive. The bonus represented an 
8% salary increase, which can be considered significant, especially in a context of low salaries as 
in Chile. According to the 2014 OECD Indicators, teachers’ salaries in Chile were among the 
lowest for all OECD countries (OECD, 2014). Chilean upper secondary teachers earned 77% of 
what other tertiary-educated full-time workers earned, compared with an average salary gap of 
92% across all OECD countries. Moreover, a Chilean upper secondary teacher with 15 years of 
experience earned USD 26,195 a year while the OECD average was USD 42,861. 
The non-financial component included a certification ceremony where the teacher received a 
diploma and a pin (see Appendix C for more details). With great solemnity, the MINEDUC 
organized the ceremony. As an example of the importance put on the ceremony, in 2003, the 
President personally gave the certification to the first cohort of certified teachers. Afterwards the 
Minister of Education handed out the certificates in the ceremony held in the capital, Santiago. In 
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addition, in some cases, local authorities and schools also organized reward ceremonies. 
Importantly, in 2007 and 2008 the non-financial component of the program was not given to 
teachers. Certified teachers during those years did not receive public recognition. No awarding 
ceremonies were held, and no pins were handed out. The reason for this had to do with the 
bureaucratic issues that prevented the government those years from a timely purchase of needed 
pins. Later in 2009, both financial and non-financial rewards were given again. 
The AEP successfully became the nationwide program to reward teaching quality publicly. 
Until 2011, more than 16,000 Chilean teachers who worked in publicly funded schools had 
voluntarily applied to the program and 24% of them were awarded the certification (Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1. AEP applicants. 
Application Year AEP Applicants AEP Certified % 
2002 1,906 313 16% 
2003 935 409 44% 
2004 1,621 522 32% 
2005 1,834 632 34% 
2006 2,215 626 28% 
2007 1,666 341 20% 
2008 1,661 315 19% 
2009 1,815 319 18% 
2010 1,499 258 17% 
2011 1,316 272 21% 
Total 16,468 4,007 24% 
 
Despite its importance, the program effects have not been fully and causally addressed 
Interestingly, Araya et al. (2011) carried out a qualitative study to develop and test the program 
underlying action theory. In the absence of a formal theory of action, based on inputs given by 
key informants, the expected results of the program were set at three levels. First, at the 
educational system level, it was expected that the program would increase teaching salaries 
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according to individual performance, retain good teachers in the classroom, and encourage the 
collaboration with peers. Second, at the school level, certified teachers were expected to 
encourage their peers to be-come certified and to model good practices among their colleagues. 
In the medium term, certified teachers were expected to contribute to installing the concept of 
quality within schools. Third, at the individual level, certificates were expected to increase their 
salary, lead to social recognition and increase their professional self-esteem, while in the long 
term, certification was expected to stimulate teachers’ reflection on their own teaching practices. 
With all this, in the long term, the AEP was expected to contribute to the improvement of 
educational quality. To empirically verify the action theory of the program, Araya et al. (2011) 
carried out interviews and focus groups with principals and teachers who applied to the program. 
It was intended to check if the expected effects were taking place, as well as identify effects—
positive or negative—that were not originally anticipated by those who designed the AEP. 
The qualitative study shows that: 
• Regarding self-perception, certified teachers experienced greater professional self-
esteem. All the teachers interviewed said that obtaining the certification improved their 
professional assessment of themselves and their sense of self-efficacy. They stated that they felt 
more confident in their abilities, feel responsible for doing well, and had a desire to support their 
peers. In addition, they experienced higher levels of conscientiousness and self-commitment, 
desire to improve themselves, greater interest in innovating teaching practices and adapting to 
the learning needs of their students, as a result of obtaining certification. The teachers were 
proud of themselves for having obtained a certification that is recognized in the education system 
as a demanding and arduous process. A certified teacher stated "It is a personal effort, also the 
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desire to want to improve, to change. That’s why for me this has meant a positive change" 
(Araya et al., 2011, p. 311, certified teacher quote). 
• Regarding perceived social recognition, teachers felt more recognized by external and 
distant actors in their communities than by their own schools. From the perception of certified 
teachers, the reaction of the school community was ambivalent: when the results of the 
certification process were known, peers and principals publicly congratulated the successful 
applicants, however, there were also signs of envy and ignorance regarding the achievement 
obtained. Even though teachers pointed out that they felt respected by colleagues belonging to 
their closest network, almost all of them reported feeling isolated or criticized by their peers, 
some of whom cast doubt on the legitimacy of the certification or the real merits of a certified 
teacher. One-third of the principals agreed with this perception. In summary, certified teachers 
reported having received an initial recognition from their local school community, but it was 
superficial, ambiguous and not long-lasting. This finding is similar to that found by the National 
Research Council and others (2008) in the USA. According to this research, teachers certified by 
the NBPTS made considerable efforts to minimize the distinctions between them and their non-
certified colleagues, sometimes even hiding the fact that they have earned the credential. In this 
way, certified teachers avoid transgressing the egalitarian tradition that dominates the teaching 
field in order to avoid isolation in their schools (National Research Council and others, 2008). 
This evidence suggests that teachers might have increased their self-esteem, but in weak fashion. 
• Certified teachers did not systematically report a perception of higher effort and 
improvement. One third of the principals and most of teachers interviewed perceived that the 
certification did not imply improved teacher performance. A certified teacher stated, “it simply 
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confirms a performance that was already good before the certification” (Araya et al., 2011, p. 
312, certified teacher quote). However, one third of principals and some certified teachers 
registered changes in teachers’ level of professionalization to the extent that they used a more 
technical language and had greater reflection on their own pedagogical practice. 
• Certified teachers found that the financial reward was welcome, although the bureaucratic 
obstacles in receiving it detract from the benefits. They described difficulties to obtain it, so that 
it ends up losing its value as a reward. All the certified teachers who participated in the study 
noted permanent arrears in the payment of the bonus, attributing it to the bureaucracy and to the 
disinformation at all levels of the administrative system. 
These findings reveal that the program might not have worked as expected, which casts 
doubts over the program’s effectiveness to enhance teachers’ behavior and performance and 
thereby the quality of the educational system. In fact, Araya et al. (2011) state that important 
questions remain unanswered, especially those regarding the effects of AEP at the educational 
system level, for example assessing the impact of AEP on students’ achievements, taking into 




Chapter 3 – Incentives and rewards for teachers: are they effective? A theoretical 
answer from a literature review 
3.1. Introduction 
We know teachers matter. However, the question about how to enhance teachers’ effectiveness 
has no easy answer. The first answer would be to pay wages to teachers based on their 
observable characteristics, as most school systems do. This idea has been proven to be 
ineffective since teacher characteristics rewarded in this way (such as experience and having a 
master’s degree in education) are poor predictors of better student outcomes (Rockoff, 2004, 
Rivkin et al., 2005). A second answer would be to pay teachers based on their effort. This is 
especially difficult considering the moral hazard problem that makes their effort unobservable 
and unmeasurable for the principal. It would be prohibitively expensive to write complete 
contracts that specify desired actions for each potential classroom setting and then to provide the 
monitoring required to ensure these desired actions are taken (Neal, 2011). A third possible 
answer is to give teachers extra resources to allow them to improve their teaching. Even though 
extra resources might be a possible condition for improvements, it may not be sufficient if 
teachers lack the motivation to increase their effort. If teachers lack motivation to put effort into 
the education production functions (e.g., lesson planning, parental engagement), direct incentives 
to teachers may have a positive impact by motivating teachers to increase their effort, subject to 
the available resources. Thus, in order to allow teachers to choose the best means to improve 
performance given their circumstances, the best possible answer is to provide these direct 
incentives tied to an observable outcome such as student performance. 
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One way to create incentives for teachers is performance-related pay, which can be 
considered an extrinsic incentive because it is a recompense that is tangible or physically given 
to the teacher for accomplishing something positive. This kind of incentive has been increasingly 
implemented, showing mixed results. In fact, the implementation in the U.S. of test-based 
accountability systems such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB), and the Race to the Top education 
initiative, coupled with the poor relative performance of American students on international math 
and science tests, have stimulated interest in performance-related pay policies (Podgursky and 
Springer, 2007). However, while the idea of using incentive pay schemes for teachers as a way 
of improving school performance is increasingly making its way into policy, it might not be as 
promising as expected. 
The most recent empirical evidence with improved identification of the causal impact of 
teacher incentives on the effectiveness of such policies shows that the evidence from developing 
countries tends to support their effectiveness (Duflo et al., 2012, Glewwe et al., 2010, 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011). However, these estimates are difficult to generalize to a 
context of a more developed country. This is due to large cross-country differences in 
educational systems (Imberman and Lovenheim, 2015). Indeed, for developed countries, there is 
little evidence of performance-based pay’s effects for teachers on student learning outcomes 
(Springer et al., 2011, Fryer et al., 2012, Fryer, 2013). In addition, monetary teacher incentives 
have been proven to result in many unintended consequences, such as cheating and teaching to 
the test. 
The mixed evidence on the effectiveness of teacher incentives can be discussed from a 
theoretical perspective. This help rationalize the empirical results that have been found. A labor 
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economics model, such as the theory of piece-rate compensation, would predict higher effort in 
the presence of incentives Lazear (2000). In this model of agency theory, introducing extrinsic 
incentives cannot lower effort levels. Without extrinsic incentives, effort is necessarily at the 
lowest possible level (Kreps, 1997). However, more sophisticated models state something 
different by taking into consideration the fact that jobs are not always based on relatively 
straightforward, observable, and measurable tasks. As shown in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), 
increased rewards for measurable outcomes can lead to either increased or decreased effort on 
other unobserved outcomes, depending on whether different types of effort are complements or 
substitutes in the production of those outcomes. Theoretically, teachers could narrowly direct 
their effort only at increasing scores on the formula used to determine teacher rewards. Others 
argue that teacher incentives can decrease a teacher’s intrinsic motivation (Bénabou and Tirole, 
2003), or lead to harmful competition among teachers in what some believe to be a collaborative 
environment (Moore Johnson, 1984, Firestone and Pennell, 1993, as cited in Fryer, 2013). 
In this context, we have to wonder how the design of teacher incentive programs can be 
improved to assure their effectiveness and to minimize the unintended consequences. One way of 
addressing this question is to study the mechanisms underlying the effect of programs rather than 
by only estimating their treatment effect. This is the path undertaken recently by Barlevy and 
Neal (2012), Fryer et al. (2012), Goodman and Turner (2013) and Imberman and Lovenheim 
(2015). For example, Goodman and Turner (2013) examines a group-based teacher incentive 
scheme implemented in New York City. They investigate whether specific features of the 
program (i.e., the number of teachers’ tests, the different degrees of accountability pressure, the 
teachers’ lack of understanding of the bonus program’s complex goals) contributed to its 
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ineffectiveness. Another way of addressing the question is to think about how the monetary 
incentives can be complemented to increase their efficacy. However, it may be that monetary 
incentives alone are not sufficient to foster enough teacher motivation to obtain significant 
positive results that endure over time.  
Rewards for what teachers know and do, as an alternative to performance-based incentives, 
can also be considered a valid strategy to increase student outcomes after rewarding high-skilled 
teachers. Moreover, they can be a cost-effective tool to foster teachers’ motivation and education 
quality. In this sense, this chapter contributes to existing literature by providing a theoretical and 
empirical discussion on how teacher incentives could or could not result in enhanced motivation 
and higher effort. Complementarily, this chapter discusses how a reward could also be an 
effective alternative policy compared with expensive monetary-incentive policies. 
Importantly, the focus of analysis is the effect of giving a knowledge- and skills-based 
reward to high-performing teachers on ex-post outcomes. This is very different to the most 
common approach that is to estimate the effect of incentives programs focused on ex-ante or 
contingent outcomes, before the incentive is given. In fact, incentives are frequently offered to 
people as an inducement to engage in a behavior in which they might not otherwise engage (Deci 
et al., 2001). The offer or probability of receiving the compensation is what works as an 
incentive for all potential winners, while competence-based rewards work fostering motivation 
on those that have received the reward with probability one.   
The purpose of this chapter is to systematize what can be learned from empirical and 
theoretical literature regarding initiatives to enhance teachers’ performance, which are primarily 
focused on monetary incentives given to affect the teachers’ performance before the incentive is 
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given. The goal is to understand the theory that supports the effectiveness of monetary incentives 
in school settings. The second goal is to review whether the empirical literature agrees with the 
theory. The empirical evidence is analyzed to see if teacher incentives have unintended 
consequences that compromise their potential benefits. Later, theories are presented to explain 
the empirical results. Lastly, in light of what we know about teacher incentives, the evidence 
supporting that rewards potential is discussed.  
3.2. In theory: why should incentives work? 
Why would we need incentives for teachers? The answer is moral hazard. This implies that 
workers’ efforts are not perfectly observable. Thus, the administrator’s problem is to find a 
contract that induces the highest effort. This is a principal-agent problem with asymmetric 
information. Teachers often work in an environment in which most of their actions are hidden 
from their supervisors. The contextual information that determines the efficient choice of actions 
at any point in time is also hidden to their supervisors. In this configuration, it is prohibitively 
expensive to write contracts that specify the desired required actions for each potential classroom 
setting and then to provide the monitoring required to ensure these actions are taken (Neal, 
2011). Faced with these monitoring problems, educational authorities can pursue one of two 
strategies. They can pay teachers flat salaries and try to shape their effort through professional 
development and the processes used to identify and recruit educators, or they can link incentives 
to teacher performance. In the latter context, performance pay systems are designed to encourage 
greater teacher effort. 
The theory underlying teacher incentive programs seem to be straightforward. It is to be 
expected that teachers, as with other occupations, are extrinsically motivated to some extent by 
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income. This is borne out by studies of teachers’ responsiveness to relative salary levels 
(Zymelman and DeStefano, 1989, Eide et al., 2004, Chevalier and Dolton, 2004, Glewwe and 
Kremer, 2006. as cited in Levačić, 2009). If teachers lack the motivation to put additional effort 
into important inputs to the education production function, financial incentives tied to student 
achievement may have a positive impact by motivating them to increase their effort (Fryer et al., 
2012). All this is assuming teachers have the knowledge and skills to effectively improve. 
From a theoretical perspective, the labor supply model can be used to explain how incentives 
can increase effort. The simplest way of doing this is to analyze performance-based pay (a piece-
rate salary) against flat salaries (a time-rate salary) by using the model proposed by Lazear 
(1986) and explained in its simplest case by Borjas (2000).  From this analysis, the simple static 
labor supply model shows important implications given that teachers’ effort cannot be directly 
observed, and it is not possible to closely monitor their activities. Performance-based salaries 
may be able to induce effort and to affect sorting of teachers among schools. Specifically, a 
performance-based system that ties pay to performance may be able to attract the most able 
teachers, elicit higher levels of effort, and increase a school’s productivity.  
3.3. Do incentives work? Evidence on incentives’ effectiveness 
It is a central theme of economics that incentives promote effort and performance, and there is 
much evidence they actually do (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). However, there is a body of 
empirical research that does not support incentives’ effectiveness for teachers. As a result, the 
evidence on financial incentives effectiveness is mixed. In order to provide some clarity to the 
discussion, the evidence can be classified according to three variables: the kind of empirical 
methodology used (experimental/non-experimental), economic development of the country 
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where the program was implemented (developed/developing), and measure used to give the 
incentive (relative/absolute). This helps organize the large body of available evidence as shown 
in Figure 3.3. There, it is possible to observe that there are no unequivocal results. 
First, the evidence can be organized based on the type of methodology used, it gives us an 
idea of the internal validity of the results. The research on the effectiveness of teacher incentives 
has used experimental and non-experimental methodologies, with mixed results, regardless of 
method. For example, Glewwe et al. (2010), Goodman and Turner (2013) and Fryer (2013) all 
study school-based incentive programs using experimental methodology, but they arrive at 
different results. Goodman and Turner (2013) and Fryer (2013) examine a New York City 
school-based teacher incentive pay experiment where close to 200 high-poverty schools were 
randomly selected to participate in an incentive scheme that allowed the schools to choose how 
to allocate incentive payments. Each participating school could earn USD 3,000 per unionized 
teacher (3% - 7% of annual teacher pay), which the school could distribute at its own discretion 
if the school met the annual performance target set by the Department of Education. 
Yet, despite this apparent flexibility, the vast majority of schools chose to distribute the 
rewards evenly. Fryer (2013) finds there were not any effects on student achievement or teacher 
behavior. If anything, there was a negative impact especially in larger schools where free riding 
may have been an issue. Complementarily, Goodman and Turner (2013) find that program had 
only a little effect on student achievement in schools where incentives to free ride were weakest. 
In contrast, Glewwe et al. (2010) show that treatment scores increased by 0.14 standard 
deviations relative to controls in the second year of the experimental implementation of a 
Kenyan school-based program that gave bonuses to schools for either being the top scoring 
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school or for showing the most improvement. Importantly, scores on exams not linked to 
incentives did not increase significantly. 
Table 3.1. Summary of Evidence. 
  
Relative measure to assign 
rewards Absolute measures to assign rewards 
  
Rank-tournament 








Roland G. Fryer et al. 
(2012) (0) Fryer (2013) (0)   
Springer et al. (2011) (0) Goodman et al. (2013) (0)   
Non-Experimental 
Imberman et al. (2015) (+) Neal et al. (2010) (0) Atkinson et al. (2009) (0) 
Ladd (1999) (0) 
 









Glewwe et al. (2010) (+)  Muralidharan et al. (2011) (+) 
 
 
Behrman et al. 
(2015) (0) 
  Duflo et al. 
(2012) (+) 
Non- Experimental Lavy (2002) (+) 
   
Lavy (2009) (+)    
Note: (+) Program had positive and significant effects, (0) Program had no significant effects 
 
While the first category was related to internal validity of the results, the second has more to 
do with the external validity of the results. The evidence can be classified by the development 
level of the country where the program was implemented. This variable is important since the 
results might be linked to the setting and context of program implementation, which affects the 
generalizability or external validity of the results. The evidence for developing countries is 
difficult to generalize in a more developed country context due to large cross-country 
differences. For instance, Glewwe et al. (2010) argues that agency problems between public 
school teachers and education authorities are often much more severe in developing countries. In 
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many developing countries, teachers are often absented from school and even absent from their 
classrooms even when they attend school. They summarize evidence from a number of 
developing countries and made a compelling case that educational settings are very different in 
many dimensions. Therefore, the effect found from an incentive program in a developing country 
might not be easily extrapolated to developed countries. Having said that, we can observe some 
kind of pattern here. As stated by Imberman and Lovenheim (2015) for developed countries, the 
results from several recent randomized controlled trials suggest that linking teacher pay to their 
students’ academic performance does little to raise student achievement (Fryer, 2013, Goodman 
and Turner, 2013, Fryer et al., 2012, Springer et al., 2011). They do not find any significant 
impact of teacher incentives on student performance on average. In contrast, programs in 
developing countries have shown better results, but they have also shown mixed results. For 
instance, Behrman et al. (2015) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) implemented 
experimental performance pay incentive programs in developing countries–Mexico and India, 
respectively. Both studies were first in their purpose: Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) 
conducted the first randomized evaluation of teacher performance pay in a representative sample 
of schools, and Behrman et al. (2015) studied the first randomized control trial that incorporated 
incentive payments to both students and teachers. 
Behrman et al. (2015) evaluates the impact of the ALI program, which is a large-scale social 
experiment that was designed to promote math achievement through performance-based 
monetary incentives. The program randomly assigned 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 
students into three different incentive schemes for students, teachers, and a control group. 
Treatment 1 was for students and Treatment 2 was for math teachers. The annual bonus was 
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between 10% and 15% of the annual teacher salary in a federal high school. Treatment 3 gave 
both individual and group incentives to students, teachers, and school administrators, thus 
rewarding cooperation among all actors in the school. The third treatment included bonuses 
based on the performance of peers and for non-math teachers and administrators. Payments to 
math teachers were based on the performance of the students in their classes and on the 
performance of the students in all other math classes. Payments to non-math teachers and school 
administrators were based on the performance of all the students in the school. This mix of 
treatments allowed the authors to compare student and teacher incentives. They find the largest 
average effects for the school incentive, smaller impacts for student incentives and no impact for 
teacher incentives. In order to rationalize the non-significant effect of the teacher incentive from 
the ALI experiment, Behrman et al. (2015) developed a model of student and teacher effort 
choice. The model suggests that teacher incentives are not enough to make the difference; 
students need incentives as well. It also suggests that under specific assumptions, a teacher bonus 
alone may not be sufficient to induce enough students who, without the bonus, were supplying 
minimum effort, to supply above-minimum effort in response to an increase in teacher effort 
(given complementarity of student and teacher effort). A student bonus alone, given that it 
directly affects student incentives, can induce such a response and will also increase teacher 
effort. Once a student bonus is in place and students are supplying above-minimum effort, an 
additional teacher bonus can further augment both teacher and student effort. 
On the other hand, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) finds positive effects in rural 
India. They evaluated the effects of teacher performance incentives and school input 
interventions by comparing test score outcomes in treatment schools over a subsequent two-year 
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period to outcomes in a group of control schools. They randomly allocated schools to four 
treatment groups and to one control group with 100 schools in each group. One of the treatments 
was a performance incentive paid to teachers on the basis of the average improvement in their 
students’ test scores. Taken as a whole, they find that paying teachers for test score increases in 
math and reading increased test scores without any evidence of any adverse consequences. 
Finally, the studies have been categorized depending on how a program is aimed at allocating 
incentives. The monetary incentives can be allocated based on either relative or absolute teacher 
performance. Among the programs based on absolute standards to identify incentive 
beneficiaries, we find both assessment-based accountability systems and performance-pay 
systems. Assessment-based accountability systems are promoted as vehicles for holding public 
schools accountable for their use of public funds. These systems define students’ achievement 
standards and then measure schools’ performance. This is by using metrics that describe the 
degree of discrepancy between the standards set by the accountability systems and student 
achievement in various schools. Furthermore, these systems include a set of sanctions and 
rewards that school administrators and teachers face if their students fail or do not meet the 
performance targets set by the accountability system (Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010). Finally, 
the primary objective of most accountability systems is performance measurement rather than 
performance incentive, which explains why they typically contain rewards and sanctions that are 
either not spelled out in detail or are less than credible because they cannot be enforced ex post 
(Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010). In contrast, performance-pay systems are more explicitly 
focused on incentive provision and often contain precise mappings between student performance 
and educator compensation and employment status (Neal, 2011). These performance-pay 
 24 
 
systems have shown more positive results. For instance, Dee and Wyckoff (2015) studies the 
IMPACT Program, the teacher-evaluation system introduced in the District of Columbia’s public 
schools. IMPACT implemented uniquely high-powered incentives linked to multiple measures 
of teacher performance (i.e., several structured observational measures as well as test 
performance). The regression discontinuity results indicate that financial incentives further 
improved the outcomes of high-performing teachers. 
In the group of programs that are based on relative performance to identify their 
beneficiaries, we find rank-order tournament incentive pay programs. While test-based 
accountability systems and performance-based systems assign recompenses to those who 
accomplish an absolute goal, the rank-order tournament incentives assign the rewards to the best 
performances in a distribution of outcomes. The reliance on relative performance measures 
means that some teachers will win, and others will lose by design. So relative performance may 
encourage competition among teachers resulting in increased outcomes or detrimental 
collaborative behavior among them (Neal, 2011). 
There have been three studies of programs that involve both competition among educators 
for a fixed set of prizes and the use of value-added models (VAM) to rank schools or teachers. 
Ladd (1999), Lavy (2002) and Lavy (2009), all contain evaluations of experimental relative 
performance pay schemes. All three studies find that these programs generated significant 
increases in measured achievement among students, but all of them also report significant 
heterogeneity in estimated treatment effects for different sub-populations. For instance, in Ladd 
(1999) pass rates on standardized reading and math tests increased significantly, but only for 
white and Hispanic students. Black students do not exhibit significant gains relative to untreated 
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schools. However, despite the fact that Lavy (2002) and Lavy (2009) employed several empirical 
strategies that attempted to pin down the causal impacts of these programs, none of these 
programs involved random assignment of schools or teachers to treatment. 
Experimental evidence shows no effects of a rank-tournament incentive pay program. First, 
we have Springer et al. (2011) who evaluated a 3-year pilot initiative conducted in the 
Metropolitan Nashville School System from the 2006-2007 school year through the 2008-2009 
school year. Middle school math teachers who volunteered to participate were randomly 
assigned to the treatment or the control group. Teachers in the treatment group could earn 
bonuses of USD5,000, USD10,000, or USD15,000 for surpassing the 80%, 90%, and 95% 
threshold, respectively, in the historic distribution of value-added scores. Springer et al. (2011) 
finds there was not any significant treatment effect on student achievement or on measures of 
teachers’ response such as teaching practices. Second, Fryer et al. (2012) conducted an 
experiment in nine schools in Chicago Heights, IL, to study the effect of teacher incentives when 
the timing and framing of the reward payment varied significantly. They find similar results. At 
the beginning of the school year, teachers were randomly selected to participate in a pay-for-
performance program. Performance was incentivized according to the “pay for percentile” 
method developed by Barlevy and Neal (2012), in which teachers were awarded according to 
how highly their students’ test score improvement ranked among peers with similar baseline 
achievement and demographic characteristics. The expected value of the reward (USD4,000) 
was equivalent to approximately 8% of the average teacher salary in Chicago Heights. Consistent 
with much of the literature, they find no significant impacts of this incentive. 
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Having covered the most recent research regarding the effect of financial teacher incentives 
allows us to understand the meaning of mixed results. Regardless of the nature of the incentive 
program, whether it is the setting that conditions its results, or the methodology applied to 
evaluate the program, there is not any systematic evidence supporting the unequivocal 
effectiveness of teacher incentive programs. Moreover, as discussed in the next section, these 
programs have additionally proved to have many other consequences that go beyond their 
primary purpose. 
3.4. Unintended consequences 
Going beyond the average treatment effect of the program, the incentives have shown to have 
unintended consequences. The literature explores many ways that schools may seek to inflate 
their assessment scores without actually increasing all students’ subject mastery (Neal and 
Schanzenbach, 2010). This section covers the most important unintended consequences. This 
discussion has attracted much attention because these unintended consequences might have 
significant impact on the overall functioning of the educational system, making it essential to 
address them in program design to prevent their appearance. 
The first unintended consequence is that the program effect does not reach all the students. 
How do teacher incentives influence the decision of “on whom” to put the effort? Depending on 
how the incentives are set, teachers might decide to concentrate their effort on specific groups of 
students, reducing their interest in helping all their children learn. To study this, Neal and 
Schanzenbach (2010) uses the introduction of two separate accountability systems in Chicago 
Public Schools. There was a district-wide system implemented in 1996, and the introduction of 
NCLB in 2002. They use this to investigate how the rules that accountability systems use to turn 
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student test scores into school performance rankings determine how teachers allocate their 
efforts. Specifically, they analyze how teachers may have incentives to concentrate on subsets of 
students. In their case, it was students near cutoff values that determined whether school-level 
goals were met. They show that as performance measures, the use of proficiency counts provides 
strong incentives for schools to shift more attention to students who are near the proficiency 
standard. However, it provided weak incentives to devote extra attention to students who are 
either already proficient or to those who have little chance of becoming proficient in the near 
term. The authors show that this evidence is consistent with previous research (Gillborn and 
Youdell, 2002, Booher-Jennings, 2005, Reback, 2008, Springer, 2008).  
The second unintended consequence of teacher incentive programs is that the program effects 
do not include the acquisition of broad skills. In this case, teachers decide whether they respond 
to incentives by promoting broad human capital acquisition or by narrowly focusing on skills and 
actions that raise scores on the formulas. The latter is what (Koretz, 2002) refers to as coaching. 
Coaching involves activities that improve scores on a given assessment without improving 
student mastery of a subject (Koretz, 2002). This behavior can be understood from a theoretical 
perspective by using the agency model with multiple tasks developed by Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1991). Based on their model, they warn that when workers perform complex jobs 
involving many tasks, pay-for-performance schemes based on objective measures of output often 
create incentives for workers to shift effort among the various tasks they perform in ways that 
improve their own performance rating but hinder the overall mission of the organization. Applied 
to the educational context, teachers could narrowly direct effort at increasing scores on the 
formula used to determine teacher rewards at the expense of effort aimed at broader, longer term 
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increases in their students’ human capital. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) notes that coaching in 
response to test-based accountability systems is an obvious example of this phenomenon. 
Much of the existing empirical literature on assessment-based accountability focuses on 
whether the test score increases that might follow the introduction of such systems represent 
actual increases in subject mastery. If coaching is the case, we should observe that teachers 
might respond to incentives by devoting more class time to topics listed in the curriculum and 
stressed on related high-stakes assessments. Scores on these assessments may then rise 
substantially while scores on broader assessments of the same subject may show only modest 
improvements. This is exactly what Glewwe et al. (2010) finds while investigating a school-
based teacher incentive experiment in rural Kenya. They find that the program created large 
score gains on government tests, but no improvements on the low stakes exams. These results are 
consistent with the fact that teachers responded to the program by increasing the number of test 
preparation sessions held for students while there is no evidence of improvements in teacher 
attendance or classroom practice. Another piece of evidence is provided by Imberman and 
Lovenheim (2015). They use of a series of non-incentivized exams to test whether the impacts of 
the incentive program occur only on the directly incentivized exams. This analysis indicates that 
teachers may be teaching to the test rather than increasing general knowledge of the students. In 
the case of India, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) provides evidence of coaching 
behaviors surrounding the positive effects of the incentive program. Teachers in treated schools 
assigned more work and conducted classes beyond regular school hours, and part of the extra 
class time was devoted to taking practice tests. 
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The third unintended consequence of the teacher incentive programs is that the program 
diverts teacher efforts from producing higher learning towards wasteful activities. Although 
coaching—the second unintended consequence—is typically not an optimal allocation of teacher 
effort, some forms of coaching may generate some lasting human capital gains for students. If 
coaching activities reflect a reduction of teaching time losses3 on the part of teachers rather than 
reductions in effective teaching time, it is possible that these incentive schemes are improving 
educator performance (Neal, 2011). Nonetheless, the literature has documented other ways that 
some teachers respond to assessment-based incentive schemes that are almost certainly 
unproductive from a social perspective such as cheating. Some researchers have found that high-
stakes testing can lead teachers or administrators to engage in cheating behaviors (Jacob and 
Levitt, 2003, Figlio and Winicki, 2005). Jacob and Levitt (2003) provides evidence that some 
teachers or principals in Chicago actually changed student answers after high stakes assessments 
in the 1990s. They estimated that 4-5% of Chicago elementary school teachers help their pupils 
cheat, and that this cheating increased after the introduction of high-stakes testing. In the context 
of the introduction of teacher incentives in Mexico, Behrman et al. (2015) finds evidence of 
cheating as well. A comparison of the ALI program impact estimates to those of prior studies 
reveals that the treatment effects associated with the ALI treatments in which students received 
incentives are quite large, especially for the treatment in which both students and teachers 
receive incentives. However, close examination of the textbook answer patterns shows that part 
of the reason for higher test scores in the treatment group was a higher rate of cheating (in the 
                                               
3 This means that coaching may imply that teachers reduce those lost periods during the day. For instance, teachers 
may allocate an excessive and unnecessary number of hours on hygiene, bathroom and feeding activities. 
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form of student copying) than in the control group, particularly in higher grades and in later 
years of the program. 
The fourth unintended consequence of the teacher incentive programs is that the program 
effect fades out. The purpose of an incentive program is to enhance behavior and foster the 
accumulation of human capital, which, if real, should endure over time. However, the evidence 
has shown that the effects of incentives tend to fade. Glewwe et al. (2010) conducted a 
randomized trial over a 2-year period that provided incentives to primary school teachers based 
on student performance on district-level exams in seven subjects. Students in treatment schools 
had higher test scores in the second year of the program, but the gains dissipated by one year 
after the program ended. Thus, the test preparation sessions and other activities that generated the 
measured improvements in high-stakes test performance during the program did not generate 
lasting improvements in test-taking skills or knowledge specific to the government exams. They 
interpret these results as being consistent with teachers expending effort toward short-term 
increases in test scores but not toward long-term learning. Complementarily, Springer et al. 
(2011) evaluated a 3-year pilot initiative on teacher incentives conducted in the Metropolitan 
Nashville School System. The program involved 5th through 8th grade math teachers. There was 
some evidence of achievement gains in 5th grade math in years two and three, but these gains did 
not persist over the next school year. Along the same line, Rothstein (2010) and Carrell and West 
(2010) find that teachers’ impacts on test scores fade out very rapidly in subsequent grades. All 
this evidence is consistent with the fact that rewards (extrinsic motivation) might have a limited 
impact on current performance and may reduce the agent’s motivation to undertake similar tasks 
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in the future, as suggested by the Intrinsic Motivation Theory developed by Bénabou and Tirole 
(2003). 
Theoretical and practical solutions have been suggested to address some of these unintended 
consequences. Barlevy and Neal (2012) provides a theoretical work on optimal teacher incentive 
pay. They develop the “pay per percentile” mechanism: ordinal comparisons between each of a 
teacher’s students and the student’s peers. Because this is a relative performance system where 
performance thresholds are endogenously determined through peer comparisons, they argue that 
such a scheme does not promote focusing on a specific group of students, but on enhancing the 
learning of all students. In addition, the pay-per-percentile mechanism allows for free 
employment of assessments without repeated items and common formats. Much research 
demonstrates that, while repeated items and common formats make scale integrity possible in 
theory, these features also invite the coaching behaviors that undermine scale integrity in 
practice. The policy recommendation made by Barlevy and Neal (2012) follows from this 
argument. The assessment used to calculate the "pay per percentile” should be a test with simpler 
psychometric characteristics, making it hard to be anticipated by teachers. This reduces the 
chances of coaching and cheating. For instance, tests with no repeated items can make it very 
hard for a teacher to produce tests that prepare and train the students. 
3.5. Why financial incentives don’t seem to work as expected? 
While simple labor supply models predict that incentives should increase effort, the empirical 
evidence is ambiguous. Why teacher incentives fail to operate in the desired manner? For 
instance, teachers may not know how to increase student achievement, or the production function 
has important complementarities outside their control. Additionally, the incentives are either 
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confusing or too weak, and teacher incentives may not have any impact on achievement. Even 
though there can be many reasons behind the ineffectiveness of financial incentives, those that 
have been studied from an empirical or theoretical perspective are discussed below, by grouping 
the reasons into two types: form and substance. In terms of form, the design of the teacher 
incentive program can determine its potential effectiveness. In terms of substance, a theoretical 
model might highlight how the design of a program matters and explain why incentives are not 
so effective as expected. 
Why financial incentives don’t seem to work as expected?  Answers related to the 
program design 
Many “form” aspects of program design might influence effectiveness. However, only a few of 
the design features have been studied. One important feature regarding the design of a teacher 
incentive program is how the prize is allocated: individual or school based. The theoretical 
prediction of the relative effectiveness of individual versus group teacher incentives is 
ambiguous. As explained by Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), school incentives could 
induce free riding and thus be less effective than individual incentives (Holmstrom, 1982). Free 
riding occurs in group-based incentives because each worker has a temptation to reduce effort 
and consume more leisure in response to the expected benefit received from the effort of others 
in the group (Imberman and Lovenheim, 2015). However, social norms and peer monitoring 
(which may be feasible in small groups of teachers) may enable community enforcement of the 
first-best level of effort. In this case the costs of free riding may be mitigated or eliminated 
(Kandel and Lazear, 1992, Kondor, 1992). Finally, if there are gains for cooperation or 
complementarities in production, then it is possible that group incentives might yield better 
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results than individual incentives (Itoh, 1991, Hamilton et al., 2003). The relative effectiveness 
of group and individual teacher performance pay is therefore an empirical question, which has 
been directly addressed by Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), Fryer et al. (2012), and 
Behrman et al. (2015). They study school and individual incentives simultaneously by using 
experimental methodology, obtaining mixed results. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) 
studies group and individual incentives in the same field experiment over two full academic 
years. The study was conducted by randomly allocating incentive programs across a 
representative sample of 300 government-run schools in rural Andhra Pradesh, India, where 25% 
of teachers were absent on any given day. They find that school-level group incentives and 
teacher-level individual incentives performed equally well in the first year, but the individual 
incentive schools outperformed group incentive schools after two years of the program. In the 
same vein, Fryer et al. (2012) conducted an experimental pay-for-performance program in which 
they randomly assigned teachers to receive either individual or team rewards. Examining the 
individual and team treatment separately, the estimated effects were identical. Conversely, 
Behrman et al. (2015) finds that individual incentives had no effect, but group incentives for 
teachers have an effect on students test scores only when accompanied by student incentives. 
Within group-based incentives, a focus of study has been on whether the effect of the group-
based incentives vary with the strength of the incentive, which has been measured either as the 
group size or as the percentage of students in a group that a teacher instructs. Both measures 
have shown to be important in determining the effectiveness of group-based teacher incentives 
programs. Goodman and Turner (2013) used the variation in the number of math and English 
teachers in each school in a school-level randomized teacher incentive pay experiment in New 
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York City, to examine the effect of group size. They present suggestive evidence that the group-
based structure of the program may have been detrimental in the majority of schools where the 
number of teachers was large. A lack of monitoring, as well as the diffusion of responsibility for 
test-score gains, may have diluted the incentives of the opportunity to earn bonuses. Conversely, 
the program improved math achievement in schools that had fewer teachers responsible for 
tested students or that had a more cohesive group of teachers. Another focus of study has been 
whether the effect of the incentives varies with the percent of students in a group a teacher 
instructs. Under a group incentive scheme, the share of students instructed by a teacher is a 
strong proxy for incentive strength because as the teacher’s share increases, the teacher’s impact 
on the probability of award receipt rises and free-rider incentives decline. Specifically, Imberman 
and Lovenheim (2015) focuses on whether teachers who are responsible for a larger share of 
students in each grade and subject generate more achievement gains after implementation of the 
award system than those who are responsible for teaching fewer students. Taking advantage of 
the variation in the share of students in a subject-grade that a teacher instructs, which proxies for 
incentive strength, they identify how the effect of this share changes when the incentive pay 
program is implemented. This was using a difference-in-differences methodology. They find that 
achievement on incentivized exams improved when incentives were strengthened. 
Reward timing has been also studied. Fryer et al. (2012) conducted the first field experiment 
on teacher incentives that exploited the power of framing it as the presence of loss aversion. The 
experiment gave some teachers individual-based award bonuses and other teachers fixed cash 
payouts prior to the school year that needed to be returned if performance was low. Consistent 
with much of the literature on the effectiveness of teacher financial incentives in developed 
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countries, they do not find any significant impacts from the first group, but they do find 
improvements from the second group, when teachers have to pay back an earlier bonus payment 
for poor performance. The math test scores increased between 0.2 and 0.4 standard deviations. 
This is equivalent to increasing teacher quality by more than one standard deviation. Thus, the 
authors suggest that loss aversion is a more powerful incentive than standard pay for 
performance. 
Many important features of the incentive programs are still not studied. First is the size of the 
reward. As explained by Glewwe et al. (2010), larger incentives could lead to more efforts 
focused on broad acquisition of human capital, but, of course, larger incentives could also induce 
wasteful or even harmful signaling effort such as cheating on tests or forcing weak students to 
drop out. Additionally, individual-level teacher incentives might undermine cooperation within 
schools. The second unstudied feature is how the standards are set. Political forces often create 
pressure for “high standards” in education, but these pressures can be counterproductive. 
Although it is clearly wasteful to set standards too low, standards well beyond what is possible 
may not induce any additional effort from teachers (Neal, 2011). A good example of this issue 
would be the POINT program that allowed math teachers in the 5th through 8th grades in 
Nashville, TN, to volunteer for a performance pay program. This program was studied by 
Springer et al. (2011). They find there was no significant treatment effect on student achievement 
or on measures of teachers’ response, such as teaching practices. According to Neal (2011), this 
finding might be explained by the fact that POINT may have set targets so high that teachers 
responded optimally by doing roughly what they had done before. Around half of the teachers in 
the experiment faced less than a 20% chance of winning a bonus based on their past 
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performance. The third unstudied factor is relative or absolute standards. As discussed above, the 
distinction between the relative and absolute distribution of the rewards can be critical for the 
design of the teacher incentive programs. It is simply not clear whether rank-order tournament 
incentive pay programs, assessment-based accountability systems, or performance pay systems 
are the most effective. In fact, there is no empirical research comparing the effectiveness of 
relative versus absolute teacher incentives systems. 
The evidence provided so far makes clear how sensitive the effectiveness of the programs is 
to the conditions of its application and its features. The conjunction of school characteristics, the 
education production function, and the incentive design determine the potential effectiveness of 
such programs. Importantly, more research is needed to get a deeper understanding of whether 
specific program features contributed to its ineffectiveness. Despite the lack of research, theories 
have been developed to explain why incentive programs do not always bring the expected 
results. 
Why financial incentives don’t seem to work as expected? Answers related to the 
theory of change behind the incentive programs 
So far, the “form” reasons behind the inconsistent effectiveness of financial incentives have been 
discussed. Now, the reasons that have been studied from a theoretical perspective to address that 
inconsistency are discussed below. Financial incentives can work as extrinsic sources of 
motivation, which may imply that the worker is willing to make a larger effort to reach the award 
linked to the incentive plan. However, teachers also have intrinsic sources of motivation (the 
individual’s desire to perform the task for its own sake), which may be substituted by the 
extrinsic sources of motivation brought by the financial incentive. This substitution can be 
 37 
 
crucial since teacher performance is strongly predicted by the level of intrinsic motivation. The 
relationship between the extrinsic incentive and intrinsic motivation of the teacher can help 
explain why financial incentives do not always positively affect performance in the long term. 
By using a meta-analysis focusing on the inter-relationship among intrinsic motivation, 
extrinsic incentives, and performance, Cerasoli et al. (2014) shows that intrinsic motivation is 
positively related to performance. Intrinsic motivation is a medium-to-strong predictor of 
performance. They also show that the relation between intrinsic motivation and performance is 
stronger for quality-type tasks than for quantity-type tasks. Tasks emphasizing performance 
quality, such as teaching, will have a strong link to intrinsic motivation. The reason is that 
quality-type tasks tend to require a higher degree of complexity and engagement of more skills, 
which commands greater personal investment.  
Having stated the great importance of intrinsic motivation for teaching performance, Kreps 
(1997), gives a more intuitive idea about how incentives may harm teachers’ intrinsic motivation 
to teach, which is consistent with the null effects found in empirical research. He explains that 
imposing extrinsic incentives changes the individual’s utility for the work. If an employee 
undertakes some effort without the spur of some extrinsic incentive, he will rationalize his effort 
as reflecting his enjoyment of the task. Since he enjoys it, he works harder at it. But if extrinsic 
incentives are put in place, he will attribute his efforts to those incentives, developing a distaste 
for the required effort. In this case, the extrinsic incentive is “crowding-out” the intrinsic 
motivation.More recently, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) inspired by psychology literature, 
formalizes Krep’s intuition and developed a theoretical model on why incentives may not work, 
and if they do, why the effect fades out in the long run. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) examines a 
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motivational crowding out phenomena in a theoretical principal-agent model. Discussed here is 
one of their interpretations, where the agent is a teacher and the principal is a school authority. 
The teacher has imperfect knowledge about his own ability. His own self-confidence is defined 
as the belief the teacher has about the probability of succeeding in a task where effort and ability 
are complements. Meanwhile, the principal has knowledge about the ability of the teacher to 
succeed in the task and wants the teacher to pursue the task. However, the teacher will pursue the 
task and resist distractions (such as planning a class rather than having more leisure hours) only 
if he has high enough self-confidence that he will succeed in the task. Of course, in the short run, 
the principal can motivate the teacher to do so by giving an incentive for success. The incentive 
influences the teacher’s motivation through two channels. First, the incentive increases the direct 
payoff the teacher has from succeeding in the task. Second, the incentive affects the self-
confidence of the teacher via an inference process, where he takes the incentive as a signal of the 
principal’s knowledge of his ability. Here, a large incentive is bad news for the teacher, because 
he understands that the principal would offer a lower incentive if he were more able. That is, a 
higher incentive reduces the teacher’s self-confidence and thereby his intrinsic motivation, 
which, in turn, lowers his effort once the incentive is no longer given.  
A substantial body of experimental and field evidence, but not within the teacher labor 
market, indicates that extrinsic motivation can conflict with intrinsic motivation. On one side, we 
have Deci and Ryan (1975)’s experiment where college students were either paid or not paid to 
work for a certain time on an interesting puzzle. Those in the no-pay condition played with the 
puzzle significantly more in a later unrewarded “free time” period than paid subjects, and they 
also reported a greater interest in the task. More recently, Visaria et al. (2016) finds that 
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incentives might have significant effects on student motivation. In an experiment in non-formal 
schools in Indian slums, a reward scheme for attending a target number of school days increased 
average attendance when the scheme was in place, but it had heterogeneous effects after it was 
removed. Among students with high baseline attendance, the incentive had no effect on 
attendance after it was discontinued, and test scores were unaffected. Among students with low 
baseline attendance, the incentive lowered post-incentive attendance, and test scores decreased. 
For these students, the incentive was also associated with lower interest in school material, and 
lower optimism and confidence about their ability. Nonetheless, more recent empirical studies 
have found evidence that financial incentives do not always result in decreasing intrinsic 
motivation. Bettinger (2011) studies the experimental implementation of a pay-for-performance 
program for primary school children in Coshocton, Ohio. Even though the primary focus of the 
paper was on measuring the effects of Coshocton’s program on student achievement, one of its 
aims was to reconcile some of the recent findings in economics with the established literature on 
psychology on the impacts of external incentives. The author finds that students’ intrinsic 
motivation was not significantly lower as a result of participating in the program. Cerasoli et al. 
(2014) also shows that the intrinsic motivation was less important to performance when the 
incentive was directly tied to performance, including some evidence of the “crowding out” effect 
of the extrinsic incentives. When incentivized, the relationship between intrinsic motivation and 
performance is negatively moderated (weakened) by the presence of directly performance-salient 
incentives. 
As previously stated, there are many possible reasons that can result in ineffective teacher 
incentives. From the empirical evidence, we can see that conditional on the school setting, the 
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program’s design and features can make the difference. Furthermore, from the theoretical 
perspective, we can learn that extrinsic incentives might be ineffective due to the crowding out of 
self-confidence and intrinsic motivation, which are highly related to teaching performance in the 
long run. Also, we can learn that extrinsic incentives might have negative consequences due to 
the multitasking nature of teaching. In consequence, and taking theoretical and empirical 
evidence into consideration, one could suggest studying reward programs with specific features 
that at least theoretically limit the chances of ineffectiveness. Thus, in the following section is a 
model that suggests reward that might be effective in increasing teachers’ effort and therefore 
learning. Also provided is empirical evidence to support this argument. This evidence comes 
from fields other than the teacher labor market, underscoring the research gap in the literature. 
3.6. Why rewards may have an ex-post effect?  The value of status, self-esteem, and 
feedback 
Having summarized the evidence on the effectiveness of incentives for teachers, we still need to 
address how to motivate teachers. Specifically, how can teachers be extrinsically incentivized to 
exert higher effort in the long term without crowding out their intrinsic motivation and creating 
unintended consequences? Taking into consideration that psychologists and management 
scholars have long recognized that workers are motivated by more than just monetary extrinsic 
rewards (Etzioni 1964, Deci and Ryan 1975, as cited in Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011)), a 
potential answer to the question is excellence teacher reward. Many additional reasons support 
this answer. They are less likely to reduce intrinsic motivation (Frey, 2007) due to the value is 
given to status, self-esteem, and feedback. They might even increase intrinsic motivation (Deci et 
al., 2001). Because of that, their effects on effort might not fade out over time. Non-financial 
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rewards are also an attractive solution because they are potentially cost-effective (Levitt et al., 
2012), especially when it is more difficult to formulate specific contracts ex ante, and to monitor 
ex post (Frey, 2007, Frey and Gallus, 2017). 
As an extrinsic motivation, rewards can take many forms, such as a merit recognition or 
award. Awards are designed to give recognition to those who are thought to best exemplify the 
norms/goals promoted by the award giver (Frey and Gallus, 2017). For instance, awards play a 
significant role in the arts, sports, as well as in the business sector. In the educational setting, one 
could suggest giving a prize to teachers with high performance.  
Rewards, and especially non-financial ones, derive their intrinsic motivational power from a 
variety of mechanisms including bolstering status, providing relative performance feedback, and 
enhancing self-esteem. For individuals who care about status and a positive self-image, non-
pecuniary awards carry additional utility when they remind oneself and others of one’s own 
special achievements (Huberman et al., 2004, Ariely et al., 2009). Formally, and for workers in 
general, Besley and Ghatak (2008) studies the theoretic role of the preference for status as a 
source of motivation. To do so, they developed a model with moral hazard and limited liability 
that limits the ability of an organization to achieve its desired effort level using monetary 
incentives. The model allows the principal to introduce a purely nominal award, which works as 
a positional good to the agent in the event he produces high output for the principal. This could 
be a job title change (promotion from associate to full professor in academia) calling some 
employees “employee of the week,” or an award to those teachers who certify their excellence in 
teaching. The model assumes that giving the worker a positional good has a zero marginal-cost 
and that the positional good is valued by the agent. However, the extent of the conveyed status 
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depends on how scarce the award is, and it requires a well-defined rule that awards only the 
deserving. The implications of the model are that status incentives increase effort while reducing 
the optimal level of financial incentives. The model also predicts that the case for status 
incentives may be stronger when the problem of measuring the worker’s output is more severe, 
such as in schools. This has not been empirically proven. 
The second mechanism by which non-financial incentives channel their influence goes 
through the performance feedback that they provide. As mentioned by Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 
(2011), Deci (1972) and Anderson et al. (1976) find that positive feedback increases intrinsic 
motivation implying that the feedback component of the rewards can enhance motivation as well. 
In a schooling context, Azmat and Iriberri (2010) and Tran and Zeckhauser (2009) argue that 
learning about relative performance leads to higher student effort. Azmat and Iriberri (2010) 
shows how relative performance feedback raises high school students’ educational attainment 
using data from a naturally occurring change in Spanish schools. 
Perhaps more importantly, the third underlying mechanism of non-financial rewards is its 
power on teachers’ self-esteem. They consider self-confidence as a source of intrinsic motivation 
which, if enhanced, can increase effort in the long run.  
The psychology literature with the Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET), developed by Deci 
and Ryan (1980), and explained for the educational context in Deci et al. (2001), states that “The 
underlying intrinsic motivation is the innate psychological need for competence and self-
determination” (Deci et al., 2001, p. 3). Thus, if rewards influence the people’s perception of 
competence and self-determination, they will also affect motivation. This seems to be completely 
feasible considering the theoretical model developed by Compte and Postlewaite (2004). They 
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demonstrate that in a world where performance depends on emotions, higher self-esteem 
enhances welfare. The authors compared the two effects of confidence: the harm of being overly 
confident and the benefits of being optimistic about one’s own capacity. It will be the case that 
agents with biased perceptions will have excessively optimistic beliefs and consequently will be 
induced to undertake activities they should not have. On the projects they undertake, however, 
their optimism leads to higher performance. They showed that when confidence affects 
performance, it is no longer true that correct perceptions maximize long-term payoffs. In theory, 
having some degree of optimism is preferable to correct perceptions, showing the power of 
manipulating the self-esteem of agents. 
Bénabou and Tirole (2005) provides the first formal theoretical model in economics that 
investigated the maintenance and enhancement of self-confidence. Simply put, Bénabou and 
Tirole (2005) suggests that an overly positive view of one’s ability may be an important 
motivational factor, because ability and effort are complementary factors in educational 
production. Greater self-confidence makes teachers believe their effort will be very productive, 
which in turn enhances their motivation to study/teach. 
Wang and Yang (2003) and Filippin and Paccagnella (2012) further apply these ideas. Wang 
and Yang (2003) theoretically investigates the notion of self-confidence in an economic model of 
education where students care both about their grades and about their own perception of their 
ability. The grading system determines how much information a grade conveys about ability. 
This thereby influences self-confidence, which in turn affects the choice of effort through the 
complementarity described above. If students care primarily about their perceived ability, then 
strong competition induced by relative grading may actually lead to low effort, even from high-
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ability students. Competition limits the number of good grades, making it less likely that a 
student gets favorable feedback about her ability if she works hard. To protect a prior positive 
self-image, a student can put in low effort, which makes the grades relatively uninformative 
about ability and allows the student to maintain her self-image no matter what happens. Filippin 
and Paccagnella (2012) explores in a theoretical model how a small initial difference in self-
confidence can result in diverging patterns of human capital accumulation, even when students 
start off with the same level of initial ability. 
A more recent branch of behavioral economics has explored the effectiveness of non-
financial rewards showing their potential. Symbolic awards have been studied by Kosfeld and 
Neckermann (2011) who hired students to enter data for three weeks as part of a non-
governmental organization project. The treatment was to honor the best performance publicly 
with a symbolic award. They find that the award treatment increased performance by 12%. 
These types of non-pecuniary benefits may be particularly potent in the context of 
recognition for school performance. Levitt et al. (2012) directly compares the effects of financial 
and non-financial rewards on short-term student effort and performance. They also investigate 
the effectiveness of low and high financial incentives (USD10, USD20), and compare these to 
the impact of non-monetary rewards, specifically, an achievement trophy. These incentives were 
presented in either the gain or the loss domain and were offered either immediately after the test 
or with a delay of a month after the test. They find that giving primary school students a trophy 
lead to increased performance as did financial rewards in the range of USD10 to USD20. 
Complementarily, Jalava et al. (2015) examines the effects of non-financial rewards on student 
effort on a math test. They conducted a randomized field experiment on more than a thousand 
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sixth graders in Swedish primary schools, finding significant differences in test scores between 
the intrinsically motivated control and the extrinsically motivated treatment groups. Test 
performance is significantly higher for students receiving a symbolic reward. The motivational 
strengths of the non-financial rewards differ across the skill distribution and with respect to 
gender. Specifically, only girls were motivated by a symbolic reward. They find that extrinsic 
non-financial incentives played an important role in motivating highly-skilled students to exert 
more effort, but symbolic rewards tended to crowd out intrinsic motivation for low-skill students. 
Consequently, a reward program such as the Teaching Excellence Award4 (AEP for its 
initials in Spanish), with its non-financial component, may enhance teachers’ self-confidence 
resulting in a higher effort. This assumes the teacher knows which kind of efforts are productive 
in terms of increasing students learning. 
Nevertheless, the final ex-post effect of rewards can also be unexpected. In making 
predictions about reward effects on intrinsic motivation, the CET analyzes whether the reward is 
likely to be experienced as informational or controlling. The informational aspect of the rewards 
conveys self-determined competence, and this enhances intrinsic motivation. In contrast, the 
controlling aspect—if rewards are experienced as the reason for doing the task—prompts a low 
perceived self-determination, which undermines intrinsic motivation. In consequence, depending 
on the features of the extrinsic incentive, this can result in the crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation. For instance, we have the case of performance-contingent rewards. They have strong 
                                               




control aspect that undermines intrinsic motivation. However, performance-contingent rewards 
can also include positive information when the reward signifies excellent performance. In those 
cases, rewards give information that affirms competence and, thus, offsets some of the negative 
effects of control. Deci et al. (2001), via meta-analyses, finds that tangible rewards significantly 
and substantially undermined intrinsic motivation for the rewarded activity. According to CET, 
another factor that is expected to influence the effects of performance-contingent rewards is the 
interpersonal context. In terms of education, it suggests that when rewards are used in the 
classrooms and schools, it is important that the climate of the classroom be supportive so that the 
students and teachers are less likely to experience the rewards as controlling. 
So far in this chapter, theoretical and empirical arguments have been provided to suggest that 
teacher effort can increase after a reward is given. There are three plausible theoretical channels 
by which non-financial rewards can have influence. The fact is that workers’ value status creates 
the opportunity to motivate them by offering a public valued reward. Receiving positive 
feedback about one’s performance can increase workers’ motivation and thereby increase effort. 
More importantly, non-financial rewards can help teachers increase their self-confidence and 
their effort. Furthermore, the empirical evidence emerging also supports the potential of non-
financial rewards. However, the review of the literature on non-financial rewards for teachers 
shows that they have not been explored despite its potential. 
3.7. Final remarks 
The effectiveness of financial teacher incentives remains unresolved. Moreover, and despite the 
fact that this kind of program has made its way into the education system, the fine-tuning of 
teacher incentive programs is still inconclusive. These topics remain important for researchers 
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and especially for policy makers. The incentive programs for teachers can be expensive taking 
into consideration they represent an increase in the cost of school staff, which accounts for the 
majority of spending on in-school education—on average 80% in OECD countries (OECD, 
2015). Beyond analyzing how the features of a financial incentive program can be tuned, there is 
a need to look for cost-effective mechanisms to improve teaching. In this context, the non-
financial rewards for teachers seem to be a tool worthy of being considered as potential way to 
make incentives for teachers more effective.  
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Chapter 4 - Theoretical framework. Why AEP may (not) work? 
The Teaching Excellence Award (AEP for its initials in Spanish) can be seen a reward program 
that involves to components: one financial and another non-financial. To improve our 
understanding of the program’s net effect on ex-post outcomes is necessary to study how each of 
them may work. The bonus, based on the theoretical and empirical evidence reviewed, is 
expected to have an ambiguous effect on effort. Based on the Cognitive Evaluation Theory 
(CET) (Deci et al., 2001) and Motivational Theory (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002), the non-financial 
component of the program may work in a positive and negative direction as well. These models 
are described in the following section, making clear that the effect of both components of the 
program have the potential of increasing effort, but it is not equivocal. In consequence, the effect 
of each component and the total net ex-post effect of the full program is ultimately an empirical 
question, whose answer comes to narrow a gap in the existing reward literature. 
4.1. The Cognitive Evaluation Theory 
Using the Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET), AEP can be considered a performance-contingent 
reward because it is linked to teachers’ performance, with strong controlling and informational 
aspects. In this theoretical framework, a program like AEP, 
...has the potential to affect intrinsic motivation in two ways, one quite positive and one quite 
negative. Performance-contingent rewards can maintain or enhance intrinsic motivation if the 
receiver of the reward interprets it informationally, as an affirmation of competence. Yet, 
because performance-contingent rewards are often used as a vehicle to control not only what the 
person does but how well he or she does it, such rewards can easily be experienced as very 
controlling, thus undermining intrinsic motivation. According to CET, it is the relative salience 
of the informational versus controlling aspects of performance-contingent rewards which 
determines their ultimate effect on intrinsic motivation. (Deci et al., 2001, p. 12). 
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Specifically, the controlling and informational aspects of the AEP program may have 
affected productivity as well. Overall, teachers had to meet a standard to obtain the reward, 
increasing the controlling aspect of AEP, and thus, reducing self-determination and intrinsic 
motivation. However, these negative effects may have been offset by the strong informational 
aspects of the program. In addition, the nature of the program (voluntary application, a standard-
based evaluation, excellence standards to obtain the reward, and the rigorous process of objective 
evaluation of the portfolio and test submitted by the applicant) made it more likely that teachers 
perceived self-determination when obtaining the reward. As has been found, this net effect on 
intrinsic motivation, in turn, can have affected the level of effort made by the teacher after the 
reward was given (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). 
To better analyze the potential of effect of the program, each component of the program can 
be studied separately. The two components—financial and non-financial—worked based on 
different mechanisms and may have had different results. Regarding the financial component, as 
suggested by the empirical (Deci et al., 2001, Cerasoli et al., 2014), and theoretical evidence 
(Lazear, 1986, Bénabou and Tirole, 2003), it may have induced a crowding out process of the 
intrinsic motivation. From psychology, it is known that the positive effect of a short-term raise of 
extrinsic motivation by rewards (or punishments) might prove costly due to the possibility of a 
“crowding out” of self-confidence and intrinsic motivation in the long run, Koch et al. (2015). 
Therefore, the performance-contingent feature of the program and the fact that one component of 
the program is monetary, may have resulted in a reduction of intrinsic motivation, effort, and 
productivity after the program was given. Adding the public recognition component to the 
program could reinforce the information aspect of the reward, which increased the perception of 
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self-determined competence. In consequence, AEP, with its features, could also increase the 
perception of self-determination that the reward brings, thus increasing the chance of having a 
positive net effect of the program on teachers’ effort and effectiveness. Consequently, the total 
effect of the program depended on which effect took precedence over the other on the intrinsic 
motivation, effort and productivity.  
4.2. The Motivational Model 
To further understand the relationship between an extrinsic non-financial reward, as one 
component of the AEP program, and the certified teachers’ self-confidence and effort, a 
theoretical framework, based on the paper “Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation” written by 
Bénabou and Tirole in 2002, is described in this section. 
Bénabou and Tirole (2002) developed a framework, the Motivational Model (MM), that 
unifies themes from psychology literature, and brings to light some of their economic 
implications. This MM can be applied to teachers in school settings to understand how they build 
their self-esteem, and how the AEP non-financial reward could have helped protect it and keep 
their intrinsic motivation at the highest possible level.  
Let’s consider a teacher who has imperfect knowledge of his abilities, or more generally, of 
the eventual costs and payoffs of his actions. He every day determines an optimal endogenous 
value of self-confidence that accounts for both “can-do” optimism and “defensive” pessimism 
when faced with situations and incentives. This self-esteem determination process responds to an 
optimization of the benefits obtained from preserving his effort and motivation against the risk of 
becoming overconfident.  
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The solution of this optimization process takes into consideration that the teacher has a 
demand and supply of self-confidence. The self-esteem-demand is based on the fact that he, like 
any other person, may prefer positive self-views to accurate views, which enhances the 
individual’s motivation. This preference comes from the fact that ability and effort interact in 
determining performance, in most instances, they are complements, so that higher self-
confidence enhances the motivation to act. In consequence, anyone with a vested interest in his 
performance has an incentive to build up, maintain and, ultimately, demand self-esteem.  
The supply side of the self-esteem problem is based on the power of self-deception to 
achieve a positive self-assessment. Most often, the relevant issue is how the teacher deals with 
the good and especially the bad news concerning his performances and abilities. This is where 
the mechanisms of defensive denial, so prominently emphasized in psychology, come into play.  
The interaction between self-confidence demand and supply in the presence of new 
information is modeled with a game-theoretic model of endogenously selective memory. The 
basic idea is that the teacher can, within limits, affect the probability of remembering a given 
piece of data. This is the motivation part. On the other hand, the teacher is assumed as rational 
and realize that he has a selective memory. This is the cognition part. The resulting structure is 
that of a game of strategic communication between the teacher’s temporal selves. In deciding 
whether to try to repress bad news, the he weighs the benefits from keeping his motivation level 
versus the cost associated to make decisions being overconfident. Later on, however, the teacher 
appropriately discounts the reliability of optimistic recollections and rationalizations. Solving the 
model, a multiple interpersonal equilibrium may arise, ranging from systematic denial to 
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complete self-honesty. In practice, the model solution is a set of perfect Bayesian equilibria, 
which depends on the teacher’s degree of time inconsistency and memory repression costs. 
Using the Bénabou and Tirole (2002) model, one can argue how the non-financial reward 
linked to AEP could have been capable of protecting or enhancing teacher’s self-confidence and 
motivation to give his best. The symbolic AEP award might have worked as a fixed memory 
making the self-deception process harder, which may increase teacher self-confidence. 
Moreover, information that negatively affects teacher’s self-image after the program was given, 
is more likely to be repressed to maintain a desired and optimal level of self-confidence. 
Consequently, the non-financial component of the reward might have been effective in 
increasing, or at least keeping, teachers’ efforts even after the reward has been given. This has 
the potential to reduce the likelihood of observing the “fade-out” phenomena of the effect of 
financial incentives on teacher behavior. 
The following is an excerpt and simplified adaptation of Bénabou and Tirole (2002)’s model 
to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship among a non-financial 
reward, self-confidence, and effort. Below the model is described with details and with small 
adaptations as presented by the authors in Bénabou and Tirole (2002)’s pages 878 to 879 
(demand side), 884 to 889 (supply side), 889 to 892 and 894 (equilibrium and solution). 
The Bénabou and Tirole (2002) Motivational Model 
The motivation problem. The demand side 
Consider a risk-neutral individual with a relevant horizon of three periods:  t = 0, 1, 2. At date 0, 
he selects an action that may affect both his flow payoff u0 and his date-1 information structure. 
At date 1, he decides whether to undertake a task/project (exert effort, which has disutility cost c 
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> 0) or not (exert no effort). With some probability, which defines his ability, the project will 
succeed and yield a benefit V at date 2; failure generates no benefit. The individual’s beliefs over 
q (defining his self-confidence or self-esteem) are described by distribution functions F (q) at 
date 0 and F1(q) at date 1. In the intervening period, new information may be received, or 
previous signals forgotten; focus here is on the first, more standard case, and turn to memory 
when modeling q%& ≡ ∫ qdF&(q)	&- will be a sufficient the supply side. Note that with risk-
neutrality the mean statistic for F1. For brevity, the model also refers to it as the agent’s date-1 
self-confidence.  
Now, assume that the individual’s preferences exhibit time inconsistency, due to quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. There is indeed considerable experimental and everyday evidence that 
intertemporal choices exhibit a ‘salience of the present’, in the sense that discount rates are much 
lower at short horizons than at more distant ones. Denoting ut and Et(•) the flow payoffs and 
expectations at t = 0, 1, 2, the intertemporal utility perceived by the individual as of date 1 is:5 𝑢	& + 𝛽𝛿	𝐸&	[	𝑢3] 	= −𝑐 + 𝛽𝛿	?̅?&𝑉                                                                                          (4.1) 
when he undertakes the activity, and 0 when he does not. By contrast, intertemporal utility 
conditional on the same information set at date 1, but evaluated from the point of view of date 0 
is:6 𝑢	- + 𝛽	𝐸-	[𝛿𝑢	& + 𝛿3	𝑢3|?̅?&] 	= 𝑢	- + 𝛽𝛿	[−𝑐 + 𝛿	?̅?&𝑉]          (4.2) 
                                               
5 Equation 1, page 879, in Bénabou and Tirole (2002) 
6 Equation 2, page 889, in Bénabou and Tirole (2002) 
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if the activity is undertaken at date 1, and 𝑢- otherwise. Whereas is a standard discount 
factor, reflects the momentary salience of the present. When b<1 the individual at date 0 (‘Self 
0’) is concerned about his date 1 (‘Self 1’s’) excessive preference for the present, or lack of 
willpower, which leads to the under provision of effort (procrastination). Indeed, Self 1 only 
exerts effort in the events where ?̅?& > 𝑐/𝛽𝛿𝑉, whereas, from the point of view of Self 0, it 
should be undertaken whenever ?̅?& > 𝑐/𝛿𝑉. Note that while the model focuses here on the case 
where the individual’s intrinsic ability is unknown, it could equally be the expected payoff in 
case of success V, the ‘survival’ probability 	𝛿, or the task’s difficulty, measured by the cost of 
effort c. All that matters for the theory is that the individual be uncertain of the long-term return 
to effort	𝜃𝛿𝑉/𝑐. 
The supply side of the self-esteem problem 
The model now turns to the supply side of the self-esteem problem. Given that a positive self-
assessment may be desirable, the question is what are the means through which it can be 
achieved, or at least pursued? The answer would be self-deception. The model shall capture this 
process with an intertemporal setting to reconcile the motivation and cognition aspects of self-
deception within a standard information-theoretic framework. The motivation part says that, 
under time-inconsistency, there is an incentive to try to recall signals that help sustain long-term 
goals and forget those that undermine them. The individual can, within limits, affect the 
probability of remembering a given piece of data. On the other hand, the cognition part says that 




Assumption 1 (memory or awareness management) 
The individual can, at a cost, increase or decrease the probability of remembering an event or its 
interpretation. Formally, let λ ϵ [0,1) denote the probability that a piece of information received 
at date 0 will be recalled at date 1. The model defines the natural rate of recall 𝜆? ϵ [0,1) as that 
which maximizes the date 0 flow payoff 𝑢-. Increasing or decreasing λ thus involves a ‘memory 
cost’ M(λ), i.e., a reduction in 𝑢-, with M( 𝜆?) = 0, M′(λ)£0 for λ < 𝜆? and M(λ)³ 0 for λ >𝜆?. 
Assumption 2 (metacognition) 
While the individual can manipulate his conscious self-knowledge, he is aware that incentives 
exist that result in selective memory. If a person has a systematic tendency to forget, distort, or 
repress certain types of information he will likely become aware of it, and not blindly take at face 
value what comes to his mind when thinking about his past performances and the feedback he 
received. Instead, using (some) rational inference, he will realize that what he may have 
forgotten are non-random events. Formally, this introspection or skepticism with respect to the 
reliability of one’s own self-knowledge is represented by Bayes’ rule, which implies that a 
person cannot consistently fool himself in the same direction. Less sophisticated inference 
processes lead to similar results, so long as they are not excessively naive. 
The game of self-deception 
Let the agent receive, at date 0, a signal s about his ability q. To make things simple, let s take 
only two values: with probability 1-q the agent receives bad news, s= L, and with probability q 
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he receives no news at all, s= ∅. In other words, ‘no news is good news’. Let7 𝜃A ≡ 𝐸[𝜃|𝜎 = 𝐿] < 𝐸[𝜃|𝜎 = ∅] ≡ 𝜃E            (4.3) 
Since s is informative about the return to date-1 effort, the agent’s Self 1 would benefit from 
having this signal. If it is ego-threatening, however, Self 0 may have an interest in suppressing it. 
The recollection at date 1 of the news will be denoted 𝜎F ∈ ∅, L. The model assumes that 
memories can be lost but not manufactured ex nihilo, so s= ∅ always leads to 𝜎F =∅. A signal s= 
L, on the other hand, may be forgotten due to natural memory decay or voluntary repression. Let  
l  denote the probability that bad news will be remembered accurately:8 𝜆	 ≡ 	𝑃𝑟[𝜎F 	= 	𝐿|𝜎	 = 	𝐿]              (4.4) 
As explained earlier, the agent can increase or decrease this probability with respect to its 
‘natural’ value 𝜆? ≤ 1; choosing a recall probability involves a ‘memory cost’ M (l ). The 
model now analyzes the equilibrium in several stages. 
The equilibrium 
1. Inference problem of Self 1 
Faced with a memory 𝜎F ∈ L, ∅, Self 1 must first assess its credibility. Given that memories 
cannot be invented, unfavorable ones are always credible. When Self 1 does not recall any 
adverse signals, on the other hand, he must ask himself whether there was indeed no bad news at 
date 0, or whether it may have been lost or censored. If Self 1 thinks that bad news is recalled 
                                               
7 Equation 9, page 889, in Bénabou and Tirole (2002). 
8 Equation 10, page 889, in Bénabou and Tirole (2002). 
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with probability 𝜆∗, he uses Bayes’ rule to compute the reliability of a “no recollection” message 
as,9 𝑟∗ 	≡ Pr[𝜎	 = 	𝐿|𝜎F 	= 	∅; 𝜆∗] = PPQ(&RP)(&RS∗)            (4.5) 
His degree of self-confidence is then10 𝜃(𝑟∗	) ≡ 𝑟∗	𝜃E + (1 − 𝑟∗)	𝜃A              (4.6) 
2. Decisions and payoffs 
The model normalizes the payoff in case of success to V = 1 and assume that the cost of date 1 
effort is drawn from an interval [𝑐, 𝑐̅), with probability distribution (c) and density φ(c) > 0. The 
model assumes that c > 𝛽𝛿𝜃E > 𝛽𝛿𝜃A  > c, which means that at date 1 there is always a positive 
probability of no effort, and a positive probability of effort. Given a signal σ at date 0 and a 
memory 𝜎F	at date 1, Selves 0 and 1 respectively assess the productivity of date 1 effort as E[θ|σ) 
and E[𝜃|𝜎F). Self 1 only works when the realization of the effort cost is c<𝛽𝛿𝐸[𝜃|𝜎F). So Self 0’s 
payoff is:11 
 𝛽𝛿 ∫ (𝛿𝐸[𝜃|σ) − 𝑐)𝑑Φ(𝑐)XYZ[[|\])-              (4.7) 
3. Costs and benefits of selective memory or attention 
Focusing on the ‘bad news’ case, denote as 	𝑈_(𝜃A|𝑟∗) is the expected utility of Self 0 (gross of 
memory-management costs) when the adverse information is successfully forgotten, and as 𝑈`(𝜃A) the corresponding value when it is accurately recalled. The subscripts C and T stand for 
                                               
9 Equation 11, page 889, in Bénabou and Tirole (2002). 
10 Equation 12, page 889, in Bénabou and Tirole (2002). 
11 Equation 13, page 890, in Bénabou and Tirole (2002). 
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‘censored’ and ‘truth’ respectively. Hiding from Self 1 the signal σ = L raises his self-confidence 
from 𝜃A  to (r), leading him to exert effort in the additional states of the world where L < c < (r). 
As with ex ante ignorance, this has both costs and benefits; thus, if r is high enough that (r) > L, 
the net gain or loss from self-deception is:12 𝑈_(𝜃A|𝑟∗) − 𝑈`(𝜃A) = 𝛽𝛿 ∫ (𝛿𝜃A 	− 𝑐)𝑑Φ(𝑐)Y[a	XY[a	 -∫ (𝑐 − 𝛿𝜃A	)𝑑Φ(𝑐)	XY[(b∗)	Y[a	         (4.8) 
4. Strategic memory or awareness management 
Faced with a signal σ = L that is hurtful to his self-esteem, Self 0 chooses the recall with 
probability 𝜆  so as to solve:13 𝑚𝑎𝑥S𝜆𝑈`(𝜃A) + (1 − 𝜆)𝑈_(𝜃A|𝑟∗) − 𝑀(𝜆)           (4.9) 
Given the convexity of 𝑀(𝜆), the optimum is uniquely determined (given 𝑟∗) by the first-
order condition, which involves comparing the marginal benefit from self-deception, 𝑈_(𝜃A|𝑟∗) − 𝑈`(𝜃A), with the marginal cost, 𝑀(𝜆). Finally, the Bayesian rationality of Self 1 
means that he is aware of Self 0’s choosing the recall strategy opportunistically according to 
Equation 4.9 and uses this optimal λ in his assessment of the reliability of memories (or lack 
thereof). A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the memory game is a pair (𝜆∗, 𝑟∗) 	 ∈ 	 [0,1)	𝑥	[𝑞, 1) 
solves Equations 4.5 and 4.9. 
5. The solution of the model 
First assume that the manipulation of memory is costless, 𝑀 ≡ 0. When 𝑀 ≡ 0, there exist 𝛽 
                                               
12 Equation 14, page 891, in Bénabou and Tirole (2002). 
13 Equation 15, page 891, in Bénabou and Tirole (2002). 
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arid 𝛽 in (0,1), with the following properties. For low degrees of time inconsistency, 𝛽 > 𝛽, the 
unique equilibrium involves minimum repression (𝜆∗ = 1); for high degrees, 𝛽 < 𝛽 , it involves 
maximum repression (𝜆∗= 0). For intermediate degrees of time inconsistency, 𝛽 ∈ [𝛽, 𝛽], as 
shown in Figure 4.1, there are three equilibria, including a partially repressive one: 𝜆∗ 	∈0, Λ(𝛽)	decreases from 1 to 0 as 𝛽 rises from 𝛽 to 𝛽. 
Figure 4.1. Model solution for momentary salience of present (b) and recall rate (l). 
 
Note: Figure extracted from Bénabou and Tirole (2002), page 893. 
Now assume that there is a cost of memory or awareness management. The memory cost 
function is:14 𝑀(𝜆) = 𝑎 + (1 − 𝑙𝑛	𝜆) + 𝑏(1 − 𝑙𝑛(1 − 	𝜆))         (4.10) 
with a > 0 and b ≥ 0. It minimized at the ‘natural’ recall rate 𝜆? = 𝑎 (𝑎 + 𝑏)⁄  N = a/(a+b) 
and precludes complete repression. When b > 0 perfect recall is also prohibitively costly, and M 
is U-shaped. As to the distribution of effort costs, the model takes it to be uniform, 𝜑(𝑐) 	= 	1/𝑐 
on [0;	𝑐 ), with 𝑐 > 𝛽𝛿𝜃E. In this case, for any (a, b) there are again either one or three 
equilibria. One can go further, and obtain explicit comparative statics results, by focusing on the 
                                               
14 Equation 17, page 894, in Bénabou and Tirole (2002) 
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simpler case where recall is costless, but repression is costly. The graphic solution can be seen 
the following figures. Formally, for any given 𝛽 there exist thresholds 𝑎 and 𝑎 with 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎, 
and continuous functions 𝜆&(𝑎), 	𝜆3(𝑎),	 respectively increasing and decreasing in a, such that: (i) 
for 𝑎	 ∈ (0, 𝑎), the unique equilibrium corresponds to 𝜆∗ = 𝜆&(𝑎); (ii) for 𝑎	 ∈ (𝑎, 𝑎), there are 
three equilibria: 𝜆∗ ∈ 𝜆&(𝑎), 𝜆3(𝑎), 1; (iii) for 𝑎	 ∈ (𝑎,∞), the unique equilibrium corresponds to 𝜆∗= 1. Importantly, note that small changes in awareness cost can induce large changes in self-
esteem and behavior. 
6. Increasing effort 
Having reviewed the MM formally, I can state also formally how the non-financial incentive as 
part of AEP may result in higher levels of effort. Assume that AEP can alter the 
awareness/repression’ technology 𝑀(𝜆) in a way that increases the cost of manipulating 
memory. Thus, AEP increases the first part of the cost function (a in Equation 4.10) because 
AEP gives a merit-reward to teachers, equipping them with pin that can always wear while 
teaching. To understand the consequences of this technological change the time consistency level 
of the teacher and the initial parameter cost a need to I need to be considered. Taking the simpler 
case that has a unique equilibrium, where 𝛽 < 𝛽&, where the teacher has a high degree of time 
inconsistency—teacher lack of willpower, which might lead to under-provision of effort—and 
the cost parameter is in a low range, the higher 𝑎, the more likely = 1, which means the 
minimum repression. The probability that bad news will be remembered accurately approximates 
one. With that r = 1, which means that Self 1 considers the memory process completely reliable. 
Thus, 𝜃(𝑟∗) = 𝜃E, the self-confidence of the teacher is the highest possible. Consequently, non-
financial incentives might be effective increasing teachers’ effort. Nonetheless, for different 
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levels of cost parameters and different levels of time consistency, multiple equilibriums arise. 
Thus, the effectiveness of non-financial incentives on effort is ultimately an empirical question. 
Figure 4.2. Model Solution for the parameter cost (a) and the recall rate (l). 
 
Note: Figures extracted from Bénabou and Tirole (2002), pages 895 and 896.  
 62 
 
4.3. Final remarks 
Since the certification was tied to bonuses (the financial component of the reward) and public 
recognition (the non-financial component of the reward), the program has the potential of 
improving school performance. The financial component could positively affect teacher’s 
decision on the optimal level of effort as a principal-agent model states; however, it could crow-
out intrinsic motivation decreasing it. Complementarily, based on Deci et al. (2001), the CET 
suggests that adding a public recognition component to the AEP program could reinforce the 
information aspect of the reward, which increases the perception of self-determined competence. 
In same sense, based on Bénabou and Tirole (2003)’s MM, the recognition of teacher’s quality 
may have fostered teacher’s self-confidence and motivation and thereby increasing their effort 
and productivity (student outcomes) in a permanent fashion. Taking all together, the net ex-post 
effect of the program on teachers’ effort and effectiveness could be positive.  
At the same time, the MM argues that multiple equilibria may exist, while CET states that the 
performance-contingent feature of the program and the fact that one component of the program is 
monetary, may result in a reduction of intrinsic motivation, effort, and productivity. 
Consequently, the total ex-post effect of the program depends on which effect takes 
precedence over the other on self-confidence or intrinsic motivation, effort, and productivity. 





Chapter 5 - Program effect and research questions 
As discussed previously, the rewards given by the Teaching Excellence Program15 (AEP for its 
initials in Spanish) to certified teachers had the potential of increasing their productivity. Taking 
the previous literature into account, the research on teachers’ incentives, the program’s 
objectives, and the findings made by qualitative research focused on the AEP, the program’s 
potential consequences on teachers’ effects can be divided into four groups. 
1. Full program effect. The program aimed to increase the quality of the educational 
system. Even though approximating and measuring “quality” is part of a more extensive 
discussion as explained in Chapter 9, a common practice has been to define it as the 
observed student learning outcomes. Thus, the direct effect of the full program can be 
measured by ex-post students’ academic achievement (SIMCE for its initials in Spanish) 
within three years after the teacher’s application to the program, which is the year that the 
teacher receives certification and the two following. The full program effect including 
financial and non-financial components is estimated for teachers who applied to AEP 
from 2003-2006 and 2009-2011. This means those years, when the non-financial reward 
was not given, are not included in the estimation of the full program effect.  
2. “Fade-out” of the full program effect. The program’s effect may have faded out which 
would be consistent with the literature on teacher incentives (Springer et al., 2011, 
Glewwe et al., 2010) and with recent studies that have found that the impact of being 
                                               
15 Asignación de Excelencia Pedagógica. 
 64 
 
assigned to a more effective teacher declines by half or more between end-of-year test 
scores and ones two years later (Jackson et al., 2014). Thus, the full program effect is 
estimated for the second and third year after the teacher applied to the program. 
3. Unbundled effect. The public recognition component (ceremony and pin) and the 
financial component (annual bonus) could independently explain ex-post outcomes. We 
have seen that from a theoretical perspective, the effects of the financial and public 
recognition components might even cancel each other out. On the one hand, as explained 
above, the latter may have improved the self-confidence or the perception of competence, 
which has the potential to increase teachers’ intrinsic motivation, and thus increase effort 
and improve teacher’s performance (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). Thus, frequently 
wearing the pin may have decreased the cost of increasing self-confidence, which makes 
teachers believe their efforts will be productive. This, in turn, enhanced their motivation 
and effort to teach. On the other hand, we have the effect of giving an unconditional 
bonus to certified teachers every year. The bonus works as an extrinsic motivator, which 
may have had a limited impact on current performance and may have reduced the 
teacher’s intrinsic motivation to undertake similar tasks in the future. Consequently, the 
net full program’s effect on teachers’ effort and performance after the certification was 
given is not unequivocal. To understand the direction and magnitude of the effects of 
each component, the bonus and pin effect are unbundled, taking advantage of a difference 
in the program implementation between years. In 2007 and 2008, AEP only included the 
financial incentive; thus, estimating the program’s effect for those years is equivalent to 
isolating the effect of the financial component. Importantly, the pin’s effect is never 
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observed in isolation, only the effect of the non-financial component on the top of the 
financial one is under analysis. Therefore, the comparison between full program effect 
and the unbundled effect sheds some light on the effect of the non-financial component 
complementing a financial incentive. 
4. Underlying mechanism. Following the theories of Bénabou and Tirole (2002), I explore 
the relationship among the program, teachers’ self-confidence, and efforts. This is to 
provide evidence on the underlying mechanisms of the program’s direct effects on 
student learning after the certification was given. Specifically, the effort levels and 
teacher self-confidence are studied as intermediate results. These results are obtained 
from the survey answered by the teachers associated with SIMCE. To study this 
underlying mechanism, a ceteris paribus assumption for the Motivational Model (MM) is 
also tested. This means testing the existence of an alternative mechanism by which the 
program may have resulted in significant sorting of students and schools to certified 
teachers. If the program affected the matching process between AEP teachers and 
students or schools after the program was given, the program’s effect on outcomes such 
as test scores could be explained by this fact at least in part, limiting the chances of 
testing the MM. 
Based on the theoretical framework previously described and for the sake of simplicity, the 
analysis of unbundled effects assumes that the full program’s effect can be represented by a 
function with perfect substitution and no complementarities between its two inputs/components. 





Importantly, the estimated program effect corresponds to the change in outcomes after the 
reward is given, which makes a difference compared with most of the previous research on 
incentives that estimates their impact on outcomes before the incentive is given. 
Summing up, while exploring the four groups of effects, there are five hypotheses that are 
tested: 
Question #1, Does the AEP affect ex-post teachers’ performance? (Full program effect) 
Question #2, Does the ex-post effect of the AEP fade-out? (Fade-out of the full program effect). 
Question #3, Does each component of the AEP affect ex-post teachers’ performance? 
(Unbundled program effect) 
Question #4, Does the AEP affect ex-post teachers’ behavior?  (Underlying mechanism of the 
full program) 
 Question #4.1, Does the AEP affect ex-post teachers’ self-confidence? 
 Question #4.2, Does the AEP affect ex-post teachers’ effort? 
Question #5, Does each component of the AEP affect ex-post teachers’ behavior? (Underlying 
mechanism of each program component) 
 Question #5.1, Does each component of the AEP affect ex-post teachers’ self-
confidence? 
 Question #5.2, Does each component of the AEP affect ex-post teachers’ effort? 
In Chapter 8, the empirical strategy developed to answer these research questions is 
presented. In the following Chapters 6 and 9, the data, the variables, and measures used to 
implement this strategy are presented and discussed regarding their interpretation.  
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Chapter 6 - Data 
Before presenting the theoretical and empirical approach used to estimate and understand the 
program’s effect, this chapter presents the data available for implementing the empirical strategy. 
It specifically explains how the data is accessed and merged into the main dataset, and how the 
final number of observations used for the estimations is obtained. Complementarily, Chapter 9 
explains the operationalization of the data to define and measure the outcomes of interest and 
covariates, while Appendix E describes the specific datasets that make up the main dataset used. 
Overall, the main dataset includes math and language teachers’ evaluation scores on a scale 
from 1 to 4, the corresponding standardized test score (SIMCE for its initials in Spanish), and the 
SIMCE survey data for teachers and students within the three years following the program 
application. Characteristics of schools and students, and information about motivation and self-
perception that teachers self-report are also in the dataset. The data is available for application 
year (t), the year when the incentives are given (t + 1) (April), and the year when the students 
take the SIMCE (November) at some point (t + l) within three years (l = 1, 2, 3). The timing of 
data is anchored to the application year t. This means that data for year t + l is data for l years 
after the application. The final sample of teachers that is used to estimate the program’s effect 
includes those who: were applying for certification in the math or language categories between 
2003 and 2011, were teaching math or language when their students took the math or reading 
SIMCE respectively, were applying for the first time, and who were assessed as non-cheaters. 
Teachers who applied in 2002 are excluded from the sample because their scores in the dataset 
only had one decimal instead of two, as the scores normally do. Lastly, the dataset used to 
estimate the specification checks in year t, as described in Section 8.
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teachers, except those teachers who applied in 2003 have been excluded. This is done because 
there was no information available on where they taught, making it impossible to merge their 
application data with their teaching data to check the validity of the regression discontinuity 
design. 
6.1. Merging the data 
Specifically, the main dataset is merged by linking six databases: 
1. AEP DATASET (database of AEP applicants that identifies the applicants and their scores), 
2. STCS DATASET (database of teachers working in publicly-funded schools identifying the 
school where they work, the classroom they teach in, and the subject that they teach), 
3. SIMCE DATASET (database of students and their scores on the SIMCE test), 
4. SIMCE TEACHER SURVEY (database of teacher’s answers to the SIMCE survey, which is 
used to obtain information about teachers’ characteristics, teaching attitudes, and expectations), 
5. TEACHER CENSUS DATASET (database of administrative data on teachers that includes 
teachers’ characteristics, experience, position within the school, and so on), and 
6. SCHOOL SIMCE DATASET (database of schools’ administrative data). 
The Ministry of Education in Chile (MINEDUC), through the Statistics Department and the 
Center of Teaching Training and Improvement (CPEIP in Spanish), systematically collects the 
above datasets. Some are publicly available, and others need a special request to access and 
merge. The datasets are merged by school, teacher, and student id respectively. Appendix E 
describes content of the datasets and keys used in the merge. 
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Creating the consolidated dataset involves several steps. The first step is to merge the AEP 
DATASET with the STCS DATASET in order to identify those teachers teaching language or 
math within three years after their application. For this group of teachers, I also identify the 
school and classroom where they teach. Panel A, columns 4 and 8, of Table F.1 shows that 28%-
27% of the teachers were teaching language or math in the same year that they applied to the 
Teaching Excellence Award16 (AEP for its initials in Spanish), correspondingly. Table F.1 shows 
the number of applicants that were teaching math or language one, two and three years after the 
application, respectively Panels B, C, D. Since the STCS DATASET is available from year 2004 
onward, I cannot identify where 2003 applicants taught when they applied to the AEP. 
Now that I have identified where the applicant teachers taught for years t, t + 1, t + 2 and t + 
3, as a second step, I identify the teachers who applied to be certified in math or language. 
Columns 6 and 10 of Table F.1 show the percentage of teachers who applied for language or 
math certification and teach language or math respectively. The percentage is calculated from the 
number of teachers that teach language or math. In general, a high percentage (between 79% and 
87%) of teachers that teach a given subject apply for certification in that subject (Panel A of 
Table F.1). 
Then, as a third step, I merge the teacher data with the SIMCE DATASET in order to add the 
math and reading SIMCE scores of their students in case that they took the test in years t, t + 1, t 
+ 2 and t + 3. Column 4 of Panel A in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show that 27%/29% of applicants 
                                               




teaching language/math and applying for matching certification in year t can be linked to a 
reading/math SIMCE Score in t + l. There is an important fact to consider in Tables F.1, 6.2 and 
6.4. The applicants in the year 2006 tend to have fewer observations; this occurs because of a 
problem with the STCS DATASET for that year. The MINEDUC recognizes that there might be 
a problem with the teachers’ ids and matching them with other datasets in 2006. 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the results of the merging process, which is the number of students 
of the subgroup of teachers identified previously in the third step. From Table F.1, we can see 
that, 10,621 teachers were teaching language in t+1, t+2 or t+3 and applied for a language 
certification in t (see total in the tenth column). From them 3,144 teachers (see total in the third 
column of Panel E of Table 6.1) can be linked to student’s test scores within three years after 
teachers’ application. There were 2,616 teachers (first-takers and non-cheaters) who applied for 
language certification, taught language and had reading test scores. 
This merged dataset is combined with the SIMCE TEACHER SURVEY and the TEACHER 
CENSUS DATASET to obtain information about teachers’ characteristics, teaching attitudes, 
experience, position within the school, and students’ attitudes towards learning, among other 
data. Lastly, the merged dataset is complemented with school data by merging with SCHOOL 
SIMCE DATASET. This supplies school characteristics, such as type of administration. 
Having done the merge process for each subject separately, the last step is to combine the 
math and language datasets, in order to have one single dataset for math and language teachers.  
It is important to mention again the fact that the dataset includes data for one, two, and three 
years after the teachers apply to the AEP. In practice, within the datasets each observation is 
stacked with three years following the application year. Stacking the datasets allows me to 
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evaluate the effect of the program on current and future outcomes by estimating Equation 8.6 for 
each value of l separately to allow a more flexible specification. Using data for the three years 
following the application year enables me to increase the sample size, and, with that, the power 
of the estimations. 
6.2. Final sample 
The result of this merging process is a dataset in which a sample of applicants are linked to their 
AEP score, the classrooms in which they teach, their students’ test scores, the parents’ report, 
and their own answers to the SIMCE teacher survey. This data for each applicant is available for 
a window of three years after the application. 
However, the definition of the final sample needs to take three issues into account. First, the 
evaluation process carried out by the government was aimed at finding applicants who cheat 
using material produced by other applicants. These teachers did not receive certification in t + 1 
because evidence of copying or plagiarism was found by the AEP. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
keep only non-cheating applicants in the sample since the rule used for treatment assignment 
does not apply to the cheaters. The exclusion of this group of applicants is unlikely to bias the 
global estimates because they are 26 cases and represent 0.8%/0.9% of the total number of 




Table 6.1. SIMCE and math teachers in t, t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Application Year t 
Applicants 
# 
Teaching and Test 
Scores 
Teachers applying 
and teaching math 





Teachers (first-takers and non-
cheaters) applying to math 
certification, teaching math and 
having math test scores 
Panel A. In t N Year t N % N % N % N % 
2002 1,906 2002         
2003 935 2003         
2004 1,621 2004 129 17 0 0.0 12 9 117 16 
2005 1,834 2005 113 20 1 0.9 22 19 90 16 
2006 2,215 2006 119 29 0 0.0 27 23 92 23 
2007 1,666 2007 197 38 2 1.0 41 21 154 30 
2008 1,661 2008 133 30 0 0.0 13 10 120 27 
2009 1,815 2009 165 38 4 2.4 22 13 139 32 
2010 1,499 2010 134 33 4 3.0 16 12 114 28 
2011 1,316 2011 160 42 4 2.5 29 18 127 33 
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 1,150 29 15 1.3 182 16 953 24 
Panel B. In t+1 N Year t+1 N % N % N % N % 
2002 1,906 2003         
2003 935 2004 98 18 0 0.0 2 2 96 18 
2004 1,621 2005 148 21 3 2.0 25 17 120 17 
2005 1,834 2006 146 28 1 0.7 25 17 120 23 
2006 2,215 2007 128 33 0 0.0 24 19 104 27 
2007 1,666 2008 146 30 0 0.0 25 17 121 25 
2008 1,661 2009 159 40 2 1.3 19 12 138 34 
2009 1,815 2010 124 31 1 0.8 12 10 111 28 
2010 1,499 2011 157 41 3 1.9 20 13 134 35 
2011 1,316 2012 124 35 3 2.4 21 17 100 28 
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 1,230 30 13 1.1 173 14 1,044 25 
Panel C. In t+2 N Year t+2 N % N % N % N % 
2002 1,906 2004         
2003 935 2005 103 20 0 0.0 25 24 78 16 
2004 1,621 2006 195 30 1 0.5 20 10 174 27 
2005 1,834 2007 191 40 2 1.0 30 16 159 34 
2006 2,215 2008 98 30 0 0.0 20 20 78 23 
2007 1,666 2009 172 40 1 0.6 31 18 140 32 
2008 1,661 2010 118 31 0 0.0 16 14 102 27 
2009 1,815 2011 158 41 1 0.6 24 15 133 35 
2010 1,499 2012 126 35 3 2.4 21 17 102 28 
2011 1,316 2013         
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 1,161 33 8 0.7 187 16 966 27 
Panel D. In t+3 N Year t+3 N % N % N % N % 
2002 1,906 2005         
2003 935 2006 106 22 0 0.0 17 16 89 19 
2004 1,621 2007 217 36 1 0.5 34 16 182 30 
2005 1,834 2008 132 31 1 0.8 19 14 112 26 
2006 2,215 2009 88 29 0 0.0 21 24 67 22 
2007 1,666 2010 117 29 2 1.7 19 16 96 23 
2008 1,661 2011 154 43 1 0.6 17 11 136 38 
2009 1,815 2012 110 31 0 0.0 18 16 92 26 
2010 1,499 2013         
2011 1,316 2014         
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 924 31 5 0.5 145 16 774 26 
Panel E. In 𝒕 + 𝒍 N Year t+1/t+2/t+3 N % N % N % N % 
2002 1,906 2002/2003/2004         
2003 935 2003/2004/2005 307 33 0 0.0 44 14 263 17 
2004 1,621 2004/2005/2006 560 35 5 0.9 79 14 476 24 
2005 1,834 2005/2006/2007 469 26 4 0.9 74 16 391 27 
2006 2,215 2006/2006/2008 314 14 0 0.0 65 21 249 24 
2007 1,666 2007/2008/2009 435 26 3 0.7 75 17 357 27 
2008 1,661 2008/2009/2010 431 26 3 0.7 52 12 376 33 
2009 1,815 2009/2010/2011 392 22 2 0.5 54 14 336 29 
2010 1,499 2010/2011/2012 283 19 6 2.1 41 14 236 32 
2011 1,316 2011/2012/2013 124 9 3 2.4 21 17 100 28 




Table 6.2. SIMCE and language teachers in t, t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3. 








language and having 
reading test scores 
Teachers 
cheating in t+1 Re-takers 
Teachers (first-takers and non-
cheaters) applying to language 
and teaching language and 
having reading test scores 
           
Panel A. In t N Year t N % N % N % N % 
2002 1,906 2002         
2003 935 2003         
2004 1,621 2004 125 15 0 0.0 6 5 119 15 
2005 1,834 2005 101 17 1 1.0 19 19 81 14 
2006 2,215 2006 2 7 0 0.0 0 0 2 7 
2007 1,666 2007 186 35 4 2.2 37 20 145 27 
2008 1,661 2008 154 32 0 0.0 10 6 144 30 
2009 1,815 2009 162 36 2 1.2 17 10 143 31 
2010 1,499 2010 137 33 2 1.5 20 15 115 28 
2011 1,316 2011 124 35 5 4.0 19 15 100 28 
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 991 27 14 1.4 128 13 849 23 
Panel B. In t+1 N Year t+1 N % N % N % N % 
2002 1,906 2003         
2003 935 2004 96 17 0 0.0 4 4 92 17 
2004 1,621 2005 143 19 3 2.1 22 15 118 16 
2005 1,834 2006 157 29 0 0.0 33 21 124 23 
2006 2,215 2007 13 36 0 0.0 4 31 9 25 
2007 1,666 2008 133 28 0 0.0 18 14 115 24 
2008 1,661 2009 143 33 2 1.4 23 16 118 27 
2009 1,815 2010 135 32 1 0.7 21 16 113 27 
2010 1,499 2011 153 40 2 1.3 18 12 133 35 
2011 1,316 2012 154 48 6 3.9 27 18 121 38 
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 1,127 29 14 1.2 170 15 943 24 
Panel C. In t+2 N Year t+2 N % N % N % N % 
2002 1,906 2004         
2003 935 2005 108 21 0 0.0 27 25 81 16 
2004 1,621 2006 224 32 1 0.4 21 9 202 29 
2005 1,834 2007 204 40 1 0.5 40 20 163 32 
2006 2,215 2008 5 21 0 0.0 2 40 3 13 
2007 1,666 2009 161 36 3 1.9 28 17 130 29 
2008 1,661 2010 136 33 1 0.7 18 13 117 29 
2009 1,815 2011 120 30 0 0.0 17 14 103 26 
2010 1,499 2012 187 53 3 1.6 30 16 154 44 
2011 1,316 2013         
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 1,145 34 9 0.8 183 16 953 28 
Panel D. In t+3 N Year t+3 N % N % N % N % 
2002 1,906 2005         
2003 935 2006 110 22 0 0.0 19 17 91 18 
2004 1,621 2007 207 31 1 0.5 33 16 173 26 
2005 1,834 2008 131 29 0 0.0 20 15 111 24 
2006 2,215 2009 10 38 0 0.0 2 20 8 31 
2007 1,666 2010 108 26 2 1.9 15 14 91 22 
2008 1,661 2011 138 37 1 0.7 25 18 112 30 
2009 1,815 2012 168 47 0 0.0 34 20 134 37 
2010 1,499 2013         
2011 1,316 2014         
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 872 31 4 0.5 148 17 720 26 
Panel E. In t+l N Year t+1, t+2, t+3 N % N % N % N % 
2002 1,906 2002/2003/2004         
2003 935 2003/2004/2005 314 20 0 0.0 50 16 264 17 
2004 1,621 2004/2005/2006 574 27 5 0.9 76 13 493 23 
2005 1,834 2005/2006/2007 492 33 1 0.2 93 19 398 26 
2006 2,215 2006/2006/2008 28 33 0 0.0 8 29 20 23 
2007 1,666 2007/2008/2009 402 30 5 1.2 61 15 336 25 
2008 1,661 2008/2009/2010 417 34 4 1.0 66 16 347 29 
2009 1,815 2009/2010/2011 423 36 1 0.2 72 17 350 30 
2010 1,499 2010/2011/2012 340 46 5 1.5 48 14 287 39 
2011 1,316 2011/2012/2013 154 48 6 3.9 27 18 121 38 
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 3,144 31 27 0.9 501 16 2,616 26 
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Table 6.3. Number of teachers by application order. 
Number of application Number of Teachers % 
1 14,703 89.3% 
2 1,632 9.9% 
3 124 0.8% 
4 9 0.1% 
Total 16,468 100% 
 
The second issue has to do with the fact that the sample of teachers includes takers. As seen 
in Table 6.3, there are 16,468 applications, of which 14,703 are first applications (p=1). This 
means that 10.7% of the applicants are applying for a second (p=2), third (p=3), or fourth time 
(p=4). 
Teachers could apply many times to the AEP, which may have resulted in a manipulation of 
the running variable. For instance, a teacher who knew that his first application was very close to 
reaching the cutoff could improve exactly what was needed in order to obtain a higher score. If 
this happened, the validity of the identification strategy would be threatened. Even though there 
is no evidence of manipulation, as shown in Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, the test is clearer for p=1. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to keep only first-time applicants in the sample. Doing this, as shown 
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 results in losing 15%/16% of data for language and math teachers with 
SIMCE scores in the main data set. 
The third issue that needs attention in order to define the final sample of applicants is related 
to the completeness of the dataset made available by the Ministry of Education. As mentioned 
above, there is no data to identify the school and classrooms where the applicants taught in 2003. 
In consequence, teachers who applied to the program in 2003 are dropped from the sample used 
to run the specification checks in year t.  
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Figure 6.1. MacCrary test for any p. 
 
Notes: The figure shows the plot calculated by the 
DCdensity STATA command for the score distance to 
the program cutoff score. Only data for non-cheaters 
who applied in 2003-2011 is included. The coefficient 
estimated by the McCrary test is -0.014, with a 
standard deviation of 0.04, which gives us a t-statistic 
of -0.39. 
 
Figure 6.2. MacCrary test for p=1. 
 
Notes: The figure shows the plot calculated by the 
DCdensity STATA command for the score distance to 
the program cutoff score. Only data for non-cheaters 
and first-applicants who applied in 2003-2011 is 
included. The coefficient estimated by the McCrary 
test is -0.007 with a standard deviation of 0.04, which 
implies a t-statistic of -0.175. 
 
Figure 6.3. MacCrary test for p>1. 
 
Notes: The figure shows the plot calculated by the DCdensity STATA command for the score distance to the 
program cutoff score. Only data for non-cheaters who applied more than once in 2003-2011 is included. The 
coefficient estimated by the McCrary test is -0.013 with a standard deviation of 0.113, which implies a t-statistic 
of -0.119. 
 
Consequently, the program’s effect, as defined in the methodology section, is estimated using 
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math or language, and whose students took the math or reading SIMCE test in t + 1, t + 2 and t + 
3. As shown in Table 6.4, 2,616 language teachers are in the final sample. They in turn can be 
linked to 93,393 students with reading test scores. Meanwhile, the final sample is comprised by 
2,784 first-applicants and non-cheaters who applied for math certification in t, taught math in (t + 
l) and have math test scores in the same year (t + l).  This group of teachers is linked to 100,545 
students with math test scores. In fact, as shown in Table 6.4, the program’s effect is estimated 
with data for teachers by using close to 200,000 observations at student level. For example, 
Table 6.4 shows the effect of program for is estimated with 193,938 student observations for 
5,400 teachers. Lastly, the specification checks are run for those 1,802 teachers applying for 
math or language certification in year t (2004-2011) who teach math or language, and whose 
64,548 students took the math or reading SIMCE test in t, as well (see Panel A of Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4. Final sample of math and language teachers and students. 
   (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
   
Final teachers' 
sample in t+1, 
t+2, and t+3 
Final students' 
sample in t+1, 









                
Year t N Year t+1/t+2/t+3 N N Year t N N 
2002 1,906  2003/2004/2005   2002   
2003   935  2004/2005/2006 527 20,586 2003   
2004 1,621  2005/2006/2007 969 37,290 2004 236 10,839 
2005 1,834  2006/2006/2008 789 32,499 2005 171 5,135 
2006 2,215  2007/2008/2009 269 7,923 2006 94 2,705 
2007 1,666  2008/2009/2010 693 25,020 2007 299 11,299 
2008 1,661  2009/2010/2011 723 26,041 2008 264 9,629 
2009 1,815  2010/2011/2012 686 23,879 2009 282 9,379 
2010 1,499  2011/2012/2013 523 14,266 2010 229 8,088 
2011 1,316  2012/2013/2014 221 6,434 2011 227 7,474 
        





6.3. Descriptive statistics of applicants and certified teachers. 
The AEP program was open to teachers who comply with specific requirements. Teachers 
working in a teaching position for at least 20 hours a week, in a public-funded school, and who 
have at least two years of experience, could apply to the program. Thus, the minimum 
requirements to apply, together with the volunteer feature of the program, resulted in having a 
pool of applicants that is a subsample of teachers who do not necessarily represent Chilean 
teachers as a whole. This fact, in turn, may have significant consequences concerning the 
external validity of the results obtained in this research. In this case, attention should be paid 
towards the possibility of extrapolating the results of the study carried out on the analyzed 
teacher sample, as compared to the average teacher in the labor market.  
To describe the teacher’s sample, in this section, besides the description of the application 
process, two kinds of comparative descriptions are presented: applicants versus non-applicants 
and certified versus non-certified teachers. The first comparative exercise allows an 
understanding of what makes the applicants different relative to those teachers that did not 
participate in the AEP. The second exercise gives an idea of the global average differences 
between teachers that showed having the teaching skills and knowledge to obtain the 
certification and those who did not. 
Application process characterization 
 Two facts can characterize the application process. The first one is the high level of self-selection 
along the application process, represented by a high drop-out rate between the registration stage and 
the portfolio submission six months later. As stated by an applicant, “They knew that this was a 
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difficult thing; that is, that it was made that way because it was a selective process, not everyone 
was going to reach the end” (Araya et al., 2011, p. 218, certified teacher quote).  
Every year, thousands of teachers registered for the program, and high rate of them asked for 
the portfolio. However, only a small portion of them became valid applications, submitting the 
portfolio and taking the test to allow their assessment. At the registration stage, more than 65,446 
registrations for the program were received. However, the percentage of teachers that completes 
the application process averaged 25% and ranged between 19% and 30% for the period between 
2002 and 2011. Teachers reported that the main reasons behind their drop-out decision were an 
excessive work-load and limited time to work on the portfolio (Falck et al., 2015).  






% of valid 
applicants 
2002 8,638 22% 
2003 4,147 23% 
2004 5,392 30% 
2005 6,927 26% 
2006 7,473 30% 
2007 6,941 24% 
2008 6,298 26% 
2009 7,314 25% 
2010 7,696 19% 
2011 4,620 28% 
Total 65,446 25% 
 
The second fact that characterized the application process is the small share of the total 
number of potential applicants of teachers who finished the application process (valid 
applicants). Until 2011, more than 16,000 Chilean teachers applied voluntarily to the program. 
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Even though the program was free and confidential, for the period of 2002-2011, on average, 
only 12% of eligible teachers applied to the program.17  
It is also relevant to study if the teachers that finally applied to the program come from a 
diverse set of schools. This can be informative and demonstrates how special or representative 
the applicants are. In Table 6.6, we observe that the number of schools with at least one teacher 
applying for AEP every year is slightly smaller than the number of applicants, which implies that 
most applicants come from a different school. Furthermore, the number of schools that are part 
of the program are closer to 11% per year. In the same sense, 38% of all public-funded schools 
have at least one teacher who applied to AEP during the years 2003-2011. All of this suggests 
that there is no particular concentration of applicants across the schools.  






Number of schools with at 
least one AEP applicant 
Total number of 
public-funded 
schools 
% Public-funded schools 
with at least one AEP 
applicant      
2003 935 785 10,568 7.40% 
2004 1,621 1,325 11,448 11.60% 
2005 1,834 1,495 11,673 12.80% 
2006 2,215 1,723 11,724 14.70% 
2007 1,666 1,379 11,795 11.70% 
2008 1,661 1,362 11,922 11.40% 
2009 1,815 1,386 12,050 11.50% 
2010 1,499 1,243 12,112 10.30% 
2011 1,316 1,116 12,066 9.20% 
  
                                               
17 “This percentage is calculated on the basis of the 137,729 teachers with more than 2 years of work experience 
(counted since their graduation date) who work for at least 20 classroom hours in municipal or private subsidized 
schools according to the database of the Professional Recognition Bonus Program of the Ministry of Education in 




In Table 6.7, I present a set of characteristics of the teachers that did apply and did not apply to 
the program per year. Since teachers instruct at more than one school, variables such as “only 
teaches at school” are dummy variables equal to 1 if the teacher declares to only instruct in at 
least one of the schools where he/she teaches. 
In terms of teacher characteristics, applicants are on average 41.9 years old, have nearly 15 
years of experience, and 73.2% of them are female. In most of the cases, teachers who apply to 
the program tend to teach at the school and do not have other responsibilities within their school. 
For instance, 97.2% of the applicants only teach at their school, while 3.5% have other 
responsibilities. Thus, the applicants’ main responsibility is teaching. As shown in Table 6.7, the 
teachers work in a few different schools, while 66% of applicants have a tenure contract. Lastly, 
almost all applicants have a bachelor’s degree in teaching and graduate education, which ranges 
from a diploma to a doctoral degree. However, their graduate education is mostly in areas other 
than education.   
In comparing applicants and non-applicants, we can see that in terms of the number of 
schools where they teach, there are no relevant differences between them. However, there are 
more important differences in the types of degrees. Applicants for the program are more likely to 
have an undergraduate degree in education (97% vs 92%) than non-applicants and are more 
likely to have some graduate education than non-applicants (38% vs 35). Furthermore, applicants 
are younger, less experienced and contain more female participants than non-applicants.  
Some differences between applicants and non-applicants can be explained by the nature of 
the program. For instance, to apply for the program, the teacher has to have at least 20 hours of 
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teaching, which reduces the chances of having other responsibilities at the school. Also, as stated 
by Falck et al. (2015), the fact that females are overrepresented in the applicants group can be 
explained by the way the program was implemented. The certification categories by subject-
grade were progressively expanded, starting by subject-grades that were dominated by females, 
such as general-primary-education. However, subject-grades that were dominated by males, 
including science-high-school, were opened four years after the program started and in turn, this 
made female teachers have a greater chance to apply for the program than males.   
Table 6.8 shows some differences in the types of schools where applicants and non-
applicants teach. Applicant teachers tended to come more frequently from non-vocational 
schools than non-applicants (36% vs 29%), are less likely to teach in the metropolitan region 
(28% vs 34%) and are more likely to teach in public or private voucher-schools than non-
applicants, 51% vs 48% and 55% vs 46%, respectively. Moreover, 10% of the teachers changed 
the pools of schools where they were teaching within the application period (movers) and almost 
no teachers re-entered the teaching profession after not being a teacher in a public-funded school 
during the previous period.  
Overall, there are some differences between applicants and non-applicants. Applicants are 
younger and with more specialized degrees than non-applicants, they tended to teach more often 
and are less involved in administrative duties and were more likely to work in public schools. 
Moreover, as was described above, the application process is long, and many teachers start the 
process but do not finish it; thus, it is likely that other factors, such as perseverance, are 
correlated with the final decision to apply to the program. Therefore, one must be careful when 
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examining the external validity of the results, since there are some small, but relevant, 
observable differences between applicants and non-applicants to the program.  
Table 6.7. Differences in teacher characteristics between applicants and non-applicants. 
 
Variable  Did not apply Applied 
Teacher characteristics 
Age 43.96 41.89 
 (11.81) (9.135) 
Female  0.716 0.732 
 (0.451) (0.443) 
Years of experience 16.32 14.80 
 (12.36) (9.559) 
Teacher working conditions 
Has other responsibilities besides teaching 0.162 0.0353 
 (0.369) (0.184) 
Only teaches at school 0.846 0.972 
 (0.361) (0.165) 
Teaches in the school where he/she works the most 0.840 0.968 
 (0.366) (0.176) 
Number of schools where the teachers work 1.098 1.155 
 (0.348) (0.416) 
Tenure contract 0.670 0.657 
 (0.470) (0.475) 
Teacher education level 
Bachelor’s degree in education 0.920 0.973 
 (0.272) (0.163) 
Some graduate education 0.967 0.989 
 (0.178) (0.106) 
Some graduate education with specialization in teaching/education 0.346 0.384 
 (0.476) (0.486) 
Where the teacher teaches 
Teaches in non-vocational high school 0.288 0.357 
 (0.453) (0.479) 
Teaches in vocational high school 0.0660 0.0876 
 (0.248) (0.283) 
Teaches in metropolitan region 0.352 0.294 
 (0.478) (0.456) 
Teaches in public voucher-school 0.475 0.511 
 (0.499) (0.500) 
Teaches in private voucher-school 0.458 0.550 
 (0.498) (0.498) 
Teaches in a rural school 0.146 0.128 
 (0.353) (0.334) 
Notes: (i) Standard errors in parentheses, (ii) this table shows the information for all teachers working in public-




Certified and non-certified teachers  
According to the relative results of the assessment process, AEP is a highly selective process. Up 
until 2011, 24% of the applicants were awarded this certification (see Table 2.1). The certificated 
group consists of 4,007 different teachers, who represent 3% of the total number of potential 
applicants for the program18. 
Next, I examine the differences within the applicants and between teachers who obtained the 
certification and teachers who did not. Table 6.9 reports difference-in-means of the outcome 
variables and pre-intervention covariates for the restricted final sample that is used in the 
specification checks described in Section 8.2 and whose results are presented in Chapter 10. The 
variables under analysis are grouped into balance and falsification. The former lists the variables 
that, in the next chapter, are used to run the balance checks to support the validity of the Sharp 
Regression Discontinuity (SRD) design. While the falsification variables are those outcomes that 
are analyzed in next chapter as a result of the program after certification is granted, they are also 
analyzed in the application year to see if there is a treatment effect on placebo outcomes. It is 
noteworthy that, in this case, the descriptive statistics do not restrict the sample to only 
observations that are within a pre-determined distance to the cutoff or bandwidth. 
  
                                               
18 This rate was recalculated taking into consideration the AEP applicants until 2011 and the number of eligible 
teachers in that year (137,729). They are “teachers with more than 2 years of work experience (counted since their 
graduation date) who work for at least 20 classroom hours in municipal or private subsidized schools according to 
the database of the Professional Recognition Bonus Program of the Ministry of Education in September 2011” 




Table 6.8. Summary statistics and difference-in-means within AEP applicants. 
 
 Non-Certified Group  Certified Group Difference-in-means 










means Std. Err p-value 
Panel A. Balance Variables 
            
Panel A.1 Teachers' characteristics 
Experience 1,166 14.1 0.30 590 13.0 0.39 -1.2 0.49 0.02 
Female 1,168 0.8 0.01 590 0.7 0.02 -0.1 0.02 0.01 
Age 1,167 41.9 0.28 589 39.7 0.38 -2.2 0.47 0.00 
Spec. Degree 1,168 0.2 0.01 590 0.2 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.00 
Tenure 1,168 0.7 0.01 590 0.6 0.02 0.0 0.02 0.10 
Metropolitan Region 1,168 0.3 0.01 590 0.3 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.02 
Rural Area 1,168 0.2 0.01 590 0.2 0.02 0.0 0.02 0.02 
Teacher is a mover 1,036 0.1 0.01 487 0.1 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.91 
Teacher is a re-entry 1,036 0.0 0.01 487 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.28 
            
Panel A.2 Students' Characteristics 
Female Student 41,585 0.49 0.00 22,963 0.50 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.06 
Mother's Schooling>12 36,350 0.19 0.00 20,463 0.21 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.00 
Book at home>50 37,289 0.19 0.00 20,932 0.24 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.00 
Family Income Top Quintile 37,289 0.18 0.00 20,932 0.21 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.00 
            
Panel A.3 Schools' Characteristics 
Public School 1,168 0.50 0.02 590 0.46 0.02 0.0 0.03 0.19 
Low-Medium SES School 1,168 0.52 0.02 590 0.42 0.02 -0.1 0.03 0.00 
            
Panel B. Falsification Variables 
            
Well Prepared 926 0.67 0.01 489 0.75 0.01 0.1 0.02 0.00 
Topics Covered 930 0.37 0.01 491 0.41 0.01 0.0 0.02 0.01 
Class Preparation>5 804 0.55 0.02 416 0.63 0.02 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Test Scores 41,269 -0.03 0.01 22,841 0.18 0.01 0.2 0.01 0.00 
Notes: The restricted sample of math and language teachers includes those who applied for math or language 
certification and were teaching that subject in year t (2004-2011). Only first-time applicants and non-cheaters are 
considered. 
Table 6.9 shows that certified teachers were likely to be significantly less experienced, 
younger, have some specialized degree, as well as being more likely to teach students from a 
higher socioeconomic background in higher SES schools. These certified teachers tended to feel 
better prepared at a higher frequency than teachers who did not obtain certification. Also, those 
certified in the future were more likely to cover a greater part of the curriculum and spent more 
time on class preparation than those who remained non-certified. Importantly, the students of 
certified teachers outperformed students of non-certified teachers. Student test scores of certified 
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teachers are, on average, 0.2 standard deviations higher than those of students whose teachers 
received certification the next year. Similarly, Bravo et al. (2008) shows that in 2002, the 
students whose teachers were certified obtained an average test score that was 0.16 SD and 0.27 
SD higher than those obtained by students whose teachers were non-certified or did not apply for 
the program, respectively. However, certified teachers also taught students whose parents also 
had more years of education than the parents of students of non-certified teachers and non-
applicants. Even though this evidence is informative in terms of how representative the AEP 
applicants are compared to that of the average teacher in Chile, it also gives an idea that the 
observed differences in student’s test scores cannot be assumed as differences in teacher 
performance or quality.  
Finally, I study the determinants of the AEP scores. To do this, I regress the final score on 
several teacher and school characteristics, which allows me to calculate partial correlations. 
Table 6.10 presents the results of this descriptive exercise. I found that teachers who teach in 
primary school, have more years of experience and have a specialized degree in education 
performed better in the certification, while older teachers and teachers that teach in vocational 
schools performed worse. 
Taken altogether, all the presented evidence suggests that applicants and certified teachers 
cannot be considered a representative group of all teachers in Chile. The fact that certified 
teachers are different, on average, compared to their non-certified counterparts suggests that 
using a local approximation to estimate the effect of the program is the right strategy, since the 
global approximation shown suggests that there are significant differences between treated and 
control teachers in the global sample. This also reinforces the idea that the program effects that 
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are found in Chapter 10 represent the local average treatment effect (LATE), and its 
extrapolation to all applicants would need further assumptions. Moreover, the extrapolation of 
results is also limited due to the significant instance of applicant’s self-selection that results in 
applicants who are systematically different than non-applicants in endogenous variables, such as 
working conditions and education levels. This might limit the external validity of the results 
found in this research, which means that the ex-post effect of the program that is estimated 
cannot be assumed, as the average effect that giving a performance recognition would have if 
given to an average teacher.   
Table 6.9. Determinants of the AEP score. Partial correlations. 
 
 Variables  AEP Score 
   
 Teacher characteristics 
 Age -0.009*** 
  (0.00) 
 Female  0.015 
  (0.01) 
 Years of experience 0.004*** 
  (0.00) 
 Teacher education  
 Specialized degree in education 0.055*** 
  (0.01) 
 Where the teacher teaches 
 Teaches in Primary 0.049*** 
  (0.01) 
 Teaches in Secondary Non-Vocational 0.002 
  (0.01) 
 Teaches in Secondary Vocational -0.035** 
  (0.01) 
 Teaches in Metropolitan Region -0.002 
  (0.01) 
 Teaches in Public School 0.008 
  (0.01) 
 Teaches in Private Voucher School 0.002 
  (0.01) 
 Observations 11,420 
Notes: (i) Standard errors in parentheses; (ii) Standard Errors clustered by Year, Year dummies are included; (iii)* 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Chapter 7 - Methodology 
In this section, summarizing and following the recommendations made by Skovron and Titiunik 
(2015) in “A Practical Guide to Regression Discontinuity Designs in Political Science”, 
Calonico et al. (2017) in “A Practical Introduction to Regression Discontinuity Designs: Part I”, 
and Calonico (2017) in “RDrobust: Software for regression discontinuity designs”, I formally 
show the parameter of interest for my research questions, its interpretation, how to estimate it, 
and how to make statistical inferences. I also take into consideration the seminal work presented 
by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). The graphical analysis and presentation of the results follow 
Calonico et al. (2015b) in the paper “Optimal Data-Driven Regression Discontinuity Plots”. 
7.1. The Parameter of interest 
To answer the research questions, I ideally need to identify the causal effect of the certification 
of the Teaching Excellence Program19 (AEP for its initials in Spanish) on different outcomes of 
interest after the teachers received it. The identification strategy that allows me to estimate a 
credibly causal ex-post effect of the program relies in exploiting the discontinuity in its 
rewarding process. The evaluation process gave every applicant a score that went from 1 to 4, 
only those with scores equal or higher to 2.75 were rewarded with the certification.20 Using this 
assignment rule, I use a Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design (SRD) to identify the effect of 
getting the certification given by AEP. 
                                               
19 Asignación de Excelencia Pedagógica. 
20 In 2002, teachers with scores equal or higher to 2.5 were rewarded with the certification. 
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The rationale of the SRD design can help us to understand how it can be an effective 
identification strategy. The basic idea behind the SRD Design in this case is that assignment to 
the certification (treatment), is determined completely by the value of the teacher j’s final score 
(the running variable sj) being on either side of the threshold (𝑆r 	= 	2.75). This generates a 
discontinuity of size one in the conditional probability of receiving the certification as a function 
of the score given by the applicant’s evaluation made by AEP. This running variable is itself 
associated with potential outcomes, and this association is assumed smooth. As a result, any 
discontinuity of the conditional distribution of the outcome as a function of the score at the cutoff 
can be interpreted as evidence of a causal effect of AEP (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
Formally, I estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) of AEP, which is the 
parameter of interest and can be defined as: 𝜏xyz = 𝐸[𝑌|(1) − 𝑌|(0)|	𝑆| = 𝑆r]             (7.1) 𝜏xyz = 𝐸[𝑌|(1)|	𝑆| = 𝑆r] − 𝐸[𝑌|(0)|	𝑆| = 𝑆r]           (7.2) 
Here I assume that each teacher 𝑗 has two potential outcomes, 𝑌|(1) and 𝑌|(0), which 
correspond, respectively, to the outcomes that would be observed following the assignment rule 𝑟| = 1{𝑠| − ?̃? ≥ 0}, where 1{	} is the indicator function, equal to one if the applicant j has a score 
value of at least 𝑆r; and zero otherwise. This means that all applicants with a score value less than 𝑆r are in the control group. This characteristic of the assignment rule 𝑟| is tested by analyzing the 
discontinuity in the probability of treatment around the cutoff as explained in Section 8.1 The 
result of this analysis is presented in Section 10.1. 
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Nevertheless, in Equation 7.2, the two conditional expectations or regression functions 𝐸[𝑌|(1)|	𝑆| = 𝑆r]  and 𝐸[𝑌|(0)|	𝑆| = 𝑆r] cannot be observed simultaneously. By design there are 
no teachers with a score that equals the minimum score to obtain the certification (𝑆| = 𝑆r) for 
whom we observe its performance (𝑌|) with and without treatment—this is the fundamental 
problem of causal inference. To solve this problem and estimate the regression functions 𝐸[𝑌|(𝑟)|	𝑆| = 𝑆r] , for 𝑟 = 0,1 , without making functional form assumptions, I exploit the SRD 
design that gives the possibility of observing teachers with scores close to 𝑆r. In order for this to 
work, I make a smoothness assumption that the regression functions are continuous at the cutoff 𝑆r. Under this assumption, 𝐸𝑌&(0)|𝑆& = 𝑆r	 = lim(x→xr) 𝐸[𝑌&(0)|𝑆& = 𝑎	] 	= 	 lim(x→xr) 𝐸[𝑌&|𝑆& = 𝑎	]        (7.3) 
implying that: 𝜏xyz = lim(̃→xr) 𝐸[𝑌&|𝑆& = 𝑎	] − lim(xRxr) 𝐸[𝑌&|𝑆& = 𝑎	]           (7.4) 
Equation 7.4 says that the difference between the limits of the average observed outcomes of 
teachers who received the certification and those who didn’t, as the scores converge to 𝑆r is equal 
to the LATE at S̃. I call this the SRD treatment effect, defined as Equation 7.1. 
7.2. Parameter’s interpretation 
The SRD treatment effect is defined as local. It might not represent the Average Treatment 
Effect (ATE) for every teacher and applicant, in consequence, the interpretation of the SRD point 
estimate needs further explanation. As suggested by Skovron and Titiunik [2015), in the general 
case where the ATE varies as a function of Sj, the SRD treatment effect may not be informative 
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about the ATE at values of Sj different than 𝑆r. This may be the case considering that the 
relationship between the score obtained by the applicant and her potential outcome are arguably 
non-constant functions of the score. Since the score is related to teachers’ ability, resources or 
other characteristics, those with much higher scores are often systematically different from 
teachers whose scores are much lower. For this reason, in the absence of specific assumptions 
about the global shape of the regression functions, from a conservative perspective, the effect 
recovered by the SRD design in this case is assumed as the local average treatment effect 
(LATE) at S, where the SRD point estimate is identified. This means that results found are 
representative of the sample of teachers whose score is around the cutoff, which restricts the 
external validity of the results to this group. This interpretation is also supported by the 
significant differences between the average covariates for certified and non-certified teachers as 
shown in Table 6.8. 
7.3. Approximating the functional form 
Now that I have defined the parameter of interest as the LATE at the threshold, given by 𝜏xyz =𝐸[𝑌|(1) − 𝑌|(0)|𝑆| = 𝑆r],  I determine the functional form of E[Yj(1)│Sj = s] and E[Yj(0)│Sj = s]. 
However, the exact functional form of these regression functions is unknown, so they need to be 
approximated. One way of doing this is by using local polynomial methods (Porter, 2003, 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2011, Calonico et al., 2014]. This means that the unknown regression 
function 𝐸[𝑌||𝑆| = 𝑠]  is approximated locally in a neighborhood of 𝑆r by a polynomial on the 
normalized score—i.e., on 𝑠 − 𝑆r. 
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As stated by Skovron and Titiunik (2015), the local-polynomial estimation and inference of 
the SRD point estimate (?̂?xyz = ?̂?& − ?̂?-)	 consists of the following steps: 
1. Choose bandwidth h 
Local polynomial methods estimate a polynomial using only observations whose scores are 
between 𝑆r − ℎ and 𝑆r + ℎ, where h is some chosen bandwidth. As suggested by Gelman and 
Imbens (2014), this local approach is preferable to global methods because, in the latter, 
observations far from the cutoff can distort the approximation near the cutoff and with that 
misleading results. 
Given the great importance of choosing the size of the bandwidth, the plan is to automatically 
choose the bandwidth that minimizes an approximation to the asymptotic mean squared error 
(MSE) of the SRD point estimator, ?̂?xyz . In order to avoid the search for specifications and ad-
hoc decisions, the h is selected in a data-driven fashion, looking to reduce the bias-variance 
trade-off associated with choosing a small or large bandwidth. This trade-off comes from the fact 
that choosing a very small h reduces the bias of the local polynomial approximation but increases 
the variance of the estimated coefficients because few observations are used for estimation. 
Similarly, a large h may result in a large bias if the regression function differs from the 
polynomial approximation, but results in lower variance due to the larger number of 
observations. This bias-variance trade-off can be minimized by optimizing the MSE of the 
estimator, which is the sum of its bias squared plus its variance. This procedure involves deriving 
the asymptotic MSE approximation, optimizing it with respect to h, and estimating the unknown 
quantities in the resulting formula (Calonico et al., 2014, Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2011). This 
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approach effectively chooses the h that optimizes the bias-variance trade-off, making this 
bandwidth optimal for point estimation. 
2. For each observation j, calculate weight 𝑤| = 	𝐾((𝑆| − 𝑆r) ℎ⁄ ) 
After having determined which observations are used to locally approximate the regression 
functions, I assign a weight to each one of these observations. Within the bandwidth, 
observations closer to 𝑆r receive more weight than observations further away, where the weights 
are determined by a kernel function 𝐾[∙]. This estimation approach is nonparametric because it 
does not assume a particular parametric form of the regression functions. 
More precisely, I use a triangular kernel function 𝐾(((𝑆| − 𝑆r)/ℎ)) = (1 − |(𝑆| −𝑆r)/ℎ|)(|(𝑆| − 𝑆r)/ℎ| ≤ 1). This is because, when using an optimal MSE bandwidth, triangular 
kernel at a boundary point leads to a point estimator with optimal variance and bias properties 
(Skovron and Titiunik, 2015). 
3. Choose additional covariates Xj 
Before beginning the local-polynomial estimation itself, I decide whether to use additional 
covariates to improve the fit of the local-polynomial approximation as suggested by Calonico et 
al. (2016b). They show that a covariate-adjusted RD estimator remains consistent for the 
standard SRD treatment effect and characterizes precisely the potential point estimation and 
inference improvements. 
Following Calonico et al. (2016b), I choose additional covariates that are “balanced” at the 
cutoff, which ensures that ?̂?xyz → 𝜏 , where p is the chosen polynomial order. This condition is 
tested empirically while performing the balance checks described in Chapter 8. If the balance 
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checks show no significant difference of the teachers’ characteristics between treated and 
controls in the application year, t, those that certainly cannot be affected by the treatment in t+l 
are included as additional covariates in a vector Xj. 
The way of illustrating a successful covariate-adjustment in the local polynomial RD 
estimation is to show a decrease in the length of the confidence interval while simultaneously 
leaving the point estimate roughly unchanged. This exercise is presented as robustness check in 
Chapter 10. 
Based on implementation history of the program, fixed effects of subject, grade level and 
application year are included. In terms of grade and subject, it is important to account for the fact 
that the different grade levels in which both teachers teach, and students are tested have specific 
characteristics that may influence intermediate and final outcomes. In addition, the evolution of 
the program over the years needs to be accounted for as well. For example, the tendency of 
increasing the number of certification categories at the time that the pool of potential new 
applicants was reduced became a trend in terms of the number and kind of teachers applying 
every year. The program started certifying only primary teachers, the larger group of teachers in 
Chile. Years passed and teachers from other less massive grades and subjects were progressively 
invited to apply, increasing the number of potential applicants at a decreasing rate. At the same 
time, the self-selection process of a semi-fixed stock of applicants resulted in a reduction of 
potential applicants. These two processes might have shaped a trend for the characteristics and 




4. Choose the polynomial order p. 
The polynomial order needs to be defined by choosing between the flexibility given by a 
higher polynomial order and its over-fitting risk. The high polynomial orders bring flexibility 
and improves the accuracy of the approximation, but it can lead to severe approximation errors 
due to over-fitting or biases at boundary points (Gelman and Imbens, 2014). In this context, 
Skovron and Titiunik 2015 explains that in the case of the RD point estimate, since the object of 
interest is a conditional expectation, the recommended choice is a polynomial of order one, that 
is, a local—i.e., inside the bandwidth—linear regression. 
5. Fit the regression on each hand side and calculate the SRD point estimate. 
For observations above the cutoff and within the chosen bandwidth (𝑆r ≤ 𝑆| ≤ 𝑆r + ℎ), I fit a 
weighted least squares regression of the outcome Yj on a constant, a vector of covariates Xj ,  (𝑆r ≤ 𝑆|), (𝑆r ≤ 𝑆|)3, . . . , (𝑆r ≤ 𝑆|)) where p is the chosen polynomial order one, with the 
weight 𝜔| for each observation. The estimated intercept is an estimate of 𝜏& is the SRD point 
estimate (?̂?xyz = ?̂?& − ?̂?-). For the left-hand side, the same procedure is followed, but using 
observations below the cutoff and within the chosen bandwidth (𝑆r − ℎ ≤ 𝑆| ≤ 𝑆r). In this case, 
the estimated intercept is an estimate of 𝜏-. Now, the SRD point estimate can be calculated as (?̂?xyz = ?̂?& − ?̂?-), which is an optimal and consistent estimator (Skovron and Titiunik, 2015). 
This follows from assuming that the bandwidth sequence shrinks appropriately as the sample 
size increases and using MSE-optimal bandwidths. However, Skovron and Titiunik (2015) also 
explains that the rate of convergence of the MSE-optimal bandwidth leads to a bias in the 
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distributional approximation of the estimator that is used to create confidence intervals. Ignoring 
the bias term leads to invalid inferences. This is why an additional step needs to be taken in order 
to make valid hypothesis tests. 
6. Local Polynomial Inference. 
As stated by Skovron and Titiunik (2015), the MSE-optimal bandwidth is designed to be 
optimal for point estimation, not for inference. To address this issue, I use the robust inference 
method developed by Calonico et al. (2014) (CCT method henceforth) to have smaller coverage 
errors when using the MSE-optimal bandwidth. This CCT method, besides being a data-driven 
method that reduces the ad-hoc decisions, results in robust confidence intervals that lead to valid 
local polynomial inference when the MSE-optimal is used (Calonico et al., 2015a). 
These six steps are followed by using the robust command in STATA that was developed by 
Calonico et al. (2016a). This is the CCT method that allows me to fit a weighted linear least 
squares regression of the outcome within MSE-optimal bandwidths that optimize the bias-
variance trade-off. In addition, by using the rdrobust command, robust inference methods are 
used. In consequence, the proposed estimation procedure leads to a consistent and optimal (in an 
asymptotic MSE sense) covariate-adjusted SRD point estimator of the LATE, enabling robust 
confidence intervals, valid inferences and hypothesis tests for the SRD point estimate, ?̂?xyz . 
The next step is related to clustering the standard errors. In this case the units of analysis are 
teachers, who are clustered into schools. This may result in errors correlated within but not 
across schools. In such settings default standard errors can greatly overstate estimator precision. 
Thus, clustering the standard errors at school level is needed. As suggested by Calonico et al. 
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(2017), it may be appropriate to employ variance estimators that are robust to the clustered 
nature of the data. The robust command allows for employing cluster-robust variance estimators, 
which results in different estimated standard errors and bandwidths relative to the unclustered 
case. In addition, cluster-robust variance estimators can be smaller or larger than variance 
estimators that do not account for clustering. As explained by Calonico et al. (2017), all this 
means that when cluster-robust variance estimators are employed, cluster-robust standard errors 
can lead to re-centered confidence intervals that can be either shorter or longer in length. 
In practice the main estimations include standard errors at school level and fixed effect for 
grade and subject, and application year.  
7.4. Graphical analyses 
The SRD design can be illustrated graphically by a scatter plot of the aggregated observed 
outcomes against the score values. In this case, the outcome of interest can be student test scores, 
teachers’ effort or self-esteem, is plotted against the distance between the applicant’s score and 
the cutoff. The graphical analysis with the RD plots is very informative by showing more global 
polynomial fit, and local sample means. On one hand, the global polynomial fit allows us to see 
if there is a discontinuity in the outcome around the cutoff. On the other hand, the RD plot shows 
the local sample means of the outcome computed over an evenly-spaced partition of the support 
of the running variable with binned sample means mimicking the underlying variability of the 
data, for certified and non-certified teachers separately. In order to get the most out of the RD 
plots, I use those recommended by Calonico et al. (2015b) and implemented using STATA’s 
command (rdplot): RD plots.  
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Chapter 8 - Empirical strategy 
Linked to the previous chapter, this chapter describes the analysis that is carried out. Therefore, 
this chapter starts with the Sharp Regression Discontinuity (SRD) design validation. This 
includes analysis of the discontinuity in the probability of treatment around the cutoff and 
running specification checks. The empirical strategy also describes some potential 
methodological problems and how they are tested in order to provide further evidence on the 
robustness of the results. Lastly, the analysis of the outcomes of interest is explained. 
8.1. Analysis of the discontinuity in the probability of treatment 
First of all, I test if a SRD design should be used. I look for basic evidence of the existence of a 
valid SRD design, which is the discontinuity of size one in the probability of being assigned to 
the treatment group around the cutoff. To check this, the relationship between the distance to the 
cutoff and the frequency of receiving the Teaching Excellence Award21 (AEP for its initials in 
Spanish) is plotted. This graph simultaneously includes the first application of teachers in the 
sample for all years of the program (2002-2011) excluding those who were caught cheating. The 
exclusion of this group of applicants is unlikely to affect the global interpretation of the plot 
because they represent less than 0.54% of the total number of applications (89). 
8.2. Specification checks 
Having tested the discontinuity in the probability of treatment around the cutoff, further evidence 
                                               
21 Asignación de Excelencia Pedagógica. 
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about the design’s validity is presented. I indirectly test the smoothness assumption22 that 
provides support of the SRD design. The smoothness assumption can be indirectly tested using 
various implications of the identification argument underlying the SRD design. Specifically, I 
test if there are: (i) no other changes of other covariates at the same threshold, and (ii) any 
manipulations of the score that underlies the assignment mechanism. Although the proposed tests 
do not directly test the null hypotheses required for the SRD approach to be valid, they allow me 
to argue for the approach’s validity if these null hypotheses hold. 
Following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)’s recommendations, I carry out three sets of 
specification checks. The first one is the density test of the running variable to test for 
manipulation of the assignment rule. The second and third specification sets test for a non-
treatment effect on predetermined covariates and placebo outcomes respectively. Both null 
hypotheses are expected to be non-rejected in order to provide further support to the SRD 
design’s validity. Complementarily to these three specification checks, a final falsification test 
for the non-treatment effect with alternative cutoffs is performed following Skovron and Titiunik 
(2015)’s recommendations. 
Testing manipulation of the running variable 
A discontinuity in the density of the running variable (the score (𝑆|) obtained for the applicant) at 
the particular point where the discontinuity in the conditional expectation occurs is suggestive of 
violations in the assumption of non-manipulation of the assignment rule. To check for this, I test 
the density of the running variable by looking whether, in a local neighborhood near the cutoff 
                                               
22 See Section 7.1 for further details. 
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(𝑆r), the number of observations below the cutoff is considerably different from the number of 
observations above it. To do so, I show a histogram of the running variable and visually check 
whether the number of observations above and below the cutoff is similar. Additionally, I 
formally test the null hypothesis of continuity in the density of the covariate that underlies the 
assignment at the threshold, against the alternative of a jump in the density function at that point. 
Here the focus is on the difference 𝜏() = 𝑙𝑖𝑚xr→x(𝐸[𝑓(𝑠)] − 𝑙𝑖𝑚→xr(𝐸[𝑓(𝑠)]. In practice, I 
perform McCrary (2008) density test in STATA by using the command DCdensity. A 
substantially and statistically significant difference in the left and right limits would suggest that 
there may be problems with using the SRD approach. 
Testing treatment effect on predetermined covariates 
A discontinuity in other covariates around the cutoff casts doubt on the RD underlying 
assumptions. In fact, such a discontinuity goes against the assumption that teachers around the 
cutoff do not systematically differ in their unobservable characteristics, thereby offering valid 
counterfactual comparisons between control and treatment groups. To test this assumption, I look 
for discontinuities in the average value of pre-treatment covariates around the threshold. 
Specifically, for covariates Zj, the test would look at the difference 𝜏 = 𝑙𝑖𝑚xr→x(𝐸𝑍|𝑆| =𝑠) − 𝑙𝑖𝑚→xr(𝐸𝑍|𝑆| = 𝑠).  
In practice, I perform a balance check on predetermined covariates of the treatment and 
control groups. These estimates the treatment effect of AEP on those covariates. The null 
hypothesis of no treatment effect on the covariates around the threshold is expected to hold. 
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The balance checks are calculated for the application period 𝑡 on teacher characteristics 
(experience, gender, age, having a specialized degree, tenure23, teaching in the metropolitan 
region, teaching in a rural school, the number of schools and classrooms where the teacher 
works,  if the pool of schools where the teacher taught in 𝑡 + 1 is different from the pool of 
school the teacher taught in t (mover), and if the teacher was not in teaching in a public-funded 
school in 𝑡 + 1, but he was teaching in t (leaver), student characteristics (student gender, having 
a mother with more than 12 years of education, having more than 50 books at home, and being in 
the wealthiest quintile), and school characteristics (if the school publicly funded and 
administrated, and if the school’s enrollment has on average low or medium socioeconomic 
status (SES)). Importantly, the balance check includes data for teachers assigned to classrooms 
that take the national standardized test24 (SIMCE for its initials in Spanish) in the same 
application year (t). 
The linear polynomial specification of the regressions to run the balance check on teacher 
characteristics (Equation 8.1), student characteristics (Equation 8.2) and school characteristics 
(Equation 8.3) correspondingly are: 𝐵| = 	𝛼- + 𝛼&1𝑆| − 𝑆r| ≥ 0 + 𝑎3𝑆| − 𝑆r + 𝛼𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 + 𝜔 + 𝜐|                 (8.1) 𝐵¡| = 	 𝛼- + 𝛼&1𝑆| − 𝑆r| ≥ 0 + 𝑎3𝑆| − 𝑆r + 𝛼𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 + 𝜔 + 𝜐|           (8.2) 𝐵|¢ = 	𝛼- + 𝛼&1𝑆| − 𝑆r| ≥ 0 + 𝑎3𝑆| − 𝑆r + 𝛼𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 + 𝜔 + 𝜐|           (8.3) 
                                               
23 Tenure means that there is an open-ended employment contract. Teachers may be fired only under few and very 
specific conditions. 
24 Sistema Nacional de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación. 
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In Equation 8.1 Bjt is the characteristic of teacher j in the application year t, while in 
Equation 8.2 Bijt is the characteristic of the student i of teacher j in the application year t, and in 
Equation 8.3 Bjkt is the characteristic of the school k where teacher j teaches in application year t. 
Sjt is the score of teacher j in year t, 𝑆r is the cutoff in year t. Application year, subject and grade 
dummies (𝜔) are included. 
As a way to test the robustness of the balance checks, I also show the results of estimating 
Equations 8.2 and 8.3 including a set of balanced pre-treatment covariates (Xjt). This set of 
covariates is defined after testing the balance of teacher j’s characteristics by the estimation of 
Equation 8.1. 
This linear specification with interactions does not constrain the slope of the outcome/score 
relationship to be identical on both sides of the cut-point. In fact, Equations 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 
specify a different polynomial function of score on either side of the threshold. 
Testing treatment effect on placebo outcomes 
Complementarily, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Skovron and Titiunik (2015) recommend 
studying the treatment effect on placebo outcomes by the implementation of falsification tests. 
Specifically, the exercise is to estimate the program effect on students’ test scores and teachers’ 
behavior during the application period. These are outcomes that should not be affected by the 
treatment in the application year since the teachers have not yet received the program’s results. 
As in the balance checks, the falsification tests use data linked to teachers assigned to classrooms 
that take the SIMCE test in t.  
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The falsification test is performed with the same nonparametric local linear method used to 
estimate the balance check. In this case the specification is the following: 𝐹¡| = 	 𝛼- + 𝛼&1𝑆| − 𝑆r| ≥ 0 + 𝑎3𝑆| − 𝑆r + 𝛼𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 + 𝜔 + 𝜐|            (8.4)  
This specification includes three different placebo outcomes (Fijt): (i) the math or language 
test scores of student i teacher j in the application year t; (ii) the effort of teacher j in year t; and 
(iii) the self-confidence of teacher j in year t (Fjt). The standard errors are clustered at school 
level. Lastly, as done with the balance checks, the robustness of the results of the falsification 
tests to the inclusion of covariates is also included. 
As explained in Chapter 7, Equations 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 are approximated by using the 
nonparametric local polynomial approach within a mean-squared-error (MSE) optimal 
bandwidth (optimal for point estimation) (Calonico et al., 2014) and with robust inference 
methods (Calonico et al., 2015a). In practice, to do so I use the STATA command rdrobust. As 
suggested by Gelman and Imbens (2014), I use estimators based on linear polynomials (p = 1). 
Given that nested nature of the data, I cluster standard errors at school level and include fixed 
effects for application year and grade. 
Testing treatment effect for alternative cutoffs 
Additionally, Skovron and Titiunik (2015) recommends performing a falsification test that 
involves replacing the true cutoff value with another value and performing an estimation and 
inference of the treatment effect on the outcome of interest. This means that Equation 8.6 is 
estimated with two fake cutoffs: 0.25 points above the real cutoff and 0.2 below. It is expected to 
find not statistically significant effect of the “false” program on student achievement. 
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Only one adaptation of the method is done in order to avoid “contamination” due to real 
treatment effects. As suggested by Calonico et al. (2017), the data is restricted to the appropriate 
group: only treated observations for cutoffs above the actual cutoff, and only control 
observations for cutoffs below the actual cutoff should be considered. 
The results of this last falsification test are presented after the full and unbundled program 
effect on final outcomes is estimated in Chapter 10, as a way of showing evidence to support the 
validity of the results obtained. 
8.3. Analysis of two potential methodological problems 
I address two methodological problems that, at least in theory, might threaten my identification 
strategy. The first problem is the potential sorting of teachers to students previous to the award. 
The estimates for 𝑡 + 𝑙 may be biased by previous students’ assignment patterns that (dis)favored 
certified teachers. For example, the principal, knowing the skills distribution among her teachers, 
may have decided to assign low-performing students to future AEP teachers as a targeted 
strategy to help those students. Following Taylor and Tyler (2012) where they study the effect of 
evaluation on a sample of mid-career math teachers in the Cincinnati Public Schools, I 
investigate this potential issue by looking for evidence of bias when comparing observable 
teacher and student characteristics across treatment groups before the treatment was given. 
Specifically, I test whether the average observable variables of certified and non-certified 
teachers are significantly different in the application year (𝑡). In addition, I estimate the effect of 
the program on students’ test scores for the period of application t in order to test if there was a 
trend in the assignment of students to teachers, which may bias the program effect estimator. In 
other words, the balance checks and falsification tests performed for math and language teachers 
 104 
 
as part of the specification checks help examine the sorting issue. If sorting is not a problem, 
there would be non-significant effects of the AEP on covariates and placebo outcomes in period 
t. Importantly, finding sorting in 𝑡	 + 	𝑙 is considered as a part of the program’s intermediate 
effect and not necessarily as a methodological problem. These effects are evidence for testing the 
Motivational Model’s assumption—the ceteris paribus assumption. 
The second potential methodological problem is attrition, whereby the treatment affects 
observation of the outcome of interest (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Importantly, this could drive 
the estimates’ results. This problem is highly unlikely for 𝑡 + 1 because the reward process takes 
place after the school year has started. However, for 𝑡 + 2 and 𝑡 + 3 it is more likely. Thus, non-
random attrition of the sample in 𝑡 + 𝑙 might exist if high-performing teachers—who were more 
likely to obtain the certification—tended to be more frequently assigned to the students who took 
the SIMCE test in 𝑡 + 𝑙. To investigate this possible threat, I test the existence of attrition by 
regressing the probability of attrition in 𝑡 + 𝑙 on the result of the AEP, as described by, 𝐴|Q¦ = 	𝛼- + 𝛼&1𝑆| − 𝑆r| ≥ 0 + 𝜂𝑆| − 𝑆r + 𝜓𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 + 𝜔 + 𝜐|             (8.5) 
Where Ajt+l is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the teacher j is observed in the 
dataset l = 1, 2, 3 years after the application and 0 otherwise. The fact that the teacher j is 
observed means that she was assigned in 𝑡 + 𝑙  to a classroom that took the SIMCE test in that 
year. Sjt represents teacher j’s final score, and St is the minimum score required to be awarded. 1[𝑆| − 𝑆r|] indicates whether a teacher’s final score is greater or equal to the cutoff. Finally, wt 
are application year, subject and grade dummies. This specification for the attrition test is 
performed using the rdrobust STATA command to estimate the same nonparametric local linear 
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method as in the estimation of the balance checks and falsification tests. In practice, data for 
applicants from year 2003 until 2011 is used for these estimates. The standard errors are 
clustered at school level. 
If the probability of attrition does not depend on the probability of being rewarded, we can 
assume that the sample attrition was random, positing no threat of bias to the estimates. 
8.4. Outcome variable analysis 
Having tested the validity of the SRD design, the estimation of the SRD needs to define the 
outcome of interest, and the model specification. These definitions are critical for answering the 
research questions previously defined, see Table 8.1. Then the proposed robustness checks are 
described. 
Outcome of interest 
In general, y(ijt+z) is the outcome at year t + l, where l is the number of years after the application 
year, i.e., t + 1 is both one year after the application and the year of receiving the treatment. As 
explained in Chapter 5, in 2007 and 2008, AEP only included the financial incentive; thus, 
estimating the program’s effect for those years is equivalent to isolating the effect of the 
financial component, while using the data for the rest of the years provides information for the 
effects of the Full program. The outcome definition varies with the research question being 
explored in the following way: 
• To answer Question #1 Does AEP affect teacher’s performance? (Full program effect), 
yijt+l is student i’s SIMCE test score for applicant teacher j in	𝑡 + 𝑙	for application years t 2003 to 
2006, and 2009 to 2011; l ϵ (1, 2, 3). 
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• To answer Question #5, Does the effect of AEP fade-out? (Fade-out of the full program 
effect), yijt+l is student i’s SIMCE test score for applicant teacher j in 𝑡 + 𝑙 where l ϵ (1, 2 or 3) 
for application years 2003 to 2006, and 2009 to 2011. 
• To answer Question #2 Does each component of AEP affect teachers’ performance? 
(Unbundled program effect), yijt+l is student i’s SIMCE test score for the applicant teacher j in 𝑡 + 𝑙 for application years t 2007 to 2008; l ϵ (1, 2, 3). 
• To answer Question #3 Does AEP affect teachers’ behavior? (Underlying mechanism 
of the full program), yjt+l is teacher j’s self-confidence (self-report on how prepared the teacher 
feels to teach the curriculum evaluated by SIMCE) in t + l for application years t 2003 to 2006, 
and 2009 to 2011. Additionally, yjt+1 is teacher j’s effort level (proportion of the curriculum that 
teacher covers during the academic year and number of hours spent in class preparation) in 𝑡 + 𝑙 
for application years t 2003 to 2006, and 2009 to 2011; l ϵ (1, 2, 3). 
• To answer Question #4, Does each component of AEP affect teachers’ behavior? 
(Underlying mechanism of each program component), yjt+l is teacher j’s self-confidence or the 
effort level in 𝑡 + 𝑙 for application years t 2008 to 2009; l ϵ (1, 2, 3). 
Regression discontinuity estimates 
The SRD estimates are obtained using two supplemental methods: one parametric and another 
nonparametric. Using these two methods allows us, on the one hand, to estimate the effect of the 
full and the unbundled program, and, on the other hand, to make a specification robustness check 
of the results found. For a better understanding of the estimation methods, they are explained 
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below; complementarily, Table 8.1. shows the relationship between the outcome and parameter 
of interest in Equations 8.6 and 8.7, with the corresponding research question for each method. 
 
A nonparametric local linear polynomial estimation method: the robust specification 
In practice, after defining the outcome of interest, I determine the regression to estimate the SRD 
treatment effect SRD. With that, the robust bias-corrected local linear regression that I use is: 𝑌¡|Q& = 	𝛼- + 𝛼&1𝑆| − 𝑆r| ≥ 0 + 𝑎3𝑆| − 𝑆r + 𝛼𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 + 𝜔 + 𝜐| (8.6) 
Yijt+l is outcome of interest within three years after application year–i,e, l = 1, 2 or 3. The 
outcome depends on the research question being addressed, 𝑆|is the score of teacher j in year t, 𝑆r|   is the cutoff in year t, and 1[𝑆| − 𝑆r|] is 1 if the teacher j was certified in 𝑡 + 1. Application 
year, subject and grade dummies (𝜔|). 
This specification has important features and implications. First, it is estimated twice. Once 
to estimate the full program effect with data for years t 2003 to 2006 and 2009 to 2011, and 
another to estimate the financial component effect with data for years t 2007 and 2008. In both 
cases, 𝛼& is the parameter of interest that represents the local average treatment effect. Second, 
the specification aims to locally approximate the regression functions by using a polynomial of 
grade 1, as recommended by Gelman and Imbens (2014), to improve the estimation of causal 
effects. Third, it allows the approximation of the two regression functions by differing on either 
side of the threshold. Fourth, this specification allows to use the rdrobust STATA command to 
perform the local linear polynomial method to approximate the regression functions within the 
MSE-optimally bandwidth as suggested by Skovron and Titiunik (2015). This nonparametric 
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approximation uses a triangular kernel to weight observations and to fit a weighted least squares 
regression of Equation 8.6. The standard errors are clustered at school level. 
A parametric estimation method: the alternative specification 
In order to show the unbundled program effect on teacher’s behavior and performance, I estimate 
the following alternative parametric specification: 𝑌¡|Q& = 	𝛼- + 𝛼&1𝑆| − 𝑆r| ≥ 0 + 𝑎3𝑆| − 𝑆r + 𝛼𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 +𝛽&𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0𝑃𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑆| − 𝑆r𝑃𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 + 𝜔 + 𝜐|       (8.7) 
Yijt+1 is the outcome of interest depending on the research question being addressed, Sjt is the 
score of teacher j in year t, 𝑆r| is the cutoff in year t and Pint = 1 if in 𝑡 + 1 there was a ceremony 
to give a pin to each teacher who applied in	𝑡 and was certified in 𝑡 + 𝑙. Year, subject and grade 
dummies (𝜔|) are included. 
In this alternative specification, 1 is the effect of the program when only financial incentives 
are provided; and 𝛼& + 𝛽& provides the effect of the program when financial incentives and non-
financial incentives (ceremony and pin) were given. Thus 𝛽&  is the additional effect of the non-
financial reward. 
It is important to notice that this alternative specification cannot be estimated using STATA 
command rdrobust because it includes interaction terms needed to estimate the unbundled effect 
of the program. This implies that the polynomial estimation within the MSE-optimally defined 
bandwidth cannot be calculated. Instead, a least-squares regression is used with a triangular 
kernel to weight observations within a certain data-driven neighborhood. In practical terms, this 
means running Equation 8.7 by using the observations within the same two bandwidths that were 
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automatically calculated when estimating Equation 8.6 by using the CCT method. Therefore, I 
can recover the bandwidths estimated by Equation 8.6 for the full program, to estimate the full 
program’s and the pin’s effect by running Equation 8.7. In the same way, I use the bandwidth 
estimated for the financial component. The standard errors are clustered at school level. 
Parametric versus nonparametric method 
The alternative specification has important features that make it both similar and different to the 
robust specification defined by Equation 8.6. They are similar because both aim to locally 
approximate the two regression functions independently by using a polynomial of grade 1. 
Despite these similarities, the alternative specification uses pooled data for years 2003 to 2011 in 
order to test for differences in the program components simultaneously. Another difference has 
to do with the fact that the alternative specification imposes a parametric form on the unknown 
regression functions, while the robust specification leaves these functions unspecified and 
employs nonparametric local polynomial methods for estimation and inference. 
Parametric and nonparametric approaches are different but complementary. The 
nonparametric local linear polynomial approach has three distinctive features: 
(i) the bandwidth is chosen in a data-driven way based on nonparametric approximations, 
(ii) the RD point estimator is asymptotically MSE-optimal, and (iii) inference procedures 
explicitly incorporate the effects of local parametric misspecification (i.e., nonparametric 
smoothing bias) (Cattaneo et al., 2017, p. 654). 
While the alternative specification—Equation 8.7—represents a parametric method that does 
not account for misspecification bias in estimation and inference procedures. Nevertheless, and 
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despite the positive features, the robust specification does not allow the interaction needed to 
estimate the marginal effect of the pin over the financial component of the program. This is why 
the parametric estimation method is helpful as a complement to identify the unbundled effect. 
Robustness Checks 
In order to show that the results in the next chapter are not driven by the choices made to 
estimate the program effect, two strategies are followed. The first one is related to the 
specification of the model, while, the second one is related to the sensitivity of the results to the 
bandwidth that is automatically calculated by the CCT Method. 
First, I estimate the robust and alternative specifications with covariates following Equations 
8.8 and 8.9 and clustering the standard errors at school level. These are similar to Equations 8.6 
and 8.7 but include a vector of covariates (𝑋|), which might bring efficiency gains (Calonico et 
al., 2016b). Due to this, the set of covariates are defined by taking into consideration the balance 
check on teachers’ characteristics as described in Section 8.2. This set of covariates might 
comprise teacher j’s characteristics such as experience, and gender. In doing so, I apply the same 
estimation method but with covariates in all estimations except to those balance checks. The 
results of this exercise are presented in Appendix I. 𝑌¡|Qª = 	𝛼- + 𝛼&1𝑆| − 𝑆r| ≥ 0 + 𝑎3𝑆| − 𝑆r + 𝛼𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 + 𝛼«𝑋|Qª +𝜔 + 𝜐|Qª                                                                                                                                               (8.8) 𝑌¡|Qª = 	𝛼- + 𝛼&1𝑆| − 𝑆r| ≥ 0 + 𝑎3𝑆| − 𝑆r + 𝛼𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 +𝛽&𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0𝑃𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑆| − 𝑆r𝑃𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑆| − 𝑆r × 1𝑆| − 𝑆r ≥ 0 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑗𝑡+𝑙 +𝛽4𝑋𝑗𝑡+𝑙𝑃𝑖𝑛 + 𝜔 + 𝜐|                                                                                                                (8.9) 
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The second strategy is a sensitivity analysis of the results to the window length. Given that 
the bandwidth for each estimation varies, the sample of teachers used to estimate the effect of the 
program on final and intermediate outcomes also varies. This is because the CCT Method 
automatically calculates the data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth for each estimation done with 
the different outcomes of interest. Thus, using the CCT Method does not follow the more 
traditional way of presenting the RD results, which is using a fixed bandwidth for all estimations. 
In this context, the sensitivity analysis is done in order to see if the results vary as a function 
of the bandwidth size in a way that affects its statistical significance. The analysis shows the p-
values calculated when testing the null hypothesis on the parameters of interest for a range of 
pre-determined bandwidths. 
More precisely, this sensitivity exercise is constructed in the following way. First, I define a 
list of values for the bandwidth. Then, for each window I estimate the treatment effect using the 
robust specification with Equation 8.6. Lastly, I recover the robust p-value of testing the 
hypothesis of null treatment effect. Each p-value is plotted against the bandwidth size and 
presented at the end of the results’ section in Chapter 10. The corresponding plots also highlight 
the p-values shown in main results helping make a comparison between this p-value found using 
a data-driven bandwidth and those found when the program effect is estimated using fixed 




Table 8.1. Research questions, parameters, and outcomes. 





Interest in Eq. 
8.7 
Parameter of 
Interest in Eq. 8.7 
Question #1, Does 
AEP affect teacher’s 
performance? (Full 
program effect) 
𝑦¡|Qª is student i’s SIMCE Test 
Score of AEP teacher j in 𝑡 + 𝑙 
for years t 2003 to 2006 and 
2009 to 2011, with 𝑙 = 1,2,3. 𝛼& 𝑦¡|Qª is student i’s SIMCE Test Score of AEP 
teacher j in 𝑡 +𝑙 for years t 
2003 to 2011, 
with 𝑙 = 1,2,3. 
𝛼& + 𝛽& 
Question #3, Does 
each component of 




𝑦¡|Qª is student i’s SIMCE Test 
Score of AEP teacher j in 𝑡 + 𝑙 
for years t 2007 and 2008, with 𝑙 = 1,2,3. 
𝛼′& for the 
financial 
component 
𝛼& for the 
financial 
component; 𝛽& for 
the non-financial 
component. 
Question #4.1, Does 
AEP affect teachers’ 
self-confidence? 
(Underlying 
mechanism of the 
full program) 
𝑦|Qª is teacher j’s self-
confidence (self-report on how 
much teacher feels prepared to 
teach the curriculum that were 
evaluated by SIMCE) in 𝑡 + 𝑙 
for years t 2003 to 2006 and 
2009 to 2011, with 𝑙 = 1,2,3. 
𝛼& 










by SIMCE) in 𝑡 + 𝑙 for years t 
2003 to 2011, 
with 𝑙 = 1,2,3. 
𝛼& + 𝛽& 
Question #5.1, Does 
each component of 
AEP affect teachers’ 
self-confidence? 
(Underlying 
mechanism of each 
component of the 
program) 
𝑦|Qª is teacher j’s self-
confidence (self-report on how 
much teacher feels prepared to 
teach the curriculum that were 
evaluated by SIMCE) in 𝑡 + 𝑙 
for years t 2007 to 2008, with 𝑙 = 1,2,3. 
𝛼′& for the 
financial 
component 
𝛼& for the 
financial 
component; 𝛽& for 
the non-financial 
component. 
Question #4.2, Does 
AEP affect teachers’ 
effort (Underlying 
mechanism of each 
component of the 
program) 
𝑦|Qª is the teacher j’s effort 
level (proportion of the 
curriculum that teacher covers 
during the academic year, or 
class preparation time) in 𝑡 + 𝑙 
for years t 2002 to 2006 and 
2009 to 2011, with 𝑙 = 1,2,3. 






year and class 
preparation) in 𝑡 + 𝑙 for years t 
2004 to 2011. 
𝛼& + 𝛽& 




mechanism of each 
component of the 
program) 
𝑦|Qª is the teacher j ’s effort 
level (proportion of the 
curriculum that teacher covers 
during the academic year, or 
class preparation time) in 𝑡 + 𝑙 
for years t 2007 and 2008, with 𝑙 = 1,2,3. 
𝛼′& for the 
financial 
component 
𝛼& for the 
financial 
component; 𝛽& for 
the non-financial 
component. 
Question #2, Does 
the effect of AEP 
fade-out? (Fade-out 
of the full program 
effect) 
𝑦¡|Qª is student i’s SIMCE test 
score for applicant teacher j in 𝑡 + 𝑙 where l can take the value 
1, 2 or three. This is for 
application years t 2002 to 
2006, and 2009 to 2011. 




Chapter 9 - Variables and Measures 
In order to estimate Equations 8.6 and 8.7 as explained in Chapter 8, the outcome of interest and 
the covariates need to be defined according what factors are to be tested (Motivational Model), 
the research questions, and the methodological considerations previously described. As presented 
in Table 8.1, there are three outcomes of interest to be measured. Specifically, a measure of 
teachers’ performance, a measure of teachers’ self-esteem, and a measure of teachers’ effort are 
needed. In this regard, the following section presents a discussion on how these variables and 
measures can be interpreted and their limitations. 
9.1. Teachers’ Performance 
The main and expected effect of the program was to foster educational quality. As stated in 
Chapter 2, this objective of the program was defined by Law 19715 as “to strengthen the quality 
of education and to recognize and highlight the merit of teachers, fostering their retention at 
teaching and helping identify those that show knowledge, skills and competencies of excellence.” 
Thus, at this point, the question is how to measure the program effect on the quality of the 
educational system. One—at least partial—answer to this question is to measure the effect of the 
program on student learning, which is assessed by the Measurement System of the Quality of 
Education25 (SIMCE for its initials in Spanish) in math and reading. In this context, the 
following question turns out to be an explanation under which conditions a change in these 
SIMCE test scores can be potentially understood as a change in teachers’ performance. Having 
answered it allows to address the first research question. 
                                               
25 Sistema Nacional de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación. 
 114 
 
Bringing a valid measure, that can be credibly attributed to teacher’s performance, has been a 
practical, theoretical and empirical challenge for academics and policy makers. Test scores as a 
measure of student achievement have often been used to approximate teachers’ performance or 
effectiveness. Loeb (2013) explains that the use of student test scores to measure teaching 
practice is both an advantage and a disadvantage. She notes that the clear benefit is that, however 
imperfect, test scores are a direct measure of student learning, which is the key outcome. 
Students who learn more in school tend to complete more schooling, have greater earning 
potential, and lead healthier lives. In addition, she mentions that basing teacher assessments on 
student learning also recognizes the complexity of the teaching process; many different teaching 
styles can benefit students. This is why school districts in the US have explored complementing 
test scores with multiple measures of teacher evaluation, as is the case in New York City and 
Washington, DC (Grossman et al., 2013). This might be also important considering that it’s not 
fair to judge teachers’ effectiveness solely on the basis of end-of-year test scores, without regard 
to where the teachers’ students started at the beginning of the year. End-of-year test scores do not 
show how much students learned that year in that class, so measures that take into account where 
students started are surely an improvement. In this context, value added measures (VAM) are 
developed to compute the teacher’s unique contribution in promoting student achievement gains 
from grade to grade, net of student background and prior ability. Because VAM adjust for 
student characteristics in a given classroom, they are less biased measures of teacher 
performance than unadjusted test score measures. 
Despite the advantages of using a VAM, the available data does not allow for it. In Chile, the 
national government developed the SIMCE; a yearly, national and standardized student test. All 
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students in 4th grade yearly and 8th and 10th grade every other year take the test, thus follow-up 
of student achievement is not possible. This kind of cross-sectional data does not allow for 
calculating a value added in order to provide a more valid/credible measure for teacher 
performance whenever estimating the program effect. 
Nevertheless, SIMCE test scores as a measure of student learning can be interpreted as an 
approximation of teachers’ performance when estimating the effect of the Teaching Excellence 
Award26 (AEP for its initials in Spanish) under a Sharp Regression Discontinuity (SDR). There 
are at least two reasons suggesting this. First, the theoretical and empirical modeling allows me 
to set and test the conditions under which the program effect on test scores can be attributed to a 
change in teachers’ behavior. Second, the identification strategy allows me to make a causal 
interpretation of the program effect on teachers’ performance measured by student outcomes. 
Specifically, below is a discussion on two points regarding using test scores and how they 
capture the teacher effect: (i) SRD design as a good identification strategy that provides 
consistent results even though I use cross sectional instead of longitudinal data; (ii) when 
changes in test scores can be interpreted as a measure of teacher’ performance in the context of 
the Motivational Model (MM). 
The Identification Strategy and VAM 
The problem with using cross sectional test scores to measure teachers’ performance is the lack 
of adjustment for student background and prior ability (Loeb, 2013). However, the need of 
                                               




adjustment becomes less crucial when exploiting the discontinuity in the probability of reward as 
the strategy to identify the effect of AEP on teachers’ performance. 
Comparing the average test scores of different teachers, may not result in an accurate rank of 
their effectiveness, since the raw scores do not take into consideration differences in the starting 
point of the students. However, in theory, SRD design assumes that units around the cutoff do 
not systematically differ in their unobservable characteristics, thereby offering valid 
counterfactual comparisons between control and treatment groups (Skovron and Titiunik, 2015). 
This means that, around the threshold that defines who obtains the reward, the students are on 
average expected to be equal, therefore, they have the same starting point. Even though this SRD 
design underlying assumption is by definition untestable, I perform several specification checks 
(balance checks and falsification tests) that help support the design’s assumption. As described in 
Chapter 8, I test for discontinuities on the average observables of students and school 
characteristics around the cut-off. The results of the specification checks are shown in Chapter 
10. There, the results show, as expected, that there were not statistically significant differences in 
teacher’s behavior, prior test scores, student background and school characteristics between 
treated and controls, previous to receiving the reward. This adds evidence to the argument that 
finding a discontinuity in student outcomes after the reward was given can be interpreted as a 
causal average treatment effect (ATE) of AEP on teachers’ performance without any need of a 
VAM. Despite this, I make a further conservative interpretation of the recovered effect, as 
explained below. 
As detailed in Section 7.2, the SRD treatment effect found might not represent the ATE for 
every teacher and applicant (Skovron and Titiunik, 2015). The specification checks allow me to 
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say that the SRD design’s assumption holds for those teachers whose scores are close to the 
cutoff point. However, it might be the case that the relationship between the running variable and 
potential outcomes are arguably non-constant functions. Since the score is related to teachers’ 
ability, resources, or other teacher characteristics, teachers with much higher scores were often 
systematically different from those whose scores are much lower. Moreover, it is possible their 
students were also different, perhaps violating the SRD design’s assumption that reduces the 
need for a VAM. For this reason, in the absence of further assumptions, the effect recovered by 
the SRD design is conservatively interpreted as the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the 
program on test scores for those teachers whose AEP scores are close to the cutoff point—
making VAM dispensable in representing teacher’s performance. In consequence, interpreting 
the SRD point estimate as the LATE of AEP, makes it more likely that the SRD design’s 
assumptions hold, bringing support for using cross sectional test scores as a valid proxy of 
teacher’s performance, without need for a VAM. 
The MM and Interpretation of Teacher’s Performance 
As explained in Chapter 4, the MM helps me understand the underlying mechanism by which the 
program may have affected teachers’ behavior, thereby affecting students’ test scores. Student 
outcomes represent a direct measure of student learning, which in turn might be a credible proxy 
of teachers’ performance. Nonetheless to argue that student outcomes are in fact a measure of 
teacher’s performance, one important assumption of MM must hold: everything else remains 
unaffected by the program. 
Figure 9.1 shows that, according to the MM, the program could have affected self-esteem 
and thus effort and test scores. However, one important assumption is implicit. If the program 
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changed something else that also affects test scores, interpreting a discontinuity in test scores 
around the cutoff as a change in teacher performance might be misleading. For instance, 
rewarded teachers might have been assigned high-achievement students, resulting in an upward 
bias for the effect of the program on student outcomes. Attributing this effect to an enhanced 
teachers’ performance is a misinterpretation of the results. Then, it is necessary to test the MM’s 
implicit assumption. In practice, this assumption is empirically tested by checking if the pool of 
students assigned to the teachers changed due to the reward. This hypothesis is tested by 
studying if there are differences in the variables: the income quantile of students assigned to 
teachers, the schooling level of students’ mothers, the number of books students had at home, the 
school socioeconomic status, and the public/private status of the school where teachers taught.  






Summing up, the test scores can be interpreted as students learning, which, in turn, might be 




Self-esteem Effort Student Learning
Effect of the program on 
teachers’ behavior 
Effect of the program on 
teachers’ performance 
Assumption: The program does not significantly change the characteristics of both the pool 
of students that rewarded teacher teaches and the schools where they teach after they obtain. 
the certification.  
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interpretation, scores are re-standardized using this information: SIMCE Scores have been 
standardized on a scale that has a mean of 250 points and standard deviation of 50 points, 
allowing comparison of student performance across years. 
9.2. Teachers’ Behavior 
To test the MM theory, as shown in Figure 9.1, the outcomes of interest are related to teachers’ 
behavior, which can be called intermediate outcomes. One of them is the self-declared level of 
self-esteem. In practice, teacher’s self-confidence is approximated by an index that measures 
teacher self-reported preparedness to teach several topics. There is a question that addresses this 
measure: “Considering your preparation and experience in curriculum and teaching practices, 
how prepared do you feel to teach the following contents of subject in grade?” The potential 
answers are: not prepared, prepared, or very prepared. The self-confidence index constructed is 
equal to the percentage of topics teacher j feels “very well prepared to teach” by the time of 
SIMCE in (𝑡 + 𝑙). 
Another intermediate outcome of interest related to teachers’ behavior is effort, which is 
measured as an index of the number of contents covered during the school year. This measure 
can be interpreted as the learning opportunities given to students (Rowan et al., 2002), which 
depends on the effort made by the teacher. Specifically, it is measured using a question related to 
the coverage level of a content list that students should have learned during the year according 
the mandatory Chilean curriculum. Each teacher whose students would take the SIMCE test were 
asked about this. Specifically, the question is: “Given that class time is limited, and it is likely 
you could not address all curricular content, to what extent could you teach the following 
contents of subject in grade?” The possible answers are: totally taught, considerably taught, 
 120 
 
some taught, and not taught at all. Effort then is represented by an index going from 0 to 1, 
calculated as the percentage of topics teacher j has “completely’” taught by the time of SIMCE. 
It is expected that a teacher who exerts a higher level of effort would cover a higher amount 
of content. This is likely for at least four reasons. First, the school community with its owner, 
manager, principal and teachers have the incentive to effectively cover the math and reading 
curriculum as much as possible, since their progress is assessed by high-stakes standardized 
testing, SIMCE. These results obtained by each school are used by the Chilean Ministry of 
Education (MINEDUC) in order to inform parents’ decisions in the context of a full choice 
school system, and to allocate public resources. This means that SIMCE test scores have the 
potential to affect the enrollment and school resources. Schools’ income can change as a result of 
the effect of SIMCE test scores on parents’ enrollment decisions. In addition, the schools’ 
financial status is affected by SIMCE test scores because they are used to distribute resources. 
For example, the National System of Performance Evaluation of Public-Funded School27 (SNED 
for its initials in Spanish) is public program that rewards schools’ outstanding performance 
giving them additional financing. Second, it is likely that teachers were also focusing their effort 
on “teaching to the test”—i.e., focusing on the material tested—suggested by many research 
papers (David 2011, Jones et al. 2003, Russell et al. 2009, Polesel et al. 2014, Reay and Wiliam 
1999, Rentner et al. 2006 cited in Ashadi and Rice (2016)). Third, following the Curricular 
Basis28 is mandatory in Chile (Ministry of Education, 2009). This official document was 
                                               
27 Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño. 
28 Bases Curriculares. 
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produced by the MINEDUC, as stated by the 2009 General Education Law. The Curricular Basis 
indicates what all the students must learn during their school trajectory (Ministry of Education, 
2012b). In consequence, teachers must put their effort into covering the contents defined in the 
survey question. Fourth, evidence shows that content coverage can also be an important predictor 
of student achievement (Rowan et al., 2002). This is why teacher observation tools, such as the 
Protocol for Language Arts Teaching Observation (PLATO) developed by Pam Grossman and 
her colleagues, used in the context of teacher’s performance assessment, include checklists for 
the major content domains required (Grossman et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, less content covered might not be interpreted unequivocally as less effort. One 
teacher could be superficially going through all of the material, while another teacher may focus 
on ensuring that their students are learning the material, even if that leads to fewer topics being 
covered. Taking this point into consideration, another measure of effort is used to estimate the 
effect of the program on teachers’ behavior: class preparation. Data about this can be obtained 
because math and reading teachers are asked: “In this school, in case you spend time preparing 
your classes, how many hours do you allocate in to it?”. The answer is a continuous variable, 
which is truncated at eleven hours for the 2010 survey. To address this truncation issue, the 
variable “Class Preparation>5” was calculated, which takes the value of 1 if the teacher stated 
spending five or more hours every week to prepare for her classes. This indicator could be a 
proxy of effort, assuming spending more time in preparation reduces the time that teaches can 
spend in other kind of activities that may bring a higher level of satisfaction. Note that in Chile 
teachers are paid for very few hours outside the classroom. OECD (2017) states that: in spite of 
large class sizes and student-teacher ratios, teachers in Chile work more hours in other OECD 
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countries. Their statutory working time is 2,015 hours per year at the pre-primary to upper 
secondary levels, the highest among OECD countries with available data. The time spent on 
teaching is also high, 1,157 hours per year from pre-primary to upper secondary levels. (p. 5). In 
fact, until 2015, in Chile by law the ratio of paid teaching to non-teaching hours was 75/25 
(Ministry of Education, 1997). 
Two additional measures of class preparation help to illuminate if there is any difference in 
the program effect as a function of the level of hours spent on it. The number of hours spent in 
class preparation is expected to have an important role in terms of defining the likelihood of the 
marginal allocation of extra hours into class preparation. One may suggest that the class 
preparation is an input in the production function of learning outcomes, in which at some point 
the law of diminishing returns starts to operate. Increasing class preparation, while holding all 
others constant (i.e., ceteris paribus), would some point yield lower incremental per-unit return. 
An optimal increase in the time allocated on this task becomes less likely for teachers who 
already spend a large number of hours a week preparing classes than for teachers spending 






Students’, teachers’ and schools’ characteristics are used as described in Chapter 8 to run 
specification checks. The selection of variables is based on their correlation with student 
achievement. 
Based on the parents’ survey given along with the SIMCE, three students’ characteristics are 
considered. The variables associated take the value of one if: 
• the monthly family income belongs to the highest income quintile in the student sample. 
Parents are asked to report where in fifteen categories their family income can be classified, 
• the mother has more than 12 years of education, which in Chile means that she has more 
than high school education, and 
• there are more than 50 books at home. Parents are asked to classify the number of books 
at home based on five categories. 
Based on both administrative data and the teacher’s survey given with the SIMCE, eight 
teachers’ characteristics are considered when running specification checks. Six variables are 
dichotomic and take the value of one if teacher is female, has a graduate degree, is tenured, 
works in the Santiago, Chile’s capital city, works in a rural area, and works in a public funded 
and administrated school. From this group of variables, covariates are chosen to estimate the 
SRD models. Doing so has the potential of increasing the efficiency of the SRD point estimator. 
Based on administrative data provided by SIMCE dataset, there are two school 
characteristics variables. They take the value of one if: 
 124 
 
• The school’s socioeconomic status (SES) is either low or medium. This SES index 
classifies schools into five groups and is calculated by the MINEDUC every year. It is used to 
report SIMCE test scores in a more equitable way, comparing schools of similar SES (Ministry 
of Education, 2013). Four variables are used to calculate this SES index by a cluster analysis: 
mother’s schooling, father’s schooling, monthly family income, and a vulnerability indicator. All 
except for the last are parental self-report. The vulnerability indicator is an index calculated by 
the MINEDUC to target need-based school programs. The following Table shows the average 
value of each variable for the five SES groups for SIMCE 2012. 
Table 9.1. Description of school SES indicator calculated by MINEDUC in 2012. 
School SES 
Average Number of 
School Years (Mother) 
Average Number of 
School Years 
(Father)  
Monthly Family Income 
(2012 US Dollars) 
% of vulnerable 
children in the 
School 
Low 8 years (1) 8 years (1)  315 US$ (126) 88% (9) 
Medium-Low 10 years (1) 10 years (1)  464 US$ (122) 71% (8) 
Medium 12 years (1) 12 years (1)  709 US$ (170) 49% (9) 
Medium-High 14 years (1) 14 years (1)  1,454 US$ (433) 24% (9) 
High 16 years (1) 17 years (1)  3,730 US$ (673) 1% (4) 
Note: Standard Deviations in parentheses. Source is Ministry of Education (2013). 
• The school is public funded and administrated. These schools are administrated by the 
municipalities and get funding from the central government. They receive a fixed amount of 
money for each enrolled student in the school. In 2012, according to official statistics, 39% of all 
students enrolled in the education system attended a public funded and administrated school, 





Chapter 10 - Results 
In this chapter I answer the research questions, following the empirical strategy discussed in 
Chapter 8. First, I confirm that the data shows a discontinuity in the probability of treatment 
around the cutoff. Then I show the specification checks. Next, is an analysis of the potential 
methodological problems described in Section 8.3, which do not seem to be threatening the 
causal interpretation of the results, although they affect the interpretation of the parameters. 
Lastly, I present the estimates for the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the program on 
the final and intermediate outcomes. 
10.1. Discontinuity in the treatment probability 
As the very first step in the analysis, I check if the data shows a discrete and deterministic 
change in the probability of receiving the AEP certification at the cutoff point. Figure 10.1 shows 
that all applicants below the cutoff point are not awarded, while individuals above the cutoff 
receive the certification—with either only the financial component or both parts. This result 
indicates that a Sharp Regression Discontinuity (SRD) design can be used. Next, I carry out three 
sets of specification checks as suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and described in 
Section 8.2. 
10.2. Specification checks 
Testing manipulation of the running variable 
An underlying assumption that gives validity to the regression discontinuity (RD) design is that 
individuals do not have the ability to precisely manipulate the score that they receive, so the 
number of treated observations just above the cutoff should be approximately similar to the 
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number of control observations below it. Although this assumption is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the validity of an RD design, as explained by Skovron and Titiunik (2015), RD 
designs where there is an unexplained abrupt change in the number of observations right at the 
cutoff tend to be less credible. 
There is qualitative information regarding teachers’ limited possibility to manipulate their 
scores. Crucially, while teachers knew about the evaluation process from the program’s website 
and the law,29 they do not know about the evaluation rubric nor the cutoff, or how the scores are 
processed. In addition, there were no institutionalized mechanisms for appeal and teachers were 
never told their final scores. 
Figure 10.1. Evidence of a SRD. 
 
 
Note: this figure shows a scatter plot of the probability of obtaining the certification at each score distance to the 
cutoff for teachers’ first application. This plot does not include re-takers or cheaters. Total observation number 
(14,626) equals the number of total applications in 2002-2011 (16,468) minus cheaters (89) and re-takers (1,753). 
                                               


















There is also empirical evidence to rule out the possibility of teachers having manipulated 
their scores. First, I look at raw data with the number of observations above and below the cutoff. 
Figure 10.2 shows histogram of the running variable for teachers who were applying for first 
time. Visually, the running variable does not seem to have a discontinuity around the cutoff. 
Figure 10.2. Histogram of running variable. 
 
Note: the histogram shows the density of the score distance to the program’s cutoff. Forty bins are plotted. Only data 
for first-takers and non-cheaters is included. The dashed line indicates the cutoff or zero distance to it. Data for 2003 
to 2011 is included. 
In addition to a graphical illustration of the density of the running variable, I perform a 
density test of the running variable by calculating the McCrary test for discontinuity in the AEP 
score. The null hypothesis of the test is that the density of the running variable is continuous at 
the cutoff, and its implementation requires the estimation of the density of observations near the 
cutoff separately for observations above and below the cutoff. The coefficient estimated by the 
McCrary test is -0.007 with a standard deviation of 0.04, which implies a t-statistic of -0.175. 
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following page shows the density pooling of the data for all available years. The results of the 
McCrary test suggest that was no manipulation of AEP scores. 
Figure 10.3. McCrary test. 
 
Note: the figure shows the plot calculated by the DCdensity STATA command for the score distance to the 
program’s cutoff. Only data for first-takers and non-cheaters for 2003-2011 is included. 
 
Testing treatment effect on predetermined covariates and placebo outcomes 
In order to further check for the internal validity of the identification strategy, the treatment 
effect on predetermined covariates (balance check) and placebo outcomes (falsification test) are 
calculated. These tests are important because finding a discontinuity in these predetermined 
covariates might cast doubt on the assumptions underlying the RD design. As explained by 
Skovron and Titiunik (2015), if teachers lacked the ability to manipulate their scores, there 
should not be any systematic differences among teachers with similar scores. Thus, except for 
their treatment status, teachers just above and just below the cutoff should be similar in all those 
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To approximate the regression functions, a local linear polynomial, without covariates within 
a Mean-Square-Error-(MSE)-optimal bandwidth for all years is used. To do so and for inference 
purposes, the CCT method (rdrobust STATA command) is used. When applying this 
nonparametric method, three-point estimators are obtained: the conventional RD estimator, the 
bias-corrected RD estimator that is optimal for point estimation since optimizes the bias-variance 
trade-off by a MSE-optimal bandwidth, and the robust RD estimator that complementarily 
presents robust-bias corrected confidence intervals for valid inference. When estimating the RD 
effect, tables show the conventional RD estimator, the robust-bias corrected confidence intervals, 
robust standard errors, and robust p-values. 
As a robustness exercise, the results of balance checks and falsification tests using robust 
specifications with covariates are presented in Appendix G. In general, these tables show that the 
results of the specification checks are robust to the inclusion of covariates. In addition, Appendix 
H shows the graphical analysis for the specification checks. 
Balance checks 
A balance check is performed on predetermined covariates jointly for language and math 
teachers whose students took the national standardized SIMCE test30 (SIMCE for its initials in 
Spanish) and have SIMCE test score data. This is done without distinguishing if the program had 
either only the financial component or both components, since at the time of the application 
teachers did not know whether the program included a pin or not. The covariates chosen to 
                                               




perform the balance check are related to teacher, student, and school characteristics. In general, 
balance checks show no imbalance. One of seventeen characteristics are significantly different at 
the 5% confidence level between certified and non-certified teachers in the application year. The 
imbalanced covariate is a teacher characteristic related to having graduate education. 
Panel A.1 in Table 10.1 shows the balance check on teachers’ characteristics for the 
application period (t). The variables examined are: experience, gender, age, having a specialized 
degree, having tenure, teaching in the metropolitan region, teaching in a rural school, and the 
average number of schools and classrooms where the teacher teaches, whether the teacher moved 
to a new school or left a school where she was teaching before the application to the program, 
and whether the teacher was not teaching in the year previous to the application. Overall, the 
table shows that teachers below and above the threshold are similar in almost all of the variables 
examined, except for gender. Female teachers, in the application year, were 20 percentage points 
less likely to obtain the certification in t + 1. When covariates are included, gender differences 
are still significant, as shown in Appendix G.   
As suggested in Section 8.4 of Chapter 8, the results of the balance check on covariates also 
help test the assumptions needed to include pre-treatment covariates, which are aimed to in-
crease the efficiency of the SRD estimator. As shown in Appendix G, using this variable does 
result in smaller confidence intervals for most of the specifications, however the gains are small. 
In fact, using age as covariate to estimate the program’s effect on a set of placebo test scores in 
year t does not affect the standard error and hence there is no change in the length of the 
confidence interval. In consequence, the results including age as a covariate are presented as a 
complement in the appendixes. 
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Panels A.2 of Tables 10.1 shows the balance checks on the following student characteristics: 
being female, having a mother with more than 12 years of education, having more than 50 books 
at home, and being in the wealthiest quintile. The results indicate that there are not statistically 
significant differences in students with teachers below and above the cutoff, then there is no 
evidence of previous sorting on teachers above and below the threshold.  
Differences in school characteristics where the teachers taught are also analyzed. The 
variables tested are the school socio-economic status and the probability of teaching in a public 
school. As shown in Panels A.3 of Table 10.1, there are not statistically significant differences in 
the schools where teachers below and above the cutoff taught. Overall, the results indicate there 
is a balance all but one of the observable characteristics for teachers below and above the cutoff. 
Falsification tests 
Panel B of Table 10.1 shows the estimates of treatment effect on placebo outcomes. The first 
exercise is to estimate the effect of the program on students’ test scores during the application 
period. Table 10.1 shows not statistically significant differences in test scores for students of 
teachers who were just below and above the threshold. The second falsification exercise tests if 
there is some imbalance in teacher behavior. The behavior measures are: an index of the number 
of topics covered during the academic year, an index that measures teacher’s self-perceived 
preparedness to teach several topics in class, and an indicator if teachers spend more than 5 hours 
a week preparing for classes. The result in Panel B of Table 10.1 shows that there are no 
significant differences in the number of topics covered or how well-prepared teachers felt, but on 
average, the probability of preparing classes for more than 5 hours a week was 16 percentage 
points larger for certified teachers. Since, only 2 out of 21 variables are statistically significant, 
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the result for preparing classes maybe due to chances. These findings are robust to including 
covariates, as shown in Table H.1. 
10.3. Two potential methodological issues 
As explained in Section 8.3, two methodological problems might threaten the identification 
strategy—sorting and attrition. Here, I test for the presence of both problems. The balance 
checks and falsification tests show no evidence of teacher sorting based on their characteristics 
or school characteristics across treatment and control groups. Complementarily, the results of the 
falsification tests can be interpreted as evidence of the random sorting of math and language 
teachers to students and schools during the year of application. 
Regarding attrition, Table 10.2 shows that being awarded with the certification does not 
affect the probability of teaching a class that takes the SIMCE test in a window of one, two or 
three years after the reward was given. Similarly, from Figure 10.4 we do not observe a discrete 
change in the probability of taking the test after being rewarded. Finally, in the Appendix H and I 
present the figures for the balance check and the falsification test, showing again that samples 
below and above the threshold do not differ statistically. Taken altogether, one can assume that 
any difference in ex-post outcomes during the three years after the result of the AEP application 
process is known can be attributed to the reward. In other words, in the absence of specific 
assumptions about the global shape of the regression functions, the effect recovered by the SRD 




Table 10.1. Specification checks for teacher’s, student’s and school’s characteristics in t. 
SRD estimates using robust bias-corrected local linear polynomial regression. 








p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 Robust 95% CI 𝑵𝒉 N 
Panel A. Balance Variables 
Panel A.1 Teachers' characteristics 
Experience -0.327 2.387 0.838 0.161 (-5.168, 4.19) 713 1,756  
Female -0.208 0.105 0.019 0.093 (-0.452, -0.04) 411 1,758  
Age 0.573 2.374 0.801 0.15 (-4.054, 5.25) 624 1,756  
Spec. Degree 0.056 0.048 0.248 0.174 (-0.039, 0.15) 750 1,758  
Tenure 0.063 0.117 0.511 0.128 (-0.152, 0.306) 531 1,758  
Metro. Region 0.076 0.097 0.387 0.189 (-0.106, 0.274) 783 1,758  
Rural -0.001 0.08 0.925 0.185 (-0.15, 0.165) 783 1,758  
# Schools by Teacher 0.046 0.061 0.397 0.169 (-0.068, 0.171) 714 1,758  
# Classrooms by Teacher 0.149 0.433 0.959 0.16 (-0.825, 0.87) 714 1,758  
Teacher is a mover -0.045 0.076 0.454 0.168 (-0.206, 0.092) 638 1,523  
Teacher is a leaver -0.001 0.028 0.884 0.202 (-0.05, 0.058) 770 1,523  
        
Panel A.2 Student's Characteristics  
Female 0.046 0.056 0.384 0.144 (-0.061, 0.158)   23,360  64,548  
Mother's Schooling>12 0.041 0.043 0.226 0.142 (-0.032, 0.137)   20,491  56,813  
Books at home>50 0.034 0.03 0.205 0.181 (-0.021, 0.096)   26,435  58,221  
Family Income Top 
Quintile 0.055 0.047 0.154 0.147 (-0.025, 0.159)   21,026  58,221  
        
Panel A.3 School's Characteristics  
Public School -0.056 0.112 0.555 0.18 (-0.285, 0.153) 1012 2,246  
Low-Medium SES -0.024 0.121 0.937 0.153 (-0.246, 0.227) 869 2,246  
        
Panel B. Falsification Variables  
        
Topics Covered -0.02 0.066 0.573 0.148 (-0.166, 0.092) 662 1,808  
Well Prepared 0.104 0.084 0.229 0.151 (-0.064, 0.266) 713 1,800  
Class Preparation>5 0.165 0.101 0.043 0.115 (0.006, 0.403) 470 1,601  
Test Score 0.049 0.122 0.595 0.171 (-0.174, 0.303) 27,795  64,548  
Notes: (i) point estimators are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; (ii) robust p-
values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors as derived in Calonico et al. (2014); (iii) h 
corresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b); (iv) N is total number of observations while 𝑁µ = 𝑁µQ +𝑁µR where 𝑁µR =∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& − ℎ ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r), 𝑁µQ = ∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r + ℎ); (v) standard errors (SE) are clustered at school level; 
(vi) no covariates are included; (vii) application year, subject and grade dummies are included; and (viii) the 
observation number (N) varies for several reasons. First, the variables in the table come from different datasets, 
which have different observations. For instance, test scores come from the SIMCE dataset, while teacher’s 
characteristics come from administrative dataset. Second, variables coming from the same source have a different 
observation number because they were collected with different timings. For instance, the question regarding the 
number of hours spent preparing classes was part of the SIMCE teacher’s survey in 2004, 2006 and 2010, while the 
question regarding topics covered was asked every year in the same survey. (ix) Robust SE are estimated.  
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Table 10.2. Attrition test in (t + l). 








p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 Robust 95% CI 𝑵𝒉 N 
Dependent Variables               
        
Probability of being 
assigned to a classroom that 
takes Math SIMCE in (𝑡 +𝑙)	with l=1,2,3 -0.042 0.042 0.287 0.209 (-0.128, 0.038) 3,315  7,489  
Notes: (i) the reported RD treatment effects are estimated from a local linear regression between the probability of 
finding a SIMCE test scores in years t + 1, t + 2 or t + 3 for a teacher who teaches math or language in those years 
and apply for math or language certification in t and the distance to the cutoff; (ii) the reported coefficient is 
estimated with a single regression between the AEP score (𝑆r) and dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
teacher was assigned to a classroom that takes the SIMCE test in years t + 1, t + 2 or t + 3, if 𝑆r ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r +ℎ¹xZ(certified teachers within the MSE bandwidth estimated above) and 𝑆r − ℎ¹xZ 	≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r (non-certified 
teachers within the MSE bandwidth); (iii) no covariates are included; (iv) application year, subject and grade 
dummies are included; (v) standard errors (SE) are clustered at school level; (vi) robust SE are estimated; (vii) point 
estimators are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; (viii) robust p-values are 
constructed using bias correction with robust standard errors as derived in Calonico et al. (2014); (ix) ℎ¹xZ	  
corresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b); (x) N is total number of observations while 𝑁µ = 𝑁µQ + 𝑁µR where 𝑁µR =∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& − ℎ ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r), 𝑁µQ = ∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r + ℎ). 
 
Figure 10.4. RD plots for specification checks for SIMCE test attrition in 𝑡	 + 	𝑙. 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 25 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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10.4. Program effect on the outcomes of interest 
Having tested if the identification strategy is valid, this section aims to answer the research 
questions described in Chapter 5. I start by testing the effect of the program, after that the 
certification was given, on final ex-post outcomes, including any potential fade-out process. 
Subsequently, I study the unbundled effects. The Motivational Model (MM) that might underlie 
the program’s effect on test scores is also explored. Specifically, as suggested by Bénabou and 
Tirole (2005), the basic idea is to test if AEP and its components affect teachers’ self-confidence 
and effort after the program has given the reward. In addition, the MM’s assumption, as 
explained in Section 9.1, is tested in order to see if a change in test scores can be interpreted as a 
change in teachers’ performance. 
Before showing the estimated results, there are six issues that need to be made explicit. First, 
the results presented are estimated by pooling the data of math and language teachers. Second, 
the results presented used the robust specification described by Equation 8.6. This specification 
does not include covariates, and the standard errors are clustered at school level. Third, to show 
further evidence regarding the unbundled program effect, the results obtained by the alternative 
specification are presented. In this alternative specification, to test the differences by reward 
component, Equation 8.7 was used. Further, each table indicates the effect of the program when 
only the financial component is provided (𝛼&), the additional effect of the non-financial 
component, the pin component (𝛽&), and the full program effect when the financial incentives 
and a ceremony were given (𝛼& + 𝛽&). For the full program effect, also presented is the p-value 
for the test (𝛼& + 𝛽&= 0). Fourth, notice that, as mentioned in Chapter 8, the bandwidth is chosen 
in a data-driven manner, taking into consideration the MSE-optimal bandwidths automatically 
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calculated by the robust specification developed by Calonico et al. (2016a). Fifth, the graphical 
analysis of the outcomes around the cutoff are presented. Sixth, and lastly, as a way of testing the 
results’ robustness, Appendix I show the robustness exercise as explained in Section 8.4. 
Specifically, this appendix shows the estimates that are obtained by using the robust specification 
with covariates (as in Equation 8.8) and the alternative specification with covariates described by 
Equation 8.9. 
The full and unbundled program effect on final outcomes 
Did AEP and its components affect ex-post test scores? The answer is found by using the SIMCE 
test scores of each student i of the AEP teacher j in 𝑡 + 𝑙 for years t 2003-2011. The test scores 
are normalized for each year/grade using information for all students. The data has been pooled 
for all grades where test scores are available—2nd, 4th, 8th, and 10th grades. 
Question #1, does AEP affect ex-post teachers’ performance? Panel A.1 of Tables 10.3 and 
10.4 and plots in Figure 10.5 show that the program effect is positive, with a coefficient of 0.086. 
This suggests that giving a reward could increase subsequent student achievement by 0.09 
standard deviations, but it is not statistically different from 0, which is robust to the alternative 
specifications (see Tables I.1 and I.4). These results are consistent with the evidence on the 
impact of NBPTS on student learning. The literature has found not statistically significant or 
small ex-post effects, that vary by subject and grade (Cowan and Goldhaber, 2016, What Works 
Clearinghouse, 2018). 
Question #2, does the ex-post effect of AEP fade-out? Tables 10.3, 10.4, I.1, and I.4 and 
Figure 10.5 show that the estimate of the full program effect increases over time, from 0.07 to 
0.10. However, the effect is not statistically significant. Then the program does not affect ex-post 
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test scores either in the following three years or in one, two or three years after that certification 
was given.  
Question #3, does each component of AEP affect ex-post teachers’ performance? In terms of 
the final outcomes, Panel A.2 of Tables 10.3, and I.1, Table I.4 and plots of Figure 10.6 show the 
effect of each component of the program on test scores. In contrast to the full program results, 
the estimate of the financial component is negative and equal to -0.021 standard deviations, 
though it becomes large and positive three years after the certification. However, the effects are 
not statistically significant. In Table10.4, Panel C.3, I present the effects for the non-financial 
component of the program, finding in general a positive but not significant effect, which 
becomes negative and non-significant three years after the reward was given. 
These results are robust to alternative specifications and the inclusion of covariates. I tried 
two different cutoffs, the first one being 0.25 points below the current cutoff and the second one 
being 0.2 above the current cutoff. Since there are more teachers bellow the actual cutoff, the 
placebo cutoff is larger for that case. To further support the validity of the results found for final 
ex-post outcomes, an additional falsification test is run where the cutoff score was changed. As 
expected, a not statistically significant effect of the false program on student achievements is 




Table 10.3. Final program effect on standardized test scores in 𝑡	 + 	𝑙. SRD estimates using 
robust bias-corrected local linear regression. 








p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 Robust 95% CI 𝑁µ N 
Panel A. Final Outcomes  
        
Panel A.1 FULL PROGRAM             
Test Score if l=1,2,3 0.084 0.086 0.216 0.218 (-0.062, 0.275) 66,779 145,247 
Test Score if l=1 0.067 0.126 0.48 0.192 (-0.158, 0.337) 23,784 54,713 
Test Score if l=2 0.097 0.138 0.395 0.2 (-0.153, 0.388) 23,057 52,139 
Test Score if l=3 0.106 0.15 0.383 0.227 (-0.163, 0.424) 17,367 38,395 
Panel A.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT 
Test Score if l=1,2,3 -0.021 0.182 0.945 0.137 (-0.37, 0.344) 17,296 51,061 
Test Score if l=1 -0.068 0.214 0.688 0.121 (-0.504, 0.333) 5,475 17,021 
Test Score if l=2 -0.108 0.233 0.712 0.115 (-0.542, 0.37) 5,242 18,958 
Test Score if l=3 0.379 0.254 0.088 0.122 (-0.064, 0.93) 4,524 15,082 
        
Panel B. Placebo cutoff value: -0.2 
       
Panel B.1 FULL PROGRAM             
Test Scores if l=1,2,3 0.002 0.166 0.913 0.062 (-0.307, 0.343) 13,696 50,452 
Panel B.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT 
Test Scores if l=1,2,3 0.243 0.256 0.235 0.030 (-0.198, 0.804) 1,495 14,335 
        
Panel C. Placebo cutoff value:  +0.25  
       
Panel C.1 FULL PROGRAM             
Test Scores if l=1,2,3 0.011 0.159 0.918 0.062 (-0.295, 0.328) 16,720 80,404 
FINANCIAL COMPONENT             
Test Scores if l=1,2,3 0.088 0.229 0.546 0.055 (-0.311, 0.588) 6,838 31,695 
Notes: (i) point estimators are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; (ii) robust p-
values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors as derived in Calonico et al. (2014) ; (iii) ℎ¹xZ	corresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b); (iv) N is total number of observations while 𝑁µ = 𝑁µQ +𝑁µR where 𝑁µR =∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& − ℎ ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r), 𝑁µQ = ∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r + ℎ); (v) standard errors (SE) are clustered at school level; 
(vi) teachers’ age is included as covariate; (vii) application year, subject and grade dummies are included; (viii) the 
observation number (N) varies for reasons such as data availability and changes in surveys; (ix) robust SE are 
estimated; (x) in Panel A each row reports coefficients from a single regression restricting the sample by the value of 
l =1, 2, 3. Then rows for test scores if l =1, 2 or 3 stand for the RD program effect on next-year, two-year-later, and 
three-year-later outcomes, respectively; (xi) test scores are normalized within each grade and year to have a mean of 
0 and a standard deviation of 1; (xii) the estimates for placebo cutoffs restrict the data to only certified teachers 
when the fake cutoff is lower than the actual cutoff (-0.2), and only non-certified teachers in the other case (+0.25). 
This aims to avoid the contamination coming from the potential significant effect of the program on test scores; and 
(xiii) column eight shows the increase rate of the confidence interval length if the program effect is estimated with 
covariates versus no covariates.  
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Table 10.4. Final program effect on standardized math test scores in 𝑡 + 𝑙. SRD estimates 
using alternative local linear regression. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RD treatment effect Robust SE Robust p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 
Panel C. Final Outcomes         
     
Panel C.1 FULL PROGRAM       
Test Score if l=1,2,3 0.082 0.076 0.28 0.218 
Test Score if l=1 0.069 0.111 0.534 0.192 
Test Score if l=2 0.082 0.118 0.486 0.2 
Test Score if l=3 0.105 0.13 0.42 0.227 
     
Panel C.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT       
Test Score if l=1,2,3 -0.021 0.157 0.896 0.137 
Test Score if l=1 -0.077 0.192 0.689 0.121 
Test Score if l=2 -0.111 0.203 0.585 0.115 
Test Score if l=3 0.363 0.224 0.105 0.122 
     
Panel C.3 NON-FINANCIAL COMPONENT     
Test Score if l=1,2,3 0.12 0.161 0.455 0.218 
Test Score if l=1 0.124 0.204 0.542 0.192 
Test Score if l=2 0.241 0.21 0.25 0.2 
Test Score if l=3 -0.067 0.224 0.764 0.227 
Notes: (i) all estimators are constructed using linear ordinary least-squares with robust standard errors (SE); (ii) h 
corresponds to the second generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b) that is recovered from the estimation of the program effect on the corresponding 
outcome using a robust bias-corrected local linear regression with triangular kernel; (iii) Robust SE clustered at 





Figure 10.5. RD plots for full program effect on test scores in 𝑡 + 	𝑙. 
 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 15 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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Figure 10.6. RD plots for financial component effect on test scores in 𝑡 + 𝑙. 
 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 15 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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Underlying mechanism and intermediate outcomes 
Tables 10.5 and 10.6 show the ex-post effect of receiving AEP on two intermediate outcomes 
(self-confidence and effort). In the case of effort, the results for two measures are presented: time 
spent for class preparation and rate of completely taught topics. 
Question #4, does AEP affect ex-post teachers’ behavior? There is no evidence of a 
significant treatment effect of AEP on teachers’ practices and self-confidence after the reward is 
given. The average self-esteem for teachers above the threshold is positive but not significantly 
different than for teachers below the threshold regardless the specification used (see Figure 10.7, 
Panel A of Tables 10.5, and I.2 and Panel A.1 of Table I.5). In addition, certified teachers do not 
significantly change the rate of topics completely taught, or the time spent preparing classes. 
Question #5, does each component of AEP affect ex-post teachers’ behavior? Panel B of 
Table 10.5 and plots in Figure 10.8 show no effect on self-confidence for the financial 
component of the program. In addition, Panel A.3 in Table 10.6 also shows no change in self-
confidence for the non-financial component. For the first measure of effort, I find a reduction of 
topics covered for the financial component of the program, and the estimate indicates that 
teachers that received the financial reward decreased the rate of topics covered by 14 percentage 
points after the reward was given, though significant at a 10% of significance level. On the other 
hand, the non-financial component tends to increase the rate of topics covered by 15 percentage 
points, also significant at a 10% of significance level. Since each component goes in a different 




When the effort is measured by class preparation, I find an increment in the probability of 
preparing classes for more than 7 hours a week, which increases almost 23 percentage points for 
teachers that received only the financial reward. This occurs only for the financial component of 
the program. No such changes are observed for preparing classes for more than 2 or 5 hours a 
week. The non-financial component of the program does not have a significant effect on effort. 
The estimate is large and negative, though not significant, for preparing classes using more than 
7 hours a week. This negative effect explains the small and not significant effect of the program. 
Table 10.5. Intermediate program effect on teachers’ behavior in 𝑡 + 𝑙. SRD estimates 
using robust bias-corrected local linear regression. 







p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 Robust 95% CI Nh N 
Behavioral Outcomes  
Panel A. FULL PROGRAM 
Well Prepared 0.052 0.05 0.347 0.234 (-0.051, 0.144) 1,717 3,477 
Topics Covered 0.004 0.056 0.89 0.169 (-0.117, 0.102) 1,233 3,485 
Class Preparation>2 0.021 0.084 0.656 0.18 (-0.128, 0.203) 807 2,147 
Class Preparation>5 0.047 0.111 0.503 0.172 (-0.143, 0.291) 774 2,147 
Class Preparation>7 0.01 0.096 0.738 0.201 (-0.156, 0.22) 888 2,147 
        
Panel B. FINANCIAL COMPONENT 
Well Prepared -0.071 0.103 0.375 0.126 (-0.293, 0.11) 369 1,229 
Topics Covered -0.145 0.092 0.08 0.138 (-0.342, 0.02) 420 1,230 
Class Preparation>2 -0.038 0.064 0.552 0.156 (-0.163, 0.087) 558 1,440 
Class Preparation>5 0.119 0.136 0.249 0.136 (-0.11, 0.425) 494 1,440 
Class Preparation>7 0.225 0.126 0.039 0.162 (0.013, 0.505) 581 1,440 
Notes: (i) point estimators are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; (ii) robust p-
values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors (SE) as derived in Calonico et al. (2014); 
(iii) h corresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b);  (iv) N is total number of observations while 𝑁µ = 𝑁µQ + 𝑁µR where 𝑁µR =∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& − ℎ ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r), 𝑁µQ = ∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r + ℎ); (v) SE are clustered at school level; (vi) no covariates 
are included; (vii) application year, subject and grade dummies are included; and (viii) the observation number (N) 
varies for several reasons. First, the variables in the table come from different datasets, which have different 
observations. Second, variables coming from the same source have a different observation number because they 
were collected with different timings. For instance, the question regarding the hours spent preparing classes was part 
of the SIMCE teacher's survey was asked in 2004, 2006 and 2010, while the question regarding topics covered was 
asked every year in the same survey. Finally (ix) robust SE are estimated. 
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Table 10.6. Intermediate program effect on teachers’ behavior in 𝑡 + 𝑙. SRD estimates 
using alternative local linear regression. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RD treatment effect Robust SE Robust p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 
Panel A. Behavioral Outcomes       
     
Panel A.1 FULL PROGRAM       
Well Prepared 0.053 0.042 0.21 0.234 
Topics Covered 0 0.047 0.997 0.169 
Class Preparation>2 0.018 0.072 0.797 0.18 
Class Preparation>5 0.049 0.094 0.603 0.172 
Class Preparation>7 0.011 0.082 0.89 0.201 
     
Panel A.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT       
Well Prepared -0.064 0.088 0.468 0.126 
Topics Covered -0.139 0.078 0.074 0.138 
Class Preparation>2 -0.037 0.055 0.5 0.156 
Class Preparation>5 0.119 0.123 0.335 0.136 
Class Preparation>7 0.225 0.111 0.044 0.162 
     
Panel A.3 NON-FINANCIAL COMPONENT     
Well Prepared 0.067 0.083 0.416 0.234 
Topics Covered 0.151 0.084 0.073 0.169 
Class Preparation>2 0.056 0.088 0.528 0.18 
Class Preparation>5 0.011 0.144 0.939 0.172 
Class Preparation>7 -0.168 0.13 0.196 0.201 
Notes: (i) all estimators are constructed using linear ordinary least-squares with robust standard errors (SE); (ii) ℎ¹xZ corresponds to the second generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b) that is recovered from the estimation of the program effect on the corresponding 
outcome using a robust bias-corrected local linear regression with triangular kernel; (iii) Robust SE clustered at 





Figure 10.7. RD plots for intermediate full program effect on teachers’ behavior in 𝑡	 + 	𝑙. 
 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 10 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 10 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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Testing the assumption of the Motivational Model.  
As explained in Section 9.1, it is also important to test if the assigned student pool changed due 
to the reward because it would affect the interpretation of the program’s effect on test scores. 
This hypothesis is tested by studying if there are differences in the following: the income 
quantile of their students, their maternal schooling, the number of books they have at home, the 
school’s SES, and the public/private status of their school. The results shown in Tables 10.7 and 
10.8 and Figures 10.9, 10.10, 10.11, and 10.12 indicate that there is no sorting after the reward 
was given. 
I also test if the pool of students assigned to the teachers changed for each component of the 
program. The results shown in Table 10.7, Panel B and Table 10.8, Panel B.3 indicate that 
teachers receiving either the full program or only the financial component are not assigned to a 
different set of students or schools compared to their non-rewarded counterparts. This evidence 
is robust the inclusion of covariates (see Tables I.3 and I.6). 
Lastly, I test if teachers moved to a different school after receiving the award. Panels A.3 and 
B.3 in Table 10.7 and Panels B.1.3 and B.3.3 in Table 10.8 indicate that teachers do not move to 





Table 10.7. Intermediate program effect on student, school, and teacher characteristics in 𝑡	 + 	𝑙. SRD estimates using robust bias-corrected local linear regression. 







p-value 𝒉	𝑴𝑺𝑬 Robust 95% CI 𝑵𝒉 N 
Alternative Mechanism 
        
Panel A. FULL PROGRAM  
Female Student 0.002 0.031 0.872 0.283 (-0.056, 0.066) 83,966 145,247 
Mother's Schooling>12 0.031 0.036 0.297 0.205 (-0.033, 0.108) 57,853 129,945 
Books at home>50 0.014 0.024 0.482 0.211 (-0.03, 0.064) 60,792 130,856 
Family Income Top 
Quintile 0.038 0.042 0.26 0.197 (-0.035, 0.131) 55,947 130,856 
        
Panel A.2 School's Characteristics 
Public School -0.059 0.085 0.526 0.221 (-0.22, 0.112) 2,059 4,298 
Low-Medium SES -0.084 0.085 0.236 0.244 (-0.268, 0.066) 2,230 4,299 
        
Panel A.3 Teacher's Characteristics  
Teacher is a school-
mover 0.009 0.06 0.836 0.227 (-0.106, 0.131) 1,476 2,951 
        
Panel B. FINANCIAL COMPONENT             
Panel B.1 Student's Characteristics 
Female 0.032 0.039 0.3 0.114 (-0.036, 0.116) 14,588 51,061 
Mother's Schooling>12 -0.057 0.073 0.354 0.13 (-0.211, 0.076) 13,457 43,760 
Books at home>50 0.004 0.034 0.998 0.127 (-0.066, 0.066) 14,145 46,030 
Family Income Top 
Quintile -0.036 0.066 0.488 0.133 (-0.175, 0.084) 15,741 46,030 
        
Panel B.2 School's Characteristics 
Public School -0.117 0.151 0.439 0.181 (-0.412, 0.179) 814 1,772 
Low-Medium SES 0.165 0.189 0.295 0.113 (-0.173, 0.569) 524 1,772 
        
Panel B.3 Teacher's Characteristics  
Teacher is a mover -0.054 0.103 0.471 0.156 (-0.276, 0.128) 540 1,360 
Notes: (i) point estimators are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; (ii) robust p-
values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors as derived in Calonico et al. (2014); (iii) ℎ	¹xZcorresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b); (iv) N is total number of observations while 𝑁µ = 𝑁µQ +𝑁µR where 𝑁µR =∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& − ℎ ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r), 𝑁µQ = ∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r + ℎ); (v) standard errors (SE) are clustered at school level; 
(vi) no covariates are included; (vii) application year, subject and grade dummies are included; and (viii) the 
observation number (N) varies for several reasons. First, the variables in the table come from different datasets, 
which have different observations. For instance, math test scores come from the SIMCE dataset, while teacher's 
characteristics come from administrative dataset. Second, variables coming from the same source have a different 
observation number because they were collected with different timings. For instance, the question regarding the 
number of hours spent preparing classes was part of the SIMCE teacher's survey was asked in 2004, 2006 and 2010, 





Table 10.8. Intermediate program effect on student, school, and teacher characteristics in 𝑡	 + 	𝑙. SRD estimates using alternative local linear regression. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RD treatment effect Robust SE Robust p-value 𝒉	𝑴𝑺𝑬 
Panel B. Alternative Mechanism       
     
Panel B.1 FULL PROGRAM       
Panel B.1.1 Student's Characteristics       
Female Student 0.002 0.026 0.95 0.283 
Mother's Schooling>12 0.028 0.029 0.337 0.205 
Books at home>50 0.013 0.021 0.535 0.211 
Family Income Top Quintile 0.035 0.035 0.323 0.197 
Panel B.1.2 School's Characteristics       
Public School -0.061 0.071 0.394 0.221 
Low-Medium SES -0.084 0.072 0.242 0.244 
Panel B.1.3 Teacher's Characteristics       
Teacher is a school-mover 0.015 0.051 0.771 0.227 
     
Panel B.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT       
Panel B.2.1 Student's Characteristics       
Female 0.03 0.034 0.37 0.114 
Mother's Schooling>12 -0.051 0.064 0.422 0.13 
Books at home>50 -0.006 0.032 0.846 0.127 
Family Income Top Quintile -0.035 0.059 0.554 0.133 
Panel B.2.2 School's Characteristics       
Public School -0.109 0.131 0.404 0.181 
Low-Medium SES 0.176 0.163 0.28 0.113 
Panel B.2.3 Teacher's Characteristics       
Teacher is a school-mover -0.051 0.088 0.563 0.156 
     
Panel B.3 NON-FINANCIAL COMPONENT     
Panel B.3.1 Student's Characteristics       
Female -0.022 0.037 0.547 0.283 
Mother's Schooling>12 0.07 0.061 0.248 0.205 
Books at home>50 0.008 0.033 0.802 0.211 
Family Income Top Quintile 0.063 0.066 0.334 0.197 
Panel B.3.2 School's Characteristics       
Public School 0.064 0.139 0.647 0.221 
Low-Medium SES -0.125 0.135 0.354 0.244 
Panel B.3.3 Teacher's Characteristics       
Teacher is a school-mover 0.06 0.09 0.508 0.227 
Notes: (i) all estimators are constructed using linear ordinary least-squares with robust standard errors (SE); (ii) 	ℎ	¹xZ corresponds to the second generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b) that is recovered from the estimation of the program effect on the corresponding 
outcome using a robust bias-corrected local linear regression with triangular kernel; (iii) Robust SE clustered at 




Figure 10.9. RD plots for full program intermediate effect on student characteristics in 𝑡	 +	𝑙. 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 10 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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Figure 10.10. RD plots for full program intermediate effect on school characteristics in 𝑡	 +	𝑙. 
 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 10 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 15 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
























Sample average within bin Polynomial fit of order 1







Sample average within bin Polynomial fit of order 1
Family Income Top Quintile
 153 
 
Figure 10.12. RD plots for intermediate effect on school characteristics in 𝑡	 + 	𝑙. Financial 
component. 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 20 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
observations to individuals with AEP scores within 0.5 points of a cutoff. 
 
Sensitivity to window length 
A sensitivity analysis of the results is performed and presented in Figures 10.13 and 10.14. I 
change the bandwidth and re-estimate the effects of the program; the figures show the p-value of 
the effect of the program of each bandwidth. Figure 10.13 suggests that the results for the full 
program are robust to the window length. There is no significant effect on final and intermediate 
behavioral ex-post outcomes, and school and student characteristics at any value of the windows 
under analysis. Only for topics covered at very small windows do. I find a significant effect of 
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effort measured by class preparation, are not statistically significant for any window analyzed. 
However, for a window between 0.15 and 0.19, there is a significant effect on the rate of topics 
completely covered by the teacher. For the remaining variables (class preparation, student 
gender, number of books at home, family income, school administration and socio-economic 
level of the school), the bandwidth choice neither affects the results nor their interpretation. 
In this research, choosing a data-driven bandwidth has provided credible support for the 
program effect for at least two reasons. First, the automatically calculated bandwidth avoids 
arbitrary selection of the window length. Second, for this research, the program effect obtained 
by choosing the data-driven bandwidth resulted in a low sensitivity to the window selection.  
Results summary 
Overall, I find that behavior and performance were not affected by the program after the reward 
was given to teachers in the first year or the following two years after the certification. The 
financial component of the program was able to affect the time spent for class preparation for 
those teachers who were already spending extensive time for class preparation. However, these 
changes did not result in higher final ex-post outcomes. This lack of statistically-significant 
results cannot be explained by changes in either the student pool assigned to certified teachers or 
the schools where they taught. Overall, certified teachers did not modify their teaching practices, 
self-confidence, or effectiveness. This is consistent with the conclusions of the qualitative study 
performed by Araya (2015), in which the teachers report that the program, on one hand, came to 
reaffirm what they already knew in terms of their capacity; and on the other hand, it did not 
make them elicit any more effort after they received the reward. They reported no increased 
effectiveness in their practices. All this did not trigger a change in their behavior or performance. 
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Taken all together, the program may have been effective in acknowledging and rewarding high-
quality math teachers, but that does not translate into increased education quality. 
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Notes: for each window, treatment effects using the robust specification with Equation 8.6 are estimated. The robust 
p-values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors as derived in Calonico et al. (2014). The 
plots graph the robust p-value recovered when testing the hypothesis of null treatment effect against the bandwidth. 
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Chapter 11 - Discussion and Conclusion 
As mentioned in previous sections, this research has been developed and conducted to bring a 
deeper analysis and understanding of the effects of a teacher’s certification program that 
operated in Chile from 2002 to 2011. I start with an explanation of the Teaching Excellence 
Award31 (AEP for its initials in Spanish), then I show mixed evidence regarding the overall 
effect of incentives to increase teacher efforts in developing and developed countries. Based on 
this literature review, I showed how the Motivational Model (MM), developed by Bénabou and 
Tirole (2005), could help us to understand the effects of a program like AEP under the specific 
assumption of ceteris paribus in terms of student and school sorting. This leads to research 
questions about the full program effect, the unbundled program effect, the underlying 
mechanism, and the fade-out process of the effects. In order to address those questions, I 
presented the methodology and empirical strategy showing my identification strategy in theory. 
After this theoretical work, I moved toward the empirical implementation of my research, 
starting with showing that the identification strategy is valid for identifying the effects of AEP on 
educational outcomes. I ran specification checks showing that a Sharp Regression Discontinuity 
(SRD) design could be used. That is, I find a discrete and deterministic change in the probability 
of receiving the incentive at a predefined cutoff point. Additionally, there is no evidence of 
manipulation of the running variable and no effect on placebo outcomes during the application 
year. I also found no evidence of sorting or attrition.  
                                               
31 Asignación de Excelencia Pedagógica 
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The first important finding involves identifying the program’s results, which were estimated 
jointly for math and language subjects. Even though the program does not work as expected for 
math and language, the reasons for this are different based on the subject. I found that rewarding 
teacher performance did not systematically change teaching practices or self-confidence or result 
in higher test scores due to the expected design of the program. Overall, when measured by test 
scores, the program was ineffective in increasing the quality of the education system. 
A second important finding of this research is related to testing the MM in the context of 
teacher incentives. Originally the MM was expected to be the main explanation for the 
program’s effect. However, I found not statistically significant support for MM. This does not 
reduce the importance of testing MM in the context of AEP. On the contrary, it is key studying 
how a program aimed at acknowledging high-performance to improve educational quality was 
not able to significantly change teachers’ behavior. Consequently, we learn that when studying 
financial and non-financial incentives, complementary theories need to be used in order to better 
understand their effects and consequences.  
A third important finding is that the non-financial and financial components of the reward do 
not consistently affect behavior, working conditions, or test scores. Though in principle I 
expected each component of the program to provide some insight on how the program might 
work, the evidence does not provide relevant information about it.    
Fourth, this research has been able to test if the effect of AEP faded out, bringing evidence 
relative to a potential fading-out of the incentive program’s effects. I found that the program had 
no significant effect after the first, second, and third year after the reward was given.  
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Fifth, I found that teachers who apply to the program are on average different than teachers 
who do not apply on several observable characteristics, this imply that the results found do not 
necessarily extrapolate to the whole teacher population.  
In terms of further research, there are several questions that need to be addressed. First, what 
is the effect of the program as measured by a teacher’s value added? It would be interesting to 
investigate the results’ robustness by using a teacher’s value added as an outcome of interest. To 
do so, another data set would be required. In this case, the value-added measure is not possible to 
estimate because there is only one observation of student achievement while the literature 
suggests having a student’s prior test scores as a control variable. Second, does the effect of AEP 
vary with teacher and school characteristics? It might be the case that the effects were 
heterogeneous by teachers’ and schools’ characteristics, such as credentials, experience, and 
school size. For example, public recognition might have a larger effect in smaller schools. In 
schools with many students and colleagues, the reward that one individual teacher receives could 
go unnoticed. In addition, another potential question is if the school’s internal culture affected 
the program’s results. For instance, principals who acknowledged the teaching merit and 
supported collaborative behavior among teachers may leverage the positive effects of the 
program in terms of improving students’ outcomes. Lastly, is there any spillover effect from 
AEP-certified teachers on their colleagues within schools? Their colleagues might benefit from 
the informational component of the certification. In this case, the signaling power of the program 
may be effective in increasing the quality of the school system. If we assume that individual 
teachers do not know how to improve their teaching performance or how much effort they 
should be using, then they might benefit from the interaction with AEP teachers in learning 
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better practices, following their model, and obtaining their advice. Importantly, this would be 
evidence of complementarities in the education production function, which brings support to 
collective incentives rather than individual ones. 
Summing up, this research makes several contributions. In more general terms, studying AEP 
has contributed to understanding how a reward might affect the educational system, with 
empirical evidence on the financial and non-financial effect; the latter incentive is rarely 
analyzed despite its potential to be a cost-effective program. Also, the duration of the effects was 
studied. Ultimately, the objective of this research was met by identifying and testing the 
underlying mechanisms of the program and then showing whether a program that rewards 
teacher merit is effective at increasing educational quality. In this context, this paper also 
contributes to public policies aimed at improving learning outcomes. Here the effect of AEP and 
its underlying mechanisms are found to have not worked as expected. In fact, the certification 
was not systematically capable of increasing teacher self-esteem or fostering educational quality. 
It also did not result in the matching of the most effective teachers to the neediest students. This 
evidence, as I said above, is informative to researchers and policymakers, opening both new 
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Appendix C - Rewards 
Figure C.1. The diploma. 
 
Note: Retrieved from 
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_KYQMVaNOfE0/SP5XBgiNY_I/AAAAAAAAU24/sieNcCh5olg/s1600-
h/Diploma+AEP+2008+-+2.jpg 
Figure C.2. The pin. 
 




Figure C.3. The pin. 
 
Note: Picture was retrieved from: http://www.educacionpaillaco.cl/noticia/2014/12/paillaco-cuenta-con-dos-nuevas-
maestras-de-maestros. 
 
Figure C.4. The pin and the diploma. 
 





Appendix D - Reward Process 
Figure D.1. The reward ceremony 
 




Figure D.2. Local award ceremonies 
 
Note: Pictures were retrieved from http://deproveducaciontalagante.blogspot.com/2013/12/27-docentes-de-las-













Appendix E - Data 
The Ministry of Education in Chile through the Statistics Department and the Center of Teaching 
Training and Improvement (CPEIP for the initials in Spanish) systematically collects the following 
datasets that are used in this research. Some of them were downloaded and others needed a special 
request to access and merge. The datasets were merged by school’s, teacher’s, and student’s id 
correspondingly. 
1. STUDENTS ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT DATASET (SIMCE DATASET). 
Database of students with their score in the national standardized test SIMCE. All students in 
either 4th, 8th, or 10th grade take the test. 
Master Key: student id (KEY) 
Secondary key: school id (RBD) 
Tertiary key: level and classroom (curso-letra) 
Reporting frequency: Annual Years: 2000-2013 
Access: Via Information Request Form 
2. AEP DATASET. Database of applicants for AEP identifies the teachers and the detailed 
results of the evaluation of the instruments. Importantly, this dataset includes the score obtained 
by the applicants. This score is a number going from 0 to 4 with two decimal numbers. 
The dataset of the application year 2005 included a scores with six decimal numbers. Due to 
estimation issues, the score for that year was truncated to be with two decimal numbers as the 
other AEP datasets. 
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Master Key: teacher id (KEY) 
Secondary key: school id (RBD) 
Reporting frequency: Annual.  
Years: 2002-2013 
Access: Direct download from website. 
3. SCHOOLS, TEACHERS, CLASSROOMS, AND SUBJECTS DATASET (STCS 
DATASET). Database of teachers working in public-funded schools identifying the school 
where they work, the classroom and subject they teach (e.g. teacher id 25, school id 123, 4th 
grade, classroom A, math). This data set is used to merge DATASETS 1 and 2. 
Master Key: teacher id (KEY) 
Secondary key: school id (RBD) 
Thirdly key: level and classroom of application (curso-letra) 
Reporting frequency: Annual.  
Years: 2004-2012 
Access: Via Information Request Form 
4. SIMCE TEACHERS SURVEY. Yearly survey given to the teachers of the students who 
take the SIMCE. The dataset includes teachers’ characteristics, teaching attitudes, students’ 
attitudes towards learning, time distribution, school working environment and resources 




Master Key: teacher id (KEY) 
Secondary key: school id (RBD) 
Tertiary key: level and classroom of application (curso-letra) 
Reporting frequency: Annual 
Years: 2002, 2009, 2010, and 2011 
Access: Via Information Request Form 
5. TEACHER CENSUS DATASET. Database of all teachers working in public-funded 
schools identifying the school where they work and their position, experience, among other 
teacher characteristics. 
Master Key: teacher id (KEY) 
Secondary key: school id (RBD) 
Reporting frequency: Annual. (d) Years: 2003-2014 
Access: Direct download from website 
6. SIMCE SCORES AT SCHOOL LEVEL (SCHOOL SIMCE DATASET). Database 
of schools with their average SIMCE and their socioeconomic group as calculated by the 
Ministry of Education. 
Master Key: school id (RBD) 
Reporting frequency: Annual (c) Years: 2000-2013 




Appendix F - Sample Statistics 
Table F.1. Statistics in t, t + 1. t + 2, and t + 3. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 AEP Applicants 
AEP Applicants 
teaching language  
AEP Applicants teaching and 
applying for language  
AEP Applicants 
teaching math  
AEP Applicants 
teaching and 
applying for math  
AEP Applicants teaching and applying for 
math or language 
Panel A. In t              
Application Year t N Teaching Year t N % N % N % N % N 
2003 935 2003          
2004 1,621 2004 855 53% 808 95% 804 50% 751 93% 1,559 
2005 1,834 2005 633 35% 580 92% 630 34% 564 90% 1,144 
2006 2,215 2006 686 31% 30 4% 648 29% 405 63% 435 
2007 1,666 2007 597 36% 528 88% 579 35% 522 90% 1,050 
2008 1,661 2008 530 32% 486 92% 496 30% 448 90% 934 
2009 1,815 2009 501 28% 456 91% 479 26% 440 92% 896 
2010 1,499 2010 467 31% 418 90% 447 30% 408 91% 826 
2011 1,316 2011 379 29% 353 93% 403 31% 380 94% 733 
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 4,648 28% 3,659 79% 4,486 27% 3,918 87% 7,577 
Panel B. In t+1                       
Application Year t N Teaching Year t+1 N % N % N % N % N 
2003 935 2004 623 67% 552 89% 610 65% 533 87% 1,085 
2004 1,621 2005 815 50% 760 93% 769 47% 712 93% 1,472 
2005 1,834 2006 592 32% 538 91% 583 32% 519 89% 1,057 
2006 2,215 2007 656 30% 36 5% 626 28% 384 61% 420 
2007 1,666 2008 555 33% 480 86% 550 33% 481 87% 961 
2008 1,661 2009 475 29% 432 91% 436 26% 401 92% 833 
2009 1,815 2010 462 25% 420 91% 441 24% 401 91% 821 
2010 1,499 2011 433 29% 383 88% 422 28% 383 91% 766 
2011 1,316 2012 345 26% 322 93% 383 29% 352 92% 674 
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 4,956 30% 3,923 79% 4,820 29% 4,166 86% 8,089 
Panel C. In t+2                       
Application Year t N Teaching Year t+2 N % N % N % N % N 
2003 935 2005 600 64% 516 86% 586 63% 503 86% 1,019 
2004 1,621 2006 758 47% 708 93% 710 44% 652 92% 1,360 
2005 1,834 2007 576 31% 508 88% 547 30% 473 86% 981 
2006 2,215 2008 582 26% 24 4% 562 25% 332 59% 356 
2007 1,666 2009 516 31% 445 86% 496 30% 432 87% 877 
2008 1,661 2010 454 27% 409 90% 421 25% 379 90% 788 
2009 1,815 2011 440 24% 395 90% 430 24% 385 90% 780 
2010 1,499 2012 395 26% 352 89% 402 27% 359 89% 711 
2011 1,316 2013          
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 4,321 26% 3,357 78% 4,154 25% 3,515 85% 6,872 
Panel D. In t+3                       
Application Year t N Teaching Year t+3 N % N % N % N % N 
2003 935 2006 568 61% 496 87% 549 59% 473 86% 969 
2004 1,621 2007 711 44% 664 93% 663 41% 611 92% 1,275 
2005 1,834 2008 515 28% 456 89% 500 27% 430 86% 886 
2006 2,215 2009 568 26% 26 5% 519 23% 304 59% 330 
2007 1,666 2010 483 29% 412 85% 475 29% 410 86% 822 
2008 1,661 2011 424 26% 376 89% 404 24% 359 89% 735 
2009 1,815 2012 411 23% 358 87% 393 22% 353 90% 711 
2010 1,499 2013          
2011 1,316 2014          
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 3,680 22% 2,788 76% 3,503 21% 2,940 84% 5,728 
Panel E. In t+1, t+2, t+3                   
Application Year t N Year t+1/t+2/t+3 N % N % N % N % N 
2003 935 2003/2004/2005 1791 192% 1564 87% 1745 187% 1509 86% 3,073 
2004 1,621 2004/2005/2006 2284 141% 2132 93% 2142 132% 1975 92% 4,107 
2005 1,834 2005/2006/2007 1683 92% 1502 89% 1630 89% 1422 87% 2,924 
2006 2,215 2006/2006/2008 1806 82% 86 5% 1707 77% 1020 60% 1,106 
2007 1,666 2007/2008/2009 1554 93% 1337 86% 1521 91% 1323 87% 2,660 
2008 1,661 2008/2009/2010 1353 81% 1217 90% 1261 76% 1139 90% 2,356 
2009 1,815 2009/2010/2011 1313 72% 1173 89% 1264 70% 1139 90% 2,312 
2010 1,499 2010/2011/2012 828  735  824  742  1,477 
2011 1,316 2011/2012/2013 345  322  383  352  674 
TOTAL 16,468 TOTAL 12,957 79% 10,068 78% 12,477 76% 10,621 85% 20,689 
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Appendix G - Robustness Exercise. Covariate-adjusted Sharp Regression 
Discontinuity Estimates for Specification Checks. 
Table G.1: Specification checks for teacher’s, student’s and school’s characteristics in t. 
Covariate-adjusted SRD estimates using robust bias-corrected local linear regression. 
Notes: (i) point estimators are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; (ii) robust p-
values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors as derived in Calonico et al. (2014); (iii) ℎ¹xZ corresponds to the-second generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b); (iv) N is total number of observations while 𝑁µ = 𝑁µQ +𝑁µR where 𝑁µR =∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& − ℎ ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r), 𝑁µQ = ∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r + ℎ); (v) standard errors (SE) are clustered at school level; 
(vi) teachers’ age is included as covariate. Except in the case of age variable; (vii) application year, subject and 
grade dummies are included; (viii) the observation number (N) varies for several reasons. First, the variables in the 
table come from different datasets, which have different observations. For instance, test scores come from the 
SIMCE dataset, while teacher’s characteristics come from administrative dataset. Second, variables coming from the 
same source have a different observation number because they were collected with different timings. For instance, 
the question regarding the number of hours spent preparing classes was part of the SIMCE teacher’s survey in 2004, 
2006 and 2010, while the question regarding topics covered was asked every year in the same survey; (ix) robust SE 
are estimated; and (x) column eight shows the increase rate of the confidence interval length if the program effect is 
estimated with and without covariates.  







p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 Robust 95% CI 𝑵𝒉 N CI Length liff. w/ and w/o covs. 
Panel A. Balance Variables 
Panel A.1 Teachers' characteristics 
Experience -0.823 1.069 0.313 0.168 (-3.173, 1.017) 713 1,754 -55.2% 
Female -0.206 0.105 0.02 0.094 (-0.45, -0.039) 411 1,756 -0.2% 
Age 0.502 2.38 0.828 0.149 (-4.147, 5.183) 624 1,756 0.3% 
Spec. Degree 0.055 0.049 0.278 0.167 (-0.043, 0.149) 714 1,756 1.6% 
Tenure 0.06 0.115 0.518 0.130 (-0.151, 0.299) 531 1,756 -1.7% 
Metro. Region 0.077 0.099 0.409 0.179 (-0.112, 0.275) 750 1,756 1.8% 
Rural -0.006 0.077 0.989 0.2 (-0.151, 0.149) 865 1,756 -4.8% 
# Schools by Teacher 0.042 0.059 0.449 0.18 (-0.071, 0.16) 750 1,756 -3.3% 
# Classrooms by 
Teacher 0.132 0.438 0.996 0.155 (-0.857, 0.862) 677 1,756 1.4% 
Teacher is a mover -0.048 0.078 0.459 0.16 (-0.21, 0.095) 604 1,522 2.3% 
Teacher is a leaver 0 0.028 0.832 0.178 (-0.05, 0.062) 671 1,522 3.7% 
Panel A.2 Student's Characteristics 
Female 0.045 0.056 0.421 0.14 (-0.065, 0.156) 21,550 64,477 0.9% 
Mother's Schooling>12 0.037 0.044 0.284 0.139 (-0.039, 0.134) 18,869 56,749 2.4% 
Books at home>50 0.03 0.03 0.255 0.18 (-0.025, 0.093) 24,999 58,152 0.9% 
Family Income Top 
Quintile 0.048 0.047 0.205 0.145 (-0.033, 0.152) 1,026 58,152 0.5% 
Panel A.3 School's Characteristics 
Public School -0.042 0.097 0.607 0.211 (-0.241, 0.141) 1142 2,244 -12.8% 
Low-Medium SES -0.029 0.122 0.899 0.152 (-0.255, 0.223) 869 2,244 1.1% 
Panel B. Falsification Variables 
Topics Covered 0.014 0.062 0.989 0.17 (-0.12, 0.122) 792 1,807 -6.2% 
Well Prepared 0.092 0.092 0.347 0.137 (-0.094, 0.266) 610 1,799 9.1% 
Class Preparation>5 0.158 0.101 0.051 0.116 (-0.001, 0.394) 470 1,599 -0.5% 
Test Score 0.038 0.122 0.658 0.172 (-0.185, 0.292) 27,795 64,477 0.0% 
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Table G.2: Attrition Test. 
Notes: (i) the reported RD treatment effects are estimated from a local linear regression between the probability of 
finding a SIMCE test scores in years t + 1, t + 2 or t + 3 for a teacher who teaches math/language in those years and 
apply for math/language certification in t and the distance to the cutoff; (ii) the reported coefficient is estimated with 
a single regression between the AEP score (𝑆r) and dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the math/language 
teacher was assigned to a classroom that takes the math/reading SIMCE test in in years t + 1, t + 2 or t + 3, if 𝑆r ≤𝑆| < 𝑆r + ℎ¹xZ(certified teachers within the MSE bandwidth estimated above) and 𝑆r − ℎ¹xZ 	≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r  (non-
certified teachers within the MSE bandwidth); (iii) teachers’ age is included as covariate; (iv) application year, 
subject and grade dummies are included; (v) standard errors (SE) are clustered at school level; (vi) robust SE are 
estimated; (vii) point estimators are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; (viii) 
robust p-values are constructed using bias correction with robust standard errors as derived in Calonico et al. (2014); 
(ix) ℎ¹xZ	  corresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico 












p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 Robust 95% CI 𝑵𝒉 N 
Panel A. Dependent Variables        
        
Probability of being assigned 
to a classroom that takes 
SIMCE in  (𝑡 + 𝑙) with l=1,2,3 -0.04 0.043 0.317 0.203 (-0.126, 0.041) 3,311 7,478 
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Appendix H - Graphical Analysis. Regression Discontinuity Plots. Specification 
Checks. 
H.1. Balance Checks.   
Figure H.1. RD plots for specification checks for teacher characteristics in t. Part I. 
 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 25 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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Figure H.2. RD plots for specification checks for teacher characteristics in t. Part II. 
 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 15 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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Figure H.3. RD plots for specification checks for student characteristics in t. 
 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 15 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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Figure H.4. RD plots for specification checks for school characteristics in t. 
 
 
Notes: (i) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 15 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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H.2. Falsification Tests 
Figure H.5. RD plots for specification checks. Falsification variables in t. 
 
 
Notes: (I) data-driven RD plots using evenly spaced 15 bins on each side of the cutoff; (ii) solid lines depict linear 
polynomial fits using control and treated units separately; (iii) dots depict sample average of outcome variable 
within each bin; and (iv) all panels are based on administrative data for the 2003-2011 applicant cohorts and restrict 
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Appendix I - Robustness Exercise. Sharp Regression Discontinuity (SRD) Estimates 
for Outcome Variable Analysis.  
I.1. SRD estimates using the robust specification and covariates  
Table I.1. Final program effect on standardized test scores in 𝑡 + 𝑙. Covariate-adjusted 
SRD estimates using robust bias-corrected local linear regression with covariate. 







p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 Robust 95% CI 𝑵𝒉 N CI length diff. w/ and w/o covs. 
Panel A. Final 
Outcomes                 
          
Panel A.1 FULL PROGRAM 
Test Score if l=1,2,3 0.095 0.09 0.192 0.202 (-0.059, 0.294) 63,916 145,211 4.7% 
Test Score if l=1 0.07 0.129 0.495 0.182 (-0.165, 0.341) 22,845 54,713 2.2% 
Test Score if l=2 0.086 0.137 0.45 0.208 (-0.165, 0.372) 23,057 52,103 -0.7% 
Test Score if l=3 0.112 0.152 0.368 0.224 (-0.161, 0.434) 17,367 38,395 1.4% 
Panel A.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT 
Test Score if l=1,2,3 -0.022 0.185 0.908 0.132 (-0.384, 0.341) 17,230 50,921 1.5% 
Test Score if l=1 -0.088 0.21 0.569 0.128 (-0.531, 0.292) 5,463 16,935 -1.7% 
Test Score if l=2 -0.158 0.238 0.542 0.105 (-0.611, 0.321) 4,778 18,904 2.2% 
Test Score if l=3 0.342 0.242 0.111 0.131 (-0.089, 0.858) 5,139 15,082 -4.7% 
         
Panel B. Placebo cutoff values: -0.2 
Panel B.1 FULL PROGRAM  
Test Scores if l=1,2,3 0.017 0.176 0.843 0.056 (-0.31, 0.38) 11,452 50,418 6.2% 
Panel B.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT 
Test Scores if l=1,2,3 0.186 0.214 0.263 0.031 (-0.18, 0.658) 1,922 14,325 -16.4% 
         
Panel C. Placebo cutoff value:  +0.25 
Panel C.1 FULL PROGRAM 
Test Scores if l=1,2,3 0.005 0.158 0.945 0.062 (-0.298, 0.32) 16,720 80,404 -0.8% 
Panel C.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT 
Test Scores if l=1,2,3 0.137 0.233 0.409 0.053 (-0.265, 0.65) 11,452 50,418 1.8% 
Notes: (i) point estimators are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; (ii) robust p-
values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors as derived in Calonico et al. (2014) ; (iii) ℎ¹xZ	corresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b); (iv) N is total number of observations while 𝑁µ = 𝑁µQ +𝑁µR where 𝑁µR =∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& − ℎ ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r), 𝑁µQ = ∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r + ℎ); (v) robust standard errors (SE) are clustered at school 
level; (vi) teachers’ age is included as covariate; (vii) application year, subject and grade dummies are included; 
(viii) the observation number (N) varies for reasons such as data availability and changes in surveys; (ix) in Panel A 
each row reports coefficients from a single regression restricting the sample by the value of l =1, 2, 3. Then rows for 
test scores if l =1, 2 or 3 stand for the RD program effect on next-year, two-year-later, and three-year-later 
outcomes, respectively; (x) test scores are normalized within each grade and year to have a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1; (xi) the estimates for placebo cutoffs restrict the data to only certified teachers when the fake cutoff is 
lower than the actual cutoff (-0.2), and only non-certified teachers in the other case (+0.25); and (xii) column eight 




Table I.2. Intermediate program effect on math teachers’ behavior in 𝑡	 + 	𝑙. Covariate-
adjusted SRD estimates using robust bias-corrected local linear regression. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)            
CI length 
diff. w/ and 







p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 Robust 95% CI 𝑵𝒉 N 
Behavioral Outcomes                 
         
Panel A. FULL PROGRAM  
Well Prepared 0.047 0.05 0.43 0.227 (-0.059, 0.138) 1,647 3,477 1.0% 
Topics Covered 0.021 0.054 0.822 0.18 (-0.093, 0.118) 1,378 3,485 -3.7% 
Class Preparation>2 0.013 0.084 0.741 0.182 (-0.137, 0.193) 807 2,147 -0.3% 
Class Preparation>5 0.048 0.111 0.502 0.172 (-0.143, 0.291) 774 2,147 0.0% 
Class Preparation>7 0.015 0.096 0.696 0.199 (-0.151, 0.225) 848 2,147 0.0% 
         
Panel B. FINANCIAL COMPONENT 
Well Prepared -0.074 0.103 0.356 0.126 (-0.297, 0.107) 369 1,225 0.2% 
Topics Covered -0.154 0.093 0.059 0.138 (-0.358, 0.007) 420 1,226 0.8% 
Class Preparation>2 -0.041 0.066 0.534 0.146 (-0.171, 0.089) 513 1,433 4.0% 
Class Preparation>5 0.132 0.14 0.214 0.127 (-0.1, 0.448) 444 1,433 2.4% 
Class Preparation>7 0.221 0.124 0.041 0.163 (0.01, 0.497) 578 1,433 -1.0% 
Notes: (i) point estimators are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; (ii) robust p-
values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors as derived in Calonico et al. (2014) ; (iii) ℎ¹xZ corresponds to the-second generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b); (iv) N is total number of observations while 𝑁µ = 𝑁µQ +𝑁µR where 𝑁µR =∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& − ℎ ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r), 𝑁µQ = ∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r + ℎ); (v) standard errors (SE) are clustered at school level; 
(vi) teachers’ age is included as covariate; (vii) application year, subject and grade dummies are included; and (viii) 
the observation number (N) varies for several reasons. First, the variables in the table come from different datasets, 
which have different observations. For instance, test scores come from the SIMCE dataset, while teacher’s 
characteristics come from administrative dataset. Second, variables coming from the same source have a different 
observation number because they were collected with different timings. For instance, the question regarding the 
number of hours spent preparing classes was part of the SIMCE teacher’s survey in 2004, 2006 and 2010, while the 
question regarding topics covered was asked every year in the same survey. (vii) Robust SE are estimated; and (ix) 
column eight shows the increase rate of the confidence interval length if the program effect is estimated with 





Table I.3. Intermediate program effect on student and school characteristics in 𝑡 + 𝑙. 
Covariate-adjusted SRD estimates using robust bias-corrected local linear regression. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
        
CI length 
diff. w/ and 







p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 Robust 95% CI 𝑵𝒉 N 
Alternative Mechanism                 
          
Panel A. FULL PROGRAM 
        
Panel A.1 Student's Characteristics               
Female Student 0.002 0.03 0.89 0.294 (-0.056, 0.064) 85,791 145,211 -1.6% 
Mother's Schooling>12 0.032 0.034 0.279 0.203 (-0.03, 0.103) 57,853 129,911 -5.7% 
Books at home>50 0.014 0.024 0.488 0.213 (-0.03, 0.064) 60,792 130,822 0.0% 
Family Income Top Quintile 0.039 0.041 0.246 0.199 (-0.033, 0.127) 55,947 130,822 -3.6% 
        
Panel A.2 School's Characteristics              
Public School -0.088 0.08 0.276 0.236 (-0.244, 0.07) 2,143 4,298 -5.4% 
Low-Medium SES -0.091 0.083 0.184 0.253 (-0.271, 0.052) 2,302 4,299 -3.3% 
 
Panel A.3 Teacher's Characteristics 
Teacher is a school-mover 0.02 0.061 0.712 0.208 (-0.098, 0.143) 1,353 2,951 1.7% 
 
Panel B. FINANCIAL COMPONENT 
        
Panel B.1 Student's Characteristics               
Female 0.031 0.039 0.319 0.117 (-0.037, 0.115) 14,522 50,921 0.0% 
Mother's Schooling>12 -0.076 0.077 0.233 0.127 (-0.242, 0.059) 13,407 43,638 4.9% 
Books at home>50 -0.004 0.033 0.754 0.133 (-0.076, 0.055) 15,682 45,899 -0.8% 
Family Income Top Quintile -0.051 0.068 0.335 0.132 (-0.2, 0.068) 15,682 45,899 3.5% 
 
Panel B.2 School's Characteristics 
Public School -0.109 0.147 0.477 0.174 (-0.392, 0.183) 2,143 4,298 -2.7% 
Low-Medium SES 0.182 0.202 0.276 0.108 (-0.175, 0.615) 2,302 4,299 6.5% 
  
Panel B.3 Teacher's Characteristics   
Teacher is a school-mover -0.052 0.103 0.496 0.157 (0, -0.273) 538 1354 0.2% 
Notes: (i) point estimators are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; (ii) robust p-
values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors as derived in Calonico et al. (2014) ; (iii) ℎ¹xZ	corresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b); (iv) N is total number of observations while 𝑁µ = 𝑁µQ +𝑁µR where 𝑁µR =∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& − ℎ ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r), 𝑁µQ = ∑ 1(𝑆r·¡¸& ≤ 𝑆| < 𝑆r + ℎ);;(v) standard errors (SE) are clustered at school level; 
(vi) teachers’ age is included as covariate; (vii) application year, subject and grade dummies are included; (viii) the 
observation number (N) varies for reasons such as data availability and changes in surveys; (ix) robust SE are 
estimated; and (x) column eight shows the increase rate of the confidence interval length if the program effect is 




I.2 SRD estimates using alternative specification with covariate  
Table I.4. Final program effect on standardized test scores in 𝑡 + 𝑙. Parametric RD method. 
Covariate-adjusted SRD estimates using alternative local linear regression. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RD treatment effect Robust SE Robust p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 
Panel C. Final Outcomes     
     
Panel C.1 FULL PROGRAM 
Test Score if l=1,2,3 0.09 0.079 0.256 0.202 
Test Score if l=1 0.066 0.114 0.561 0.182 
Test Score if l=2 0.077 0.115 0.503 0.208 
Test Score if l=3 0.111 0.132 0.4 0.224 
     
Panel C.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT 
Test Score if l=1,2,3 -0.026 0.158 0.871 0.132 
Test Score if l=1 -0.094 0.191 0.624 0.128 
Test Score if l=2 -0.156 0.204 0.447 0.105 
Test Score if l=3 0.296 0.215 0.17 0.131 
     
Panel C.3 NON-FINANCIAL COMPONENT 
Test Score if l=1,2,3 0.124 0.158 0.436 0.202 
Test Score if l=1 0.131 0.207 0.528 0.182 
Test Score if l=2 0.238 0.203 0.242 0.208 
Test Score if l=3 -0.08 0.219 0.717 0.224 
Notes: (i) all estimators are constructed using linear ordinary least-squares with robust standard errors (SE); (ii) ℎ¹xZ corresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b) that is recovered from the estimation of the program effect on the corresponding 
outcome using a robust bias-corrected local linear regression with triangular kernel; (iii) robust SE are clustered at 








Table I.5. Intermediate program effect on teachers’ behavior in 𝑡 + 𝑙. Covariate-adjusted 
SRD estimates using alternative local linear regression. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RD treatment effect SE p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 
Panel A. Behavioral Outcomes         
     
Panel A.1 FULL PROGRAM         
Well Prepared 0.048 0.044 0.272 0.227 
Topics Covered 0.019 0.045 0.674 0.18 
Class Preparation>2 0.01 0.073 0.89 0.182 
Class Preparation>5 0.049 0.096 0.607 0.172 
Class Preparation>7 0.016 0.082 0.843 0.199 
     
Panel A.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT     
Well Prepared -0.065 0.088 0.459 0.126 
Topics Covered -0.145 0.079 0.066 0.138 
Class Preparation>2 -0.04 0.057 0.482 0.146 
Class Preparation>5 0.132 0.126 0.296 0.127 
Class Preparation>7 0.22 0.111 0.047 0.163 
     
Panel A.3 NON-FINANCIAL COMPONENT     
Well Prepared 0.065 0.084 0.442 0.227 
Topics Covered 0.167 0.082 0.042 0.18 
Class Preparation>2 0.051 0.09 0.573 0.182 
Class Preparation>5 0.014 0.144 0.923 0.172 
Class Preparation>7 -0.162 0.13 0.214 0.199 
Notes: (i) all estimators are constructed using linear ordinary least-squares with robust standard errors (SE); (ii) ℎ¹xZ corresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b) that is recovered from the estimation of the program effect on the corresponding 
outcome using a robust bias-corrected local linear regression with triangular kernel; (iii) robust SE are clustered at 






Table I.6. Intermediate student, school and teacher characteristics in 𝑡	 + 	𝑙. Covariate-
adjusted SRD estimates using alternative local linear regression. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RD treatment effect Robust SE Robust p-value 𝒉𝑴𝑺𝑬 
Panel B. Alternative Mechanism     
     
Panel B.1 FULL PROGRAM     
Panel B.1.1 Student's Characteristics     
Female Student 0.001 0.026 0.966 0.294 
Mother's Schooling>12 0.031 0.029 0.289 0.203 
Books at home>50 0.013 0.021 0.52 0.213 
Family Income Top Quintile 0.038 0.036 0.282 0.199 
     
Panel B.1.2 School's Characteristics     
Public School -0.091 0.066 0.169 0.236 
Low-Medium SES -0.093 0.07 0.189 0.253 
     
Panel B.1.3 Teacher's Characteristics     
Teacher is a mover 0.021 0.052 0.689 0.208 
     
Panel B.2 FINANCIAL COMPONENT     
Panel B.2.1 Student's Characteristics     
Female 0.027 0.034 0.423 0.117 
Mother's Schooling>12 -0.066 0.063 0.295 0.127 
Books at home>50 -0.011 0.031 0.728 0.133 
Family Income Top Quintile -0.049 0.057 0.396 0.132 
     
Panel B.2.2 School's Characteristics     
Public School -0.105 0.124 0.398 0.174 
Low-Medium SES 0.194 0.173 0.263 0.108 
     
Panel B.2.3 Teacher's Characteristics     
Teacher is a mover -0.051 0.088 0.56 0.157 
     
Panel B.3 NON-FINANCIAL COMPONENT    
Panel B.3.1 Student's Characteristics     
Female -0.026 0.036 0.48 0.294 
Mother's Schooling>12 0.074 0.059 0.212 0.203 
Books at home>50 0.009 0.033 0.795 0.213 
Family Income Top Quintile 0.067 0.063 0.29 0.199 
     
Panel B.3.2 School's Characteristics     
Public School 0.033 0.124 0.792 0.236 
Low-Medium SES -0.128 0.132 0.334 0.253 
     
Panel B.3.3 Teacher's Characteristics     
Teacher is a mover 0.072 0.093 0.44 0.208 
Notes: (i) all estimators are constructed using linear ordinary least-squares with robust standard errors (SE); (ii) 	ℎ¹xZ corresponds to the second-generation data-driven MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed in Calonico et al. 
(2014) and Calonico et al. (2016b) that is recovered from the estimation of the program effect on the corresponding 
outcome using a robust bias-corrected local linear regression with triangular kernel; (iii) robust SE are clustered at 
school level; (iv) teachers’ age is included as covariate; and (vi) application year, subject and grade dummies are 
included. 
